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INTERNATIONAL CIVIL INDIVIDUAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE SECURITY 




Existing literature and jurisprudence pay little attention to individual re-
sponsibility in international law beyond criminal liability. This is partly due 
to the fact that, traditionally, international individual responsibility has pre-
dominantly been associated with criminal liability as opposed to focusing 
on civil responsibility for wrongdoing. Consequently, the resulting distinc-
tion between “individual” and “criminal” responsibility signals that the for-
mer concept “concerns a target of responsibility” whereas the latter concept
“addresses the nature of the responsibility.”1 However, there is no compel-
ling reason why the discourse of international individual responsibility can-
not be transposed away from the criminal paradigm2 to the civil dimension, 
presumably with requisite adjustments.
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1. STEVEN R. RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 15 (3d ed. 2009).
2. See Chimene I. Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 837, 845 (2011); André Nollkaemper, Concurrence Between Individual Re-
sponsibility and State Responsibility in International Law, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 615, 618 
n.14 (2003).
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This Article focuses on a few tools at the disposal of the United Nations 
Security Council (“UNSC”) to enhance individual (read: civil) responsibility 
concerning nonstate terrorist actors with a view to opening other avenues of 
inquiry regarding other subversive nonstate actors (“NSAs”), for instance in 
the areas of transnational torts, human rights (“HR”) violations, and envi-
ronmental damage caused by business entities.3 As discussed in Part V, re-
cent developments surrounding the application of the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(“ATCA”)4 in the United States and the prospect of establishing a basis for 
universal civil jurisdiction further signal that no such solid basis exists in 
customary international law (or treaty law, for that matter) to hold corpora-
tions and individuals accountable for HR abuses, in large part because states 
are not willing to accept it. Therefore, these developments have created im-
plementation and enforcement gaps in different areas related to civil recov-
ery for violations of international law, of which terrorism-related wrongs 
form an important part.
Arguably, these developments have also engendered normative gaps 
given that both the relevant primary and secondary norms are not always 
clearly defined. In addressing these regulatory and enforcement gaps, I ad-
vocate turning to international institutions, particularly the UNSC, which 
can play an important role in advancing or implementing individual respon-
sibility in some circumstances. While acknowledging the relevance of other 
domestic and transnational legal regimes geared toward the implementation 
of civil liability (however limited), this Article’s overarching purpose is to 
explore ways in which NSAs’ wrongful acts can be attributed to them and 
their international civil individual responsibility (“ICIR”) invoked strictly on 
the international plane, with a focus on the UNSC’s role in this framework.
While the other dimensions of this broader framework (for example, re-
gional HR tribunals, domestic legislation and courts, and transnational legal 
regimes) remain important, this account focuses primarily on the interna-
3. Nonstate actors’ (“NSAs”) would-be civil liability in no way absolves states of 
their own potential international responsibility in the chain of wrongdoing since, if such a sce-
nario were permitted, injured parties might be stripped of meaningful access to a remedy for 
international law violations. See CHRISTINE EVANS, THE RIGHT TO REPARATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT 236 (2012); ANNE PETERS, 
BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
165–66 (Jonathan Huston trans., 2016). For a more cynical view on imposing direct interna-
tional responsibility on nonstate business enterprises, both in the HR and environmental 
fields, see André Nollkaemper, Responsibility of Transnational Corporations in International 
Environmental Law: Three Perspectives, in MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 179, 191–99 (Gerd Winter ed., 2006).
4. The Alien Tort Claims Act’s (“ATCA”) relevant provision provides that “[t]he dis-
trict courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, com-
mitted in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Alien Tort Claims 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). For a seminal case that launched contemporary U.S. HR litiga-
tion, see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1980) (equating customary 
international law with federal common law and recognizing a valid grant of federal jurisdic-
tion over a suit between foreigners under ATCA).
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tional legal framework. That said, these other dimensions will need to be 
addressed in a broader inquiry about the contents and contours of ICIR, be it 
in future scholarly projects or policy-based studies.5 By way of example, 
certain international instruments delegate an obligation upon municipal le-
gal systems to ensure civil liability for individuals’ violations of internation-
al law, including UN peacekeepers for sexual exploitation.6 Therefore, such 
accountability models are grounded on the notion of holding individuals to 
account through their home states.7 The UNSC has also emphasized the im-
portance that “all troop- and police-contributing countries . . . take appropri-
ate steps to hold accountable those personnel responsible for sexual exploi-
tation and abuse and to report to the United Nations fully and promptly on 
actions undertaken . . . .”8
5. For instance, “[n]ational civil or administrative courts may create a corpus of case 
law on international responsibility, i.e., on the direct secondary international obligations of 
natural and legal persons.” PETERS, supra note 3, at 163. A byproduct of this approach, either 
expressly or implicitly, is to provide further contour and content to relevant international pri-
mary obligations (and secondary obligations) of NSAs and individuals. In turn, this instills the 
relevant norms with a certain degree of foreseeability, making them known to potentially lia-
ble parties, thereby upholding the principle of legality. Moreover, domestic courts and their 
judgments remain significant drivers of enforcement of those would-be obligations. See id. at 
163–64. 
6. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2272, ¶¶ 8–9, 11 (Mar. 11, 2016); G.A. Res. 71/278, ¶¶ 3–4
(Mar. 20, 2017); see also Standards of Conduct, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/standards-of-conduct (last visited Mar. 16, 2019) (emphasizing 
the importance of addressing misconduct and stating that “[t]he disciplinary sanctions and any 
other judicial actions remain the responsibility of the national jurisdiction of the individual 
involved.”); Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organi-
zations, U.N. Doc. A/66/10/Add.1, at 56–57, art. 7, cmt., ¶¶ 1, 7 (2011). 
7. See, e.g., Richard J. Wilson & Emily Singer Hurvitz, Human Rights Violations by 
Peacekeeping Forces in Somalia, 21 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 2 (2014); Lauren Gabrielle Blau, Note, 
Victimizing Those They Were Sent to Protect: Enhancing Accountability for Children Born of 
Sexual Abuse and Exploitation by UN Peacekeepers, 44 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 121 
(2016). See generally RÓISÍN SARAH BURKE, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE BY UN
MILITARY CONTINGENTS (2014).
8. S.C. Res. 2272, supra note 6, ¶ 11; see also id., at pmbl. See generally JEREMY 
FARRALL ET AL., STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL: POLICY PROPOSALS 23–24 (2016). Nevertheless, the academic and poli-
cy debate has centered considerably on perceived impunity and enforcement gaps in holding 
both troop-contributing states and the UN accountable for peacekeepers’ violations of interna-
tional law. Reform proposals have been articulated, inter alia, around the potential removal of 
immunity before domestic courts, greater involvement of those courts in sanctioning unlawful 
behavior, the prospect of shared responsibility between wrongdoing entities, and instituting 
international bodies to handle such matters. See, e.g., Simone F. van den Driest, Tracing the 
Human Rights Obligations of UN Peacekeeping Operations, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: CREATION, EVOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT 179 (James 
Summers & Alex Gough eds., 2018); Kristen E. Boon, The United Nations as Good Samari-
tan: Immunity and Responsibility, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 341 (2016); Andrew Ladley, Peacekeep-
er Abuse, Immunity and Impunity: The Need for Effective Criminal and Civil Accountability 
on International Peace Operations, 1 POL. & ETHICS REV. 81 (2005).
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Under the heading of ICIR, I intend to capture any conduct carried out 
by NSAs or individuals that violates international law—using anti-terrorism 
obligations as the principal but not exclusive case study—to identify appli-
cable secondary norms of liability and legal consequences flowing from 
such breaches outside the criminal paradigm. Indeed, international law has 
long recognized that the commission of an internationally wrongful act trig-
gers the wrongdoing party’s international responsibility and corresponding 
duty to repair the harm. While this classical doctrine was traditionally ap-
plied to sovereign states, I argue that it is valid to extend it to NSAs and in-
dividuals through ICIR, both on descriptive and prescriptive grounds. In 
some ways, therefore, this account attempts to reclaim the doctrine of inter-
national responsibility back from the fragmentation of international legal 
personality. In other words, international lawyers tend to fragment the legal 
personality of nonstate entities and individuals depending on what type of 
legal person they are dealing with, presumably to determine the scope and 
extent of that person’s rights and obligations.
In contrast, this Article argues that it is important to conceive of the me-
ta-category of “nonstate actors” more broadly before nose-diving into more 
discrete aspects of the overarching problem. Thus, in this Article, I use the 
term “individual responsibility” in international law as a default category to 
capture responsibility concerning all manner of NSAs (for example, armed 
opposition groups, terrorist networks, and corporations) and individuals (for 
example, individual terrorists, State officials, and leaders of armed groups). 
As a corollary, I also use the term “nonstate actors” as a default category to 
encompass all these actors and others that could fall under this rubric. Oth-
erwise put, it would be methodologically imprudent to focus solely on indi-
viduals (that is, natural persons) or nonstate entities (that is, legal persons) 
in the analysis, as the elucidation of ICIR requires acknowledging that both 
categories are intertwined. This is especially true when considering how the 
law of state responsibility (“SR”) has been artificially stretched to address 
the subversive acts of nonstate groups.9
The contents and contours of the obligations of NSAs and individuals, 
both primary and secondary, need greater clarity in certain areas. This ac-
count attempts to address this normative dearth. Moreover, it may well be 
that a single factual complex leads to a concurrence between individual 
criminal liability and individual civil liability, another important feature of a 
would-be ICIR regime this Article acknowledges. In focusing primarily on 
the civil dimensions of international wrongdoing, this account not only at-
9. In the context of use of force by NSAs, consider Vladyslav Lanovoy, The Use of 
Force by Non-State Actors and the Limits of Attribution of Conduct, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 563
(2017) (highlighting the challenges in applying classic state responsibility (“SR”) norms to the 
subversive conduct of NSAs and advocating a complicity-based model). On a different note, 
see Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 96 AM. J.
INT’L L. 798, 815–16 (2002) (arguing that the extant, codified law of SR is insufficiently for-
ward-looking since it fails to expressly empower NSAs to invoke states’ international respon-
sibility).
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tempts to address the abovementioned normative and enforcement voids, 
but also to advance the discourse on the legal consequences flowing from 
ICIR. At the core, holding an individual or other NSA internationally liable 
in civil terms is primarily about generating declarations of illegality and 
strengthening the narrative against impunity. In developing its sanctions re-
gime, the UNSC has been clear that its aim is preventive rather than puni-
tive. The would-be ICIR regime advocated herein not only aligns with this 
overarching objective but also proves compatible—and complementary in a 
meaningful manner—with that general sanctions regime. With this in mind, 
this account strives to contribute a new perspective to the Kadi-related liter-
ature.
My objective is also to move the debate beyond these obvious points 
toward a more robust remedial model, envisaging a general ICIR regime in 
which compensation is an available remedy along with other measures. In 
so doing, three central arguments run through the Article to support the 
elaboration of an ICIR regime, at times mutually reinforcing each other. 
First, the principled argument suggests that we may extrapolate from exist-
ing doctrine, particularly SR law and the broader framework and language 
of international responsibility, to inform and shape a general ICIR regime. 
Second, the precedent argument implies that, since the UNSC interprets its 
powers very broadly and imposes several measures reconcilable with the 
essence of the international responsibility framework, it could move into a 
quasi-legislative and implementation space where it regulates and sanctions 
the unlawful conduct of NSAs more squarely. In fact, it has already done so 
very plainly with respect to regulation and at times less clearly with respect 
to implementation of individual responsibility. Finally, the pragmatic policy 
argument signals that the international community must take effective 
measures against subversive individuals and NSAs (for example, terrorist 
groups, guerrilla leaders, and irresponsible corporations), especially given 
the regulatory and enforcement gaps identified above.
Part II examines the extant individual civil responsibility legal regime 
(or lack thereof) and highlights the networks of multi-leveled relationships 
of responsibility and the multi-actor processes that serve as incubators for 
actuating individual responsibility. Focusing on the problematic regulation 
and accountability of nonstate terrorist actors and emphasizing the interac-
tion between relevant legal regimes, the Article discusses the UNSC’s role 
within this framework. In Part III, I analyze some of the UNSC’s “legisla-
tive” forays, primarily but not exclusively in the counterterrorism field, as-
sessing their impact on the prospect of enhancing international individual 
responsibility mechanisms beyond criminal responsibility.
Part IV explores the UNSC’s role in implementing individual responsi-
bility stemming from NSAs’ wrongful acts, emphasizing that organ’s attrib-
ution of illegal conduct and/or responsibility to such entities. Drawing from 
SR logic, I canvass select aspects of relevant practice in which the UNSC 
imposed a range of secondary, remedial obligations on wrongdoing individ-
uals/groups. This Part also reviews other proposals to enhance individual 
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accountability mechanisms—including a role for the UNSC in combating 
terrorism—which remain complementary with a would-be ICIR regime. 
These include UNSC referrals under the Rome Statute and broadening the 
International Criminal Court’s (“ICC”) jurisdiction to encompass “terror-
ism.” Part V offers reflections on the prospects and limits of the proposed 
ICIR model.
II. Making Individual Responsibility More Effective: The 
Importance of Regime Interaction and the UNSC’s Role
International law currently lacks a general framework for ICIR. Recent 
developments in international law across a variety of regimes, however,
suggest a growing demand, or at least an interest, in promulgating an opera-
tive notion of international civil individual responsibility. This Article 
builds upon those developments by outlining a potential framework for 
ICIR, one that draws from the SR repertoire but calls for accordant adjust-
ments to fit the peculiarities of ICIR.
A. Nonstate Actors and the Current Regime of 
International Responsibility
NSAs have gained increasing importance internationally, first and 
foremost as trendsetters but also as norm-creators and norm-enforcers.10 As 
the world shifts toward a multipolar reality, NSAs’ participation and influ-
ence in international law should not be underestimated.11 For instance, the 
emergence of transnational terrorist networks has illuminated potential defi-
ciencies in the extant international legal system, particularly as regards at-
tribution principles and self-defense standards.12 The actions of groups like 
10. See, e.g., ROBERT MANDEL, GLOBAL SECURITY UPHEAVAL: ARMED NONSTATE 
GROUPS USURPING STATE STABILITY FUNCTIONS (2013); VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS IN 
WORLD POLITICS (Klejda Mulaj ed., 2010); NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS
(Anne Peters et al. eds., 2009); Eric Dannenmaier, The Role of Non-State Actors in Climate 
Compliance, in PROMOTING COMPLIANCE IN AN EVOLVING CLIMATE REGIME 149 (Jutta 
Brunnée et al. eds., 2012); Douglas Guilfoyle, Somali Pirates as Agents of Change in Interna-
tional Law-Making and Organisation, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 81 (2012). 
11. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-STATE ACTORS (Andrew Clapham ed., 
2013); NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 2005); PARTICIPANTS IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jean d’Aspremont ed., 2011).
12. For instance, it is unclear whether classical rules have been adjusted, supplanted, or 
modified to accommodate self-defense against nonstate terrorists when the territorial state is 
“unwilling or unable” to thwart their activities, even absent a clear nexus (that is, attribution) 
between that state and the terrorists’ conduct. A sovereignty-corrosive loosening of self-
defense principles might pose serious challenges in the North-South divide. Cf. Ashley S. 
Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-
Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2012); Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, 
and the Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 244 (2011); Michael P. Scharf, 
How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law, 48 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 15
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Al-Qaeda, Daesh/ISIL, and Al-Shabaab, which sometimes wield state-like 
territorial control, influence, and military capacity, elude classical attribu-
tion theory, at least if centered on a strict agency paradigm. Indeed, agency 
seems to be the dominant model under the International Law Commission’s 
(“ILC”) 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (“the ARSIWA”), thereby highlighting their inadequacy in 
addressing the unlawful conduct of subversive NSAs.
By contrast, a group like Hezbollah falls into the interstices of different 
heads of attribution, eschewing straightforward classification and blurring 
the distinction between “acts of State” and non-attributable conduct. Its rela-
tionship to the Lebanese government likely belongs somewhere between the 
two extremes along the complete autonomy–complete dependency continu-
um.13 While some argue that Lebanon’s responsibility could be engaged for 
Hezbollah’s terrorist activities,14 what is important for present purposes is 
that the UNSC required “the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese 
and non-Lebanese militias” in Lebanon,15 encompassing Hezbollah’s armed 
wing, however defined under SR, and other nonstate extremist groups.
The UNSC addressed similar disarmament calls to Boko Haram and 
Daesh/ISIL in even more straightforward language. The UNSC added that 
individuals and groups responsible for perpetrating terrorist attacks and vio-
lations of international humanitarian law (“IHL”) and HR law should be 
held legally accountable.16 That said, these resolutions also oblige states to 
take measures to counteract the unlawful conduct of individuals and NSAs, 
a phenomenon which also runs through both the UNSC’s comprehensive 
sanctions against individual states and its targeted sanctions against individ-
uals suspected of supporting or engaging in terrorism.17 Therefore, in such 
scenarios, the targeted individuals and/or nonstate entities are still largely 
(2016); Kimberley N Trapp, Actor-Pluralism, the ‘Turn to Responsibility’ and the Jus ad Bel-
lum: ‘Unwilling or Unable’ in Context, 2 J. USE FORCE & INT’L L. 199 (2015).
13. See Gérard Cahin, The Responsibility of Other Entities: Armed Bands and Criminal 
Groups, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 331, 335 (James Crawford et al. 
eds., 2010); Enzo Cannizzaro, Entités Non-étatiques et Régime International de l’Emploi de la 
Force: Une Etude Sur Le Cas de la Réaction Israélienne au Liban, 111 REVUE GENERALE DE 
DROIT INT’L PUB. 333, 339 (2007).
14. See Stefan Kirchner, Third Party Liability for Hezbollah Attacks Against Israel, 7 
GERMAN L.J. 777, 779 (2006).
15. S.C. Res. 1559, ¶ 3 (Sept. 2, 2004).
16. See S.C. Res. 2396, ¶ 19 (Dec. 21, 2017); S.C. Res. 2349, ¶ 1 (Mar. 31, 2017). See 
generally S.C. Res. 2354, at pmbl. (May 24, 2017).
17. For instance, one common formulation employed by the UNSC is to call upon “all 
States to take appropriate measures to ensure that individuals and companies in their jurisdic-
tion . . . act in conformity with United Nations embargoes, . . . and, as appropriate, take the 
necessary judicial and administrative action to end any illegal activities by those individuals 
and companies . . . .” See S.C. Res. 1343, ¶ 21 (Mar. 7, 2001) (on Sierra Leone); see also S.C. 
Res. 1408, ¶ 18 (May 6, 2002).
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“mediated through their States (or, in the case of the EU, through the 
EU).”18
Nevertheless, these UNSC forays suggest that it is targeting nonstate 
groups/individuals with its prescriptions. While SR may address state fail-
ures to give effect to them, individual responsibility also remains relevant in 
the post-breach calculus. For instance, the UNSC recently emphatically 
condemned “all attacks, including improvised device attacks, suicide at-
tacks, assassinations and abductions, targeting civilians and Afghan interna-
tional forces and their deleterious effect on the stabilization, reconstruction 
and development efforts in Afghanistan . . . .”19 It further condemned “the 
use by the Taliban, including the Haqqani Network as well as Al-Qaida, 
ISIL (Da’esh) affiliates, and by other terrorist groups, violent and extremist 
groups, and illegal armed groups of civilians as human shields, . . . .”20 More 
importantly, the Council not only emphasized the importance of establishing 
the individual responsibility of such NSAs, but it confirmed the interde-
pendence between states’ obligations (the violation of which can trigger SR) 
and the establishment of individual responsibility. It underscored “the need 
to hold [the abovementioned] perpetrators, organizers, financiers and spon-
sors of such acts accountable and bring them to justice . . . .”21 It also 
“urge[d] all states, in accordance with their obligations under international 
law and relevant Security Council resolutions, to cooperate actively with the 
Government of Afghanistan and all other relevant authorities in this re-
gard . . . .”22
Unsurprisingly, post-9/11 events prompted scholars to investigate SR’s 
role in combating terrorism.23 More generally, the above developments 
share some connection with broader efforts to better define the individual’s 
role and place within the international legal system.24 Within SR, this quest 
18. PETERS, supra note 3, at 94.
19. S.C. Res. 2405, ¶ 23 (Mar. 8, 2018).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.; see id. ¶ 33 (denouncing “the continued high levels of child casualties and re-
cruitment and use of children in Afghanistan, in particular by terrorist and extremist groups”,
and calling for “those responsible to be brought to justice”).
23. See ROBERT P. BARNIDGE, JR., NON-STATE ACTORS AND TERRORISM: APPLYING 
THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DUE DILIGENCE PRINCIPLE (2008); TAL 
BECKER, TERRORISM AND THE STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
(2006); VINCENT-JOËL PROULX, TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AND STATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY: A NEW THEORY OF PREVENTION (2012); KIMBERLEY N. TRAPP, STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (2011). 
24. See generally KATE PARLETT, THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
SYSTEM: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011); STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL: REPARATION IN INSTANCES OF GRAVE VIOLATIONS 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Albrecht Randelzhofer & Christian Tomuschat eds., 1999); 34 
THESAURUS ACROASIUM: STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL (Kalliopi Koufa ed., 
2006); Andrew Clapham, The Role of the Individual in International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L.
25 (2010); 
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to circumscribe the individual’s legal situation has directly affected the mo-
dalities of secondary norms and the types of responsibility envisaged to cap-
ture private entities’ wrongful conduct. Indeed, “[p]ast efforts to distinguish 
between direct and indirect responsibility were explained by the need to lo-
cate the individual within the system.”25
Moreover, conceptual, evidentiary, and practical limitations of SR pre-
cepts in tackling terrorism are further exacerbated when transposed to the 
cyber-realm, in which case extant legal standards are inadequate to govern 
cyber-terrorism and cyber-warfare.26 Recent developments suggest that the 
post-World War II, bilateral typology of international relations, including 
SR and use of force rules, is no longer suitable to govern situations falling 
outside a strict state-based bilateral and/or symmetric paradigm, especially 
regarding the subversive acts of powerful NSAs (for example, transnational 
terrorist networks). We must identify outside-the-box solutions to regulate 
individual accountability beyond criminal responsibility in order to address 
the blind spots of SR and other legal schemes premised on perhaps outdated 
(read: overly bilateral or state-centric) logic.27 For one thing, the mechanism 
of criminal responsibility might become ineffective given the inability to 
secure custody over accused individuals, prosecutorial discretion, resource 
constraints, etc.
As a starting-point, the ARSIWA include a savings clause ensuring that 
the ILC’s finalized text does not impinge on the further development of in-
ternational individual responsibility mechanisms. Article 58 provides that 
25. Emmanuel Roucounas, Non-State Actors: Areas of International Responsibility in 
Need of Further Exploration, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN 
MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER 391, 392 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., 2005) (citation omitted) 
(alteration in original); see also JAMES CRAWFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 61–65, 
91–122 (2002). 
26. See, e.g., Constantine Antonopoulos, State Responsibility in Cyberspace, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 55 (Nikolaos Tsagourias 
& Russell Buchan eds., 2015); Zhxiong Huang, The Attribution Rules in ILC’s Articles on 
State Responsibility: A Preliminary Assessment on Their Application to Cyber Operations, 14 
BALTIC YEARBOOK INT’L L. 41 (2014); Peter Margulies, Sovereignty and Cyber Attacks:
Technology’s Challenge to the Law of State Responsibility, 14 MELB. J. INT’L L. 496 (2013). 
On the inadequacy of “control”-based legal standards under attribution theory, see Kristen E. 
Boon, Are Control Tests Fit for the Future? The Slippage Problem in Attribution Doctrines,
15 MELB. J. INT’L L. 330 (2014).
27. Cf. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); José Alvarez, The 
Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 223 (2011); Martti Koskenniemi, The Future of 
Statehood, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 397 (1991); Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State,
56 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1993); Susan Marks, State-Centrism, International Law, and the Anxie-
ties of Influence, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 339, 340 (2006); Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the 
Nation-State and Its Implications for International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 7
(1998); Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for 
International Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 447 (1993); James D. Wilets, The Demise of the Na-
tion-State: Towards a New Theory of the State Under International Law, 17 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 193 (1999).
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“[t]hese articles are without prejudice to any question of the individual re-
sponsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of a 
State.”28 Particularly relevant is the commentary to that provision. It con-
firms that the term “individual responsibility” does not exclusively connote 
criminal liability since “it is not excluded that developments may occur in 
the field of individual civil responsibility.”29 The drafting history suggests 
that Article 58’s primary rationale was to maintain a rigid distinction be-
tween individual criminal responsibility and SR, driven by the desire to 
avoid concluding that every finding of SR also ipso facto results in a finding 
of individual criminal liability. However, that same record indicates that this 
provision is sufficiently broad to capture something qualitatively different 
from criminal responsibility.30 Furthermore, there is every indication that 
Article 58 should not be read as exhaustive, in that international law may 
develop to recognize the international civil liability of private persons not
acting on behalf of a State. Otherwise put, even though the provision only 
refers to individual responsibility for individual conduct “ ‘on behalf of the 
State,’ it does not prohibit individual responsibility under international law 
for purely private conduct without direction by the State.”31 In fact, there is 
ample evidence that such liability already exists in certain circumstances.32
For example, the UN Convention against Torture (“UNCAT”) primarily 
requires states parties to fulfill certain obligations (for example, legislate, 
investigate, and extradite) for the purposes of submitting the prohibited 
conduct to their competent authorities for criminal prosecution. Individuals 
carry out the proscribed behavior, be they acting under the color of state au-
thority or in their private capacity. In addition, this instrument also en-
shrines a provision that ensures the ability to secure civil liability-type repa-
28. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 30, art. 58 (2001); [hereinafter the ARSIWA]. Con-
versely, the ARSIWA also reserve the right of NSAs to invoke and implement SR. See id. art. 
33, ¶ 2; see also id. pt. III, ch. I, cmt. On the ARSIWA’s shortcomings in bolstering SR invo-
cation and implementation mechanisms for NSAs, see Brown Weiss, supra note 9, at 799.
29. The ARSIWA, supra note 28, art. 58, cmt., ¶ 2 (emphasis added); see also
CRAWFORD, supra note 25, at 312; PETERS, supra note 3, at 164 (expounding from that fact 
that the individual can be the subject of a broader international responsibility, implying an 
“advanced process of ‘humanization’ of international law”).
30. See, e.g., Katja Creutz, International Responsibility and Problematic Law-Making,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAN KLABBERS 171, 173–75 (Rain 
Liivoja & Jarna Petman eds., 2014) (inferring that “technically Article 58 is not limited to an 
individual’s criminal responsibility only, but also includes individual civil responsibility”). 
31. PETERS, supra note 3, at 152 (adding that “[t]he provision is found in a text that 
otherwise deals only with State responsibility. Its purpose is merely to cut off the argument 
that the codified articles might rule out the individual responsibility of officeholders in addi-
tion to State responsibility.”).
32. See id. at 152–53 and authorities cited therein; see also CRAWFORD, supra note 25,
at 312–13. On the civil liability of public officials in international law, see infra note 75 and 
accompanying text. 
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ration, albeit pursued and ultimately implemented in the states parties’ do-
mestic jurisdictions. Indeed, Article 14 of the UNCAT provides that:
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the 
victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an en-
forceable right to fair and adequate compensation, includ-
ing the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the 
event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of tor-
ture, his dependants shall be entitled to compensation.
2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or 
other persons to compensation which may exist under na-
tional law.33
Similar remedial avenues exist concerning the underexplored and ill-
defined potential ICIR arising from crimes falling under the ICC’s jurisdic-
tion, especially given that Article 75(6) of the Rome Statute does not preju-
dice the rights of victims to secure civil reparation under international or 
domestic law.34 In many ways, Article 75 constitutes an important innova-
tion, granting victims the right in some circumstances to secure reparations 
for international crimes.35 Prior to the adoption of that instrument, victims 
disposed of severely limited legal avenues outside of domestic contexts to 
pursue civil-type reparations for international crimes. Pursuant to Article 79 
of the Rome Statute, the Trust Fund for Victims was instituted by the As-
sembly of States Parties with a view, inter alia, to assisting victims in secur-
ing reparations.36 This development constitutes an integral and significant 
33. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 14, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter UNCAT]; see also the 
ARSIWA, supra note 28, art. 58, cmt., ¶ 2, n.838. International tribunals have confirmed that 
individual criminal responsibility can be triggered when private individuals carry out acts of 
torture, without the need for State involvement. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos.
IT-96-23; IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, ¶ 148 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002). For a recent judicial interpretation of this provision, see
infra nn. 273–81 and accompanying text.
34. On this eventuality with respect to the crime of aggression, see Friedrich Rosenfeld, 
Individual Civil Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 249 
(2012). On the UNSC’s reluctance to determine individual responsibility for aggression, see
PHILIPPA WEBB, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION 127–28
(2013). See also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 75, ¶ 6, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (“Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as 
prejudicing the rights of victims under national or international law”.). 
35. See generally Carla Ferstman & Mariana Goetz, Reparations Before the Interna-
tional Criminal Court: The Early Jurisprudence on Victim Participation and Its Impact on 
Future Reparations Proceedings, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES 
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING 313 
(Carla Ferstman et al. eds., 2009); Gioia Greco, Victims’ Rights Overview Under the ICC Le-
gal Framework: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 7 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 531 (2007).
36. See Reparation Orders, TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, 
https://www.trustfundforvictims.org/en/what-we-do/reparation-orders (last visited Mar. 16, 
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feature of the ICC’s reparations practice and culture. More importantly, it 
suggests that, by incorporating both criminal and reparative (that is, civil)
aspects, which work together, the ICC’s framework further indicates that 
recovery based on ICIR might be available in international or domestic set-
tings. Granted, under the ICC framework, reparations may only be sought 
before the Court once there is a conviction, not to mention that the underly-
ing offenses must fall within the Court’s jurisdictional purview.37 Neverthe-
less, this limitation in no way precludes pursuing other avenues of recovery 
based on ICIR in other domestic or transnational forums.
Despite these overtures, no general international legal framework to in-
voke and implement NSAs’ ICIR exists.38 Former ILC Special Rapporteur 
James Crawford confirms as much: “[a] more recent addition to the dis-
course on international responsibility is the possibility of civil claims 
against non-state actors,” but “[n]o manifestation of this concept yet exists 
on the international plane.”39
The fact that the ILC itself has not substantially addressed the legal sit-
uation of the individual in its work, including the vexed question of non-
criminal individual responsibility, perhaps suggests that it is an intractable 
topic. That said, the Commission considered and produced draft articles on 
tangentially related sub-topics. For instance, it has studied and delivered 
work on the issue of nationality, including the question of statelessness.40 As 
2019); see also Peter G. Fischer, The Victims’ Trust Fund of the International Criminal 
Court—Formation of a Functional Reparations Scheme, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 187, 200–
01, 204–08 (2003); Dinah L. Shelton, Reparations for Victims of International Crimes, in 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 137 (Dinah L. Shelton ed., 2000). See generally STANISLAS KABALIRA,
THE RIGHT TO REPARATIONS UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) (2016).
37. See Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 75, ¶¶ 2, 4 (empowering the Court, inter alia,
to “make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to, or 
in respect of, victims,” and “order that the award for reparations be made through the Trust 
Fund provided for in article 79.”).
38. See generally Christian Tomuschat, Private Individuals, in THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 13, at 317–29. The topic of international indi-
vidual responsibility beyond criminal liability has generated very little attention beyond the 
human rights field. One study exploring international individual obligations, the individual’s
international responsibility, and rights arising from such responsibility is found in PETERS, 
supra note 3, at 60–193.
39. JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY 81 (2013) (adding that States rather 
“incorporate international law norms into their own legal systems, thereby enabling the mak-
ing of civil claims as an exercise of domestic jurisdiction.”); see also Tomuschat, supra note 
38, at 318 (stating that “there is no general law regulating the status of private individuals in 
international law.”). Even prior to the ARSIWA’s adoption, publicists lamented the lack of 
reliable mechanisms to engage “the responsibility of international civil society[,]” which 
“comprises non-State actors . . . .” See Christine Chinkin, A Critique of the Public/Private 
Dimension, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 387, 392 (1999).
40. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/2693 
(1954), reprinted in [1954] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 140, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/
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discussed below, the topic of international individual responsibility beyond 
criminal liability is increasingly relevant and is attracting attention in some 
specialist circles. For instance, the International Law Association constitut-
ed a Study Group on Individual Responsibility in International Law, which 
has studied the question for several years.41 The ILC and other important in-
stitutions should no longer ignore this topic.42 It should be explored with a 
view to developing corresponding intellectual and conceptual foundations, 
irrespective of its challenging nature and the parsimony of relevant practice.
Given the overall literary dearth on this question in scholarly and policy
circles, this Article attempts to articulate some embryonic foundations of a 
potential framework to address it. In so doing, I rely on parallels with SR 
law to inform a would-be ICIR regime relating to individuals and other 
NSAs. This approach is not entirely foreign to the broad field of interna-
tional responsibility. Indeed, the SR repertoire may and should be brought 
to bear upon the present inquiry as an analogical tool. By way of example, it 
has long been accepted that the law of treaties, originally envisaged as a 
strictly interstate field, can be extended, analogized, and applied to other in-
ternational actors (read: “nonstate” actors), such as international organiza-
tions or other nonstate entities (for example, armed opposition groups at the 
end of armed hostilities or investors in the field of investment law). Much in 
the same vein, SR law becomes a frame of reference for analyzing, dissect-
ing, and articulating other modes of international responsibility beyond the 
interstate paradigm, including in spaces corralling individuals and other 
NSAs. Unsurprisingly, the SR repertoire was instrumental in guiding the 
ILC when developing draft articles governing the responsibility of one type 
of NSA—international organizations—although charges of a misplaced 
“copy/paste” approach were leveled against it in that context, prompting it 
to adjust its final product accordingly.43
The ARSIWA’s central syllogistic device should also inform any legal 
regime governing ICIR. Thus, once a state (in the proposed model, an indi-
Add.l, at 140, 147–49; see also CRAWFORD, supra note 39, at 49 n.8. See generally PARLETT, 
supra note 24.
41. See Study Groups, INT’L L. ASS’N, http://www.ila-hq.org/index.php/study-groups
(last visited Mar. 16, 2019).
42. On the ILC’s past treatment of legal issues involving NSAs, see Gentian Zyberi, 
Non-State Actors from the Perspective of the International Law Commission, in 
PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-
STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 165.
43. Compare the ARSIWA, supra note 28, with Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work 
of its Sixty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/66/10/Add.1, at 39–105 (2011). On the unsuitability 
of certain SR norms for transposition to the international organizations context, see generally 
Vincent-Joël Proulx, An Uneasy Transition? Linkages between the Law of State Responsibility 
and the Law Governing the Responsibility of International Organizations, in RESPONSIBILITY 
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR IAN BROWNLIE 109 (Mau-
rizio Ragazzi ed., 2013). But see Christiane Ahlborn, The Use of Analogies Drafting the Arti-
cles on the Responsibility of International Organizations: An Appraisal of the “Copy-Paste 
Approach,” 9 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 53 (2012).
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vidual/NSA/group) breaches a primary norm of substantive conduct (for ex-
ample, perpetrating terrorism offenses or financing/supporting terrorism), 
international law sets in motion the application of secondary (remedial) 
norms, which translate into legal consequences stemming from the viola-
tion.44 Hence, the ARSIWA’s borrowed syllogistic reasoning consists of a 
wrongful act committed by the NSA (as opposed to a state), amounting to 
an action or omission invariably constituting a breach of its international ob-
ligation(s), which is then attributable to that entity/individual, thereby trig-
gering legal consequences enforceable against it.45 Presumably, when under-
taking any analysis in the realm of ICIR, questions surrounding the would-
be international legal personality of the relevant individual, NSA, or group 
and its limits (that is, is it sufficient to generate legal responsibility?) will 
arise and warrant consideration at the outset. After all, it must be recalled 
that, in its famous Reparations Advisory Opinion, the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) equated the expressions “international person” and “subject 
of international law.”46
Thus, SR’s normative scheme only gets us so far. An obvious limitation 
resides in the intrinsically different nature and character of the artificial con-
struct of the state when compared to the wide gamut of NSAs, including 
non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”).47 Moreover, once an interna-
tional law violation is established between states, it creates a legal relation-
ship which remains “on a level of parity” between the two players, despite 
the wrongful act. Absent a competent international jurisdictional body to 
decide the matter/order appropriate reparation, both the responsible state 
and injured state “remain sovereign entities,” with the latter left to navigate 
potential unilateral remedies to implement liability against the former.48
Because of this peculiar structure, the prospect of an injured state uni-
laterally invoking/implementing SR entails a process of auto-qualifying the
dispute’s various aspects and, ultimately, self-judging both the legal breach 
and its consequences.49 By contrast, a NSA that commits an international 
44. See generally Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 318. On the primary/secondary obliga-
tion dichotomy, see Eric David, Primary and Secondary Rules, in THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 13, at 27; Giorgio Gaja, Primary and Second-
ary Rules in the International Law on State Responsibility, 4 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO 
INTERNAZIONALE 981 (2014).
45. For this syllogism under extant SR repertoire, see the ARSIWA, supra note 28, art. 
2 (on the wrongful act–breach attribution sequence); id. art. 28 (on the ensuing legal conse-
quences).
46. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174, 179 (Apr. 11); see also PETERS, supra note 3, at 35–44, 414.
47. On the potential international responsibility of NGOs, see Anna-Karin Lindblom, 
The Responsibility of Other Entities: Non-Governmental Organizations, in THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 13, at 343.
48. See Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 320. 
49. For a variety of views, see Denis Alland, The Definition of Countermeasures, in
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY supra note 13, at 1129; RENÉ PROVOST, 
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law breach can be labeled the author of a criminal act or, as argued here, the 
perpetrator of an internationally (civil) wrongful act. Consequently, nothing 
prevents that juridical person/entity or an individual from being subjected to 
an appropriate criminal or economic sanction. However, it should be 
stressed that “[a] private individual does not have the same ‘ceremonial dig-
nity’ as a State.”50 Here, a key distinction lies in the horizontal enforcement 
system endemic to SR and interstate disputes, as compared with the top-
down enforcement approach applicable to individuals and NSAs. This is a 
clear distinguishing factor between state-based liability and individual 
and/or NSA-based liability, which is also reminiscent of one major differ-
ence between the international legal order and domestic legal systems.
Consequently, it is imperative to exercise caution in fashioning a sec-
ondary normative regime to govern NSAs’ (non-criminal) international re-
sponsibility. For instance, some SR remedial provisions would carry over 
rather awkwardly to the realm of NSAs. Consider the oft-awarded remedy 
of satisfaction, codified in Article 37 of the ARSIWA. It operates rather 
seamlessly between sovereign states and is routinely relied upon by the ICJ 
as adequate redress.51 Stepping away from the interstate dynamic, 
“[a]pologies or expressions of regret . . . presented by an individual are no 
more than a gesture of courtesy and do not have the same weight as official 
apologies offered by a State.”52 Moreover, the immunity that most states en-
joy with respect to their international jurisdiction further informs the over-
arching distinction between state-based liability and individual and/or NSA-
based liability. A vital query for the architects of an ICIR regime will be to 
determine why and in what circumstances individuals and other NSAs 
should be held civilly liable at the international level. With respect to crimi-
nal liability, the traditional response has been that the international legal 
system will fill the void when municipal jurisdictions are unable or unwill-
ing to prosecute domestically.53 The question remains, however, whether 
this standard could also be transposed and applied to the civil international 
responsibility of individuals and NSAs.
The sources and content of relevant primary norms may be difficult to 
ascertain in some instances given that ICIR is an emerging conceptual field, 
not to mention that it suffers from a paucity of relevant practice. Despite this 
normative uncertainty, certain primary norms—the violation of which may 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 338 n.2 (2002); Leo Gross,
States as Organs of International Law and the Problem of Autointerpretation, in SELECTED 
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 167 (Leo Gross ed., 1993); HANS 
KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW 13–14 (1944).
50. Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 320.
51. See the ARSIWA, supra note 28, art 37. For a critical take on the ICJ’s use of satis-
faction, see Juliette McIntyre, The Declaratory Judgment in Recent Jurisprudence of the ICJ:
Conflicting Approaches to State Responsibility?, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 177 (2016).
52. Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 320.
53. See, e.g., the complementary nature of the ICC’s jurisdiction, which also affects the 
admissibility of claims it can hear. Rome Statute, supra note 34, at pmbl., arts. 1, 17.
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lead to establishing ICIR—can nonetheless be grounded in specific interna-
tional instruments. Indeed, classical publicists confirmed that certain treaty 
provisions directly obligate individuals to observe certain behavioral re-
quirements and establish ICIR in the case of breach, even if the resulting 
reparation is defined and ultimately governed by domestic legal systems.54
Draft conventions in international nuclear and environmental law have 
included civil liability provisions for maritime oil pollution, nuclear dam-
age, and transboundary movement of hazardous wastes.55 While these in-
struments would engender the liability of private persons and operators in 
specific circumstances, they have not entered into force. Nevertheless, that 
states and other relevant actors have drafted such conventions suggests a 
movement toward ICIR, as these draft instruments must be contrasted with 
treaties whose violation entails state-based liability. A key cross-sectoral 
civil liability convention of this kind is the Lugano Convention on Civil Li-
ability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environ-
ment, which also has yet to enter into force.56 The above draft instruments 
seek to introduce secondary obligations binding upon NSAs and individuals 
to regulate their liability in the event they carry out conduct falling within 
the purview of the conventions (for example, pollution). However, whether 
such instruments also ground primary substantive norms of conduct govern-
ing the behavior of individuals and enterprises directly remains a more 
vexed question. One attractive construction would be to simply surmise that 
“the treaties place duties on businesses not to cause pollution.”57 A more 
careful analysis might reveal stricter conditions in which primary norms 
binding individuals and NSAs directly could be read into those instru-
ments.58
These conventions generally require signatory states to impose sanc-
tions to assist in enforcing the obligations of private actors (typically busi-
ness entities)—whose unlawful conduct may attract liability under the rele-
vant instruments—and ensure the implementation of their duty to provide 
compensation. Consequently, the more traditional construction of most of 
these instruments implies that they cannot give rise to liability of private en-
54. See Hans Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law 
with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 CAL. L. REV. 530, 537–38
(1943) (discussing Article II of the International Convention for the Protection of Submarine 
Telegraph Cables).
55. See PETERS, supra note 3, at 153–54. 
56. See generally Lugano Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from 
Activities Dangerous to the Environment, June 21, 1993, E.T.S. No. 150 (not in force).
57. Steven R. Ratner, Business, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 807, 814 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
58. See PETERS, supra note 3, at 154. See generally id. At 60–114. For a cynical take 
on whether international liability regimes “will play a significant role as a tool for environ-
mental protection[,]” see Jutta Brunnée, Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on International 
Liability Regimes as Tools for Environmental Protection, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 351, 367 
(2004).
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tities directly under international law.59 Yet, upon closer inspection, the 
wording of some of these instruments suggests that international individual 
responsibility could be established for their violation, although they would 
need to be “sufficiently specific and complete in the sense that no further 
national provisions would be needed to specify” the relevant obligations.60
Otherwise put, to achieve this standard, the instruments must enshrine “un-
ambiguous substantive standards” (that is, “general principles of liability”) 
and provisions circumscribing the scope of liability along with the financial 
and temporal parameters of such liability.61 While these criteria are met by 
some of the conventions, this is a far cry from establishing a general regime 
of international civil responsibility governing the conduct of NSAs and in-
dividuals, be it in relation to primary and/or secondary norms. These ques-
tions remain rather academic if states ultimately decline to sign and ratify 
the relevant conventions. This does not mention that, if they do enter into 
force, the “diffuseness of global environmental problems” and issues related 
to causation might pose challenges to establishing liability under these in-
struments.62
Given my focus in subsequent pages on “terrorism”63 as a principal case 
study and the UNSC as would-be implementer/facilitator of ICIR, I argue 
that this body can set specific obligations (that is, primary norms) incum-
bent upon NSAs. In fact, the UNSC imposed many of the relevant primary 
obligations (that is, prohibition of conduct amounting to “terrorism” or lend-
ing material support to “terrorism”), thereby prompting an assessment of its 
practice and role in ICIR implementation. After all, the Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion indicated that the UNSC may promulgate legal obligations that 
bind nonstate subjects.64
59. See, e.g., Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 324–25 (adding that, under the International 
Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea and its Protocol, “the relationships between the 
person causing the damage and the victims of the damage are essentially placed under the 
domain of national laws of one of the contracting parties, save for the specific rules estab-
lished under the convention which have become an integral part of national laws.”). See also
PETERS, supra note 3, at 156–57. 
60. PETERS, supra note 3, at 155–60 (analyzing the relevant provisions of several con-
ventions and their protocols).
61. Id. At 158 (adding that the “conventions would also have to contain clearly speci-
fied minimum standards governing the forum, standing, the applicable law, and the recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments.”). 
62. Id. at 161. On causation and related matters, see also infra note 110 and accompa-
nying text.
63. The present account does not purport to advance a categorical position on the defi-
nitional polemic surrounding the concept of “terrorism.” It loosely proceeds from the expan-
sive working definition provided in S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 3 (Oct. 8, 2004).
64. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independ-
ence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, ¶¶ 115–17 (July 22); see 
also PETERS, supra note 3, at 96–98 (concluding that this precedent confirms that the UNSC 
“unambiguously impose[s] strict legal obligations on private actors in situations of non-
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It is also apparent from several resolutions that the UNSC itself consid-
ers that its pronouncements (and the authorizations it issues for certain ac-
tors to engage in certain conduct) might have a law-shaping impact on gen-
eral international law. The UNSC sometimes confines a given resolution to 
the specific matter under study and expressly states that it “shall not be con-
sidered as establishing customary international law” (nor as affect-
ing/modifying the addressees’ existing legal rights and obligations).65 A con-
trario, this implies that, absent this proviso, a UNSC resolution might have 
lawmaking features in certain instances.66 For example, the Council express-
ly precludes broader lawmaking implications in a series of resolutions regu-
lating piracy off the coast of Somalia.67 It also included near-identical dis-
claimers in resolutions targeting Libya on the issues of illicit export of crude 
oil68 and migrant smuggling and human trafficking.69 This is not to mention 
that several international courts and international law institutions recognize 
the UNSC’s ability to contribute to customary international law, including 
the ICJ,70 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”),71 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,72 the ILC in its 
international armed conflict.”) (emphasis in original); Gleider I. Hernández, Non-State Actors 
from the Perspective of the International Court of Justice, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 145. 
65. See also Gregory H. Fox et al., The Contributions of United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions to the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict: New Evidence of Cus-
tomary International Law, 67 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 649, 656 (2018).
66. See id.
67. See S.C. Res. 2184, ¶ 14 (Nov. 12, 2014); S.C. Res. 2182, ¶ 21 (Oct. 24, 2014); 
S.C. Res. 2125, ¶ 13 (Nov. 18, 2013); S.C. Res. 2077, ¶ 13 (Nov. 21, 2012); S.C. Res. 2020, ¶ 
10 (Nov. 22, 2011); S.C. Res. 1950, ¶ 8 (Nov. 23, 2010); S.C. Res. 1897, ¶ 8 (Nov. 30, 2009); 
S.C. Res. 1851, ¶ 10 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 11 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1838, ¶ 8 
(Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 9 (June 2, 2008). On Resolution 1816’s wording, see Ste-
phen D. Mathias, The Work of the International Law Commission on Identification of Cus-
tomary International Law: A View from the Perspective of the Office of Legal Affairs, 15 
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 17, 27 (2016). 
68. S.C. Res. 2146, ¶ 9 (Mar. 19, 2014).
69. S.C. Res. 2240, ¶ 11 (Oct. 9, 2015).
70. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independ-
ence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, ¶ 81 (July 22). See gen-
erally Marko Divac Öberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and 
General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 879, 879–80 (2005).
71. Prosecutor v. Tadi?, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶133 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 
2, 1995).
72. Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶ 107 (Sept. 26, 2006).
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work on SR,73 and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(“ICRC”).74
In summary, the rising importance of individuals and NSAs on the in-
ternational plane has increased the need for alternate modes of liability be-
yond classic criminal responsibility. The picture that emerges is one where 
some key building blocks of a general ICIR regime are already in place, but 
where uncertainty persists. This uncertainty is particularly acute in respect 
of the origin and content of relevant primary norms and the mechanics sur-
rounding the application of secondary remedial norms. In developing a 
would-be ICIR regime, steadier conceptual and theoretical foundations must 
be articulated. In this regard, the law of SR offers a mixed bag of analogical 
tools. On one hand, its principal aims and rationales could be adjusted ac-
cordingly and transposed to the realm of individuals and NSAs and yield 
effective results. On the other hand, that normative scheme is of limited util-
ity given the qualitatively different legal personality of NSAs, the peculiari-
ties related to the abstract construct of the state, and the unique features of 
enforcement measures between sovereign states. New directions and solu-
tions must be sought, including through the UNSC as argued in the present 
account.
B. Regime Interaction and the UNSC’s Role
International individual responsibility is of vital and topical importance, 
especially given the rapid expansion of certain subversive nonstate armed 
entities and the emergence of equally subversive individuals.75 Groups like 
Daesh/ISIL, Al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram wield almost state-like power 
and control over both territory and populations in certain areas. These 
groups perpetrate various international law violations, largely with impunity 
and with no functional territorial state on which responsibility can be 
pinned. In large territorial swathes of Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Nigeria, and So-
73. See the ARSIWA Commentary, supra note 28, at 53, 89, 92–93, 114–15, 132.
74. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 39 n.13, 94 n.97, 100 n. 139, 107 nn.14 & 17, 
109 n.24, 111 n.40, 113 nn.6–8, 137 n.60, 147 n.25, 184 n.79, 188 n.22, 195–96 nn.70–73, 
198 n.87, 199 n.98, 201 nn.105–07 (2005).
75. A related area—falling within a broader research and policy program on interna-
tional civil individual responsibility (“ICIR”)—might presumably include the individual civil 
liability of state officials. As Lauterpacht cautioned, the international legal system might be 
doomed should an individual, acting in an official state capacity (that is, as an organ), be per-
mitted to violate international law in that capacity but ultimately eschew liability by seeking 
refuge behind the artificial construct of the “state.” See Hersch Lauterpacht, Règles Générales 
du Droit de la Paix, 62 RECUEIL DES COURS 95, 297 (1937). While there might be both sound 
policy and legal bases for envisaging civil liability of state officials, the reality is that states 
are generally reluctant to accept such a prospect. For one application, see Bardo Fassbender, 
Can Victims Sue State Officials for Torture?, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 347, 369 (2008) (declar-
ing that the “advanced process of ‘humanization’ of international law would surely suggest 
such a liability. [But that] so far States have not been ready to agree on it.”). 
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malia, for example, the host state has been eviscerated of its effective con-
trol over the relevant region, which has been appropriated by extremist 
groups.76
Consequently, individual accountability regimes must enhance their 
ability to combat impunity. This is a challenging task. We are often dealing 
with irregulars who cannot be swayed by the prospect of deterrence or con-
vinced of the value of reciprocity and proportionality (should those princi-
ples be applied in irregular combat). In many cases, long gone are the days 
of “clean” theaters of war; asymmetric warfare and all its attendant legal 
complexities are increasingly prevalent.77 It is messy, murky terrain, and the 
evolving international legal framework to address these challenges—if it 
exists—also mirrors this general impression.
The rules of the game are changing in areas highly relevant to NSA 
conduct, such as HR. The discourse is “therefore moving away from the tra-
ditional view that under [HR] law the individuals hold the rights while only 
states bear the obligations.”78 In fact, this shift is part and parcel of a broader 
recognition of the individual’s (and NSAs’) situation as international law 
subjects beyond the traditional paradigm.79 Indeed, the LaGrand Case 
(Germany v. United States of America) confirmed that the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations not only enshrines states’ rights pertaining to 
76. However, despite this lack of control by the territorial state, the UNSC remains res-
olute in emphasizing the state’s counterterrorism and related capacity-building obligations. 
For example, after condemning recent terrorist attacks in Mogadishu orchestrated by Al-
Shabaab and the presence in Somalia of groups affiliated with Daesh/ISIL, it called upon the 
UN Assistance Mission in Somalia to continue “strengthen[ing] Somalia’s capacity to prevent 
and counter terrorism, consistent with its international obligations, relevant Security Council 
resolutions and implement the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy . . . .” S.C. Res. 2408, ¶ 
7 (Mar. 27, 2018); see also S.C. Res. 2344, ¶ 19 (Mar. 17, 2017) (emphasizing similar obliga-
tions for Afghanistan). Some might also lump organizations like Hamas into the same catego-
ry, while others might equate Hamas with a state actor. For one view, see Amnon Aran, Con-
tainment and Territorial Transnational Actors: Israel, Hezbollah and Hamas, 88 INT’L AFF.
835, 854 (2012).
77. See WILLIAM BANKS, COUNTERINSURGENCY LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE (2013); PAULINE M. KAURIN, THE WARRIOR, MILITARY ETHICS 
AND CONTEMPORARY WARFARE: ACHILLES GOES ASYMMETRICAL 7–8 (2014); MAX G.
MANWARING, THE COMPLEXITY OF MODERN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 3 (2012); NEW
BATTLEFIELDS, OLD LAWS: CRITICAL DEBATES ON ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 8 (William C. 
Banks ed., 2011).
78. Eric de Brabandere, Non-State Actors, State-Centrism and Human Rights Obliga-
tions, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 191, 192 (2009). Over two decades ago, Thomas Franck already 
identified the inversely proportional relationship between individuals’ HR and their obliga-
tions/potential legal accountability. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND INSTITUTIONS 264 (1998). 
79. See Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 318–19; PETERS, supra note 3, at 152–66. But cf.
Jean d’Aspremont, Non-State Actors from the Perspective of Legal Positivism: The Communi-
tarian Semantics for the Secondary Rules of International Law, in PARTICIPANTS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 25.
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consular relations but also that Article 36(1)(b) “creates individual rights,
which, by virtue of Article I of the Optional Protocol, may be invoked in 
this Court by the national State of the detained person.”80 Further, the Court 
was careful not to qualify those rights as HR, arguably signaling a departure 
from the traditional posture regarding the individual’s situation as an inter-
national law subject. In fact, the ICJ expressly declined to consider Germa-
ny’s additional argument that the relevant right “was not only an individual 
right but has today assumed the character of a human right.”81
Similarly, the ILC echoed the ICJ’s conclusion that individuals (and 
other NSAs) can obtain enforceable rights in the international legal order 
while firmly stating that they can also assume international legal obliga-
tions. In the context of the responsibility of international organizations, the 
ILC Special Rapporteur construed this precedent as the “[t]he Court 
stat[ing] . . . that individuals are also subjects of international law.”82 This 
prompted the Rapporteur to ponder that “[i]t would be difficult to under-
stand why individuals may acquire rights and obligations under internation-
al law while the same could not occur with any international organization, 
provided that it is an entity which is distinct from its members.”83 Conse-
quently, Professor Gaja opined that this approach double-coated the protec-
tion afforded individuals under international law. Such individuals would 
benefit from their home state’s exercise of diplomatic protection or some 
other interstate claim while again enjoying protection where a “treaty pro-
vides for remedies that are directly actionable by individuals . . . .”84 On one 
view of the LaGrand precedent, it is significant that the Court declined to 
frame the individuals’ rights as HR. If individuals can have enforceable 
rights beyond HR, the argument presumably goes, individuals and/or other 
NSAs should be able to assume obligations beyond the traditional criminal 
prohibitions and “core” international crimes (for example, crimes against 
80. LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466, ¶ 77 (June 27) (emphasis 
added). 
81. Id. ¶ 78; see also Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Cristina Hoss, LaGrand Case (Germany v 
United States of America), in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
¶¶ 16–19, 33–36 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012) (underscoring that LaGrand “also gained some 
prominence for having raised the issue of individual rights flowing from the [Convention].”). 
For a critical take on its aftermath, see Joan Fitzpatrick, The Unreality of International Law in 
the United States and the LaGrand Case, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 427, 427 (2002). In a subse-
quent, factually similar case, the Court emphasized the “interdependence of the rights of the 
State and of individual rights” in this context, underscoring that the applicant state could, “in 
submitting a claim in its own name, request the Court to rule on the violation of rights which 
it claim[ed] to have suffered both directly and through the violation of individual rights con-
ferred on [its] nationals under the [Convention].” Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. 
v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶ 40 (Mar. 31).
82. Giorgio Gaja (Special Rapporteur), First Report on Responsibility of International 
Organizations, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/532 (Mar. 26, 2003).
83. Id.; see also Clapham, supra note 24, at 28.
84. Giorgio Gaja, The Position of Individuals in International Law: An ILC Perspec-
tive, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 11, 14 (2010).
236 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 40:215
humanity, war crimes, genocide, and aggression), the violation of which 
could engage ICIR.85
This proposition also aligns with recent scholarly proposals to recon-
ceptualize the frame of reference concerning the individual’s role and place 
in international law, steering the inquiry away from exclusive focus on HR 
as the “central and entirely undisputed element of the international legal sta-
tus of the individual.”86 The next logical step in this thinking is to 
acknowledge that NSAs’ assumption of primary (substantive) obligations 
would be rendered meaningless absent their (potential and actual) enforce-
ment through secondary norms. In summary, when the abovementioned 
85. See also Clapham, supra note 24, at 30. This line of argument must be appreciated 
with caution, as illustrated by the challenging history of corporate liability for HR violations.
Given the considerable resistance against, and concerns voiced over, adopting a more robust 
liability regime to address corporations’ HR abuses, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Rep-
resentative for Business and HR John Ruggie ultimately opted for a more measured and 
grounded position. Consequently, the resulting document, which uses hortatory language in 
relevant parts, speaks solely of the “responsibility of business enterprises to respect [HR]” as 
opposed to couching the language in mandatory legal terms. See U.N. Human Rights Office of 
the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
HR/PUB/11/04, at 13–26 (June 16, 2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf (especially Principle 23). In fairness, the document 
and its commentary, id. at 10, invites states to explore adopting corporate civil liability mech-
anisms for HR violations, recognizes, id. at 14, that the issues of legal responsibility and en-
forcement “remain defined largely by national law provisions in relevant jurisdictions,” some 
of which provide for civil actions for corporations’ complicity in HR violations, id. at 19, and 
encourages, id. at 25, corporations to treat the risk of being found complicit in such violations 
“as a legal compliance issue, given the expanding web of potential corporate legal liability 
arising from extraterritorial civil claims.” Id. at 26. The document also stresses that “corporate 
directors, officers and employees may be subject to individual liability for acts that amount to 
gross [HR] abuses” and, in various parts, maps out the HR “due diligence” that business en-
terprises should conduct. See id. at 15–26. 
For different views on this project and its implications, see JOHN RUGGIE, JUST 
BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2013); Susan Ariel 
Aaronson & Ian Higham, “Re-Righting Business”: John Ruggie and the Struggle to Develop 
International Human Rights Standards for Transnational Firms, 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 333 (2013); 
Jonathan Bonnitcha & Robert McCorquodale, The Concept of ‘Due Diligence’ in the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Rejoinder to John Gerard Ruggie and 
John F. Sherman, III, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 929 (2017); Carola Glinski, The Ruggie Framework, 
Business Human Rights Self-Regulation and Tort Law: Increasing Standards Through Mutual 
Impact and Learning, 35 NORDIC J. HUM. RTS. 15 (2017); Carlos López, The “Ruggie Pro-
cess”: From Legal Obligations to Corporate Social Responsibility?, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT? 58
(Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013); John Ruggie, Protect, Respect, and Remedy: The
UN Framework for Business and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
SIX DECADES AFTER THE UDHR AND BEYOND 519 (Mashood A. Baderin & Manisuli Ssen-
yonjo eds., 2010); John Ruggie & John Sherman, The Concept of ‘Due Diligence’ in the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Reply to Jonathan Bonnitcha and Rob-
ert McCorquodale, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 92 (2017); THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION (Radu Mares ed., 
2012). But see infra note 297.
86. PETERS, supra note 3, at 32.
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principled argument and precedent argument are appreciated in tandem, 
those actors’ international legal personality—however limited—cannot be 
dissociated from the prospect of international individual responsibility be-
yond strict criminal liability. If accepted, this conclusion would considera-
bly facilitate the transition of the individual into a key subject of interna-
tional law.87
As shown in Part III, the UNSC recently shifted away from requiring 
that states regulate the conduct of NSAs and individuals themselves—for 
example, by implementing legislation, exercising jurisdiction over crimi-
nals, punishing unlawful behavior, etc.—thereby initially only indirectly or 
implicitly regulating and binding NSAs. The UNSC moved to directly regu-
lating the conduct of NSAs in its resolutions. Coupled with scholarly at-
tempts to situate the role and place of NSAs and individuals as both holders 
of rights and bearers of obligations on the international plane,88 these devel-
opments not only suggest their increasing importance in this context but al-
so a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature and extent of their interna-
tional legal personality.89
Before addressing the UNSC’s potential contribution, creative solutions 
to palliate SR’s failures to properly capture the role of individuals (that is, 
its inherent bilateral/state-centric inclination) warrant mention. In other 
words, reconceptualizing or enhancing SR or imposing more onerous due 
diligence obligations on states across the board as the sole strategy is an in-
adequate and overly statist approach. It fails to recognize the shift of power 
away from nation-states in many contexts. As a corollary, the international 
87. See generally id. at 21–34, 165 (also observing that the imposition of secondary 
obligations upon individuals would entail their duty to compensate victims for international 
law violations). This line of argument aligns with the view that the “present era – which is 
often perceived as a period of crisis in positive international law – has seen a renaissance of 
natural law, in which the individual is celebrated as the ‘true subject’ of international law.”
Id. at 23 (emphasis in original). It is also compatible with several scholarly pronouncements 
on the importance of the international legal personality of the individual. See, e.g., JANNE 
ELISABETH NIJMAN, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY: AN INQUIRY 
INTO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 473 (2004); Antônio Augusto 
Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind: Towards a New Jus Gentium, 316 
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 33–34, 57, 147, 252, 265–267, 274, 282 (2005); see also RAFAEL 
DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW 124–26 (2010); ROLAND PORTMANN, LEGAL 
PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2–3 (2010). 
88. See, e.g., PETERS, supra note 3, at 152–66; PARLETT, supra note 24; PARTICIPANTS 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11; Clapham, supra note 24.
89. For a recent provocative treatment, see ASTRID KJELDGAARD-PEDERSEN, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL (2018). For more classical treat-
ments, compare David Feldman, International Personality, 191 RECUEIL DES COURS 343, 359 
(1985) (arguing that the ability to hold rights in international law constitutes a sufficient pred-
icate for international legal personality), with Prosper Weil, Le Droit International en Quête 
de son Identité: Cours Général de Droit International Public, 237 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 122 
(1992) (expounding that international legal personality must be premised on lawmaking and 
law enforcement powers).
238 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 40:215
community’s excessive focus on individual criminal responsibility is equal-
ly problematic. Contemporaneous events suggest that nonstate groups and 
entities, as opposed to individuals, are securing and consolidating that pow-
er.90 Similarly, Mégret has argued that to enforce obligations erga omnes—
of which some counterterrorism undertakings unquestionably form part—
”[p]erhaps a better ground is the idea that, if crimes are committed by indi-
viduals, then other individuals should also be allowed to stop their perpetra-
tion.”91 This reasoning can also be extended to other NSAs and their subver-
sive activities.
In a different context, the recent saga surrounding the ICJ’s Marshall 
Islands cases demonstrated that judicial organ’s inherent structural short-
comings (both jurisdictional and admissibility-based) to deal with multilat-
eral disputes involving alleged violations of interdependent/interrelated ob-
ligations (potentially erga omnes),92 the violation of which may be 
facilitated by state and nonstate actors. For starters, only states can appear 
before the ICJ. Individuals and other NSAs do not possess the quality of 
sovereignty (or sovereign equality), nor the requisite international legal per-
sonality to do so. In relevant state-to-state cases, however, the Court may be 
called upon to weigh in on legal issues that also relate to the unlawful acts 
of NSAs—sometimes indirectly—as part of the broader factual complex be-
fore it.93 One first obstacle is that such issues might arise in connection with 
complex multilateral disputes over which the Court may decline to exercise 
jurisdiction94 or reject on the ground of inadmissibility.95 In such scenarios, 
90. See Jan Arno Hessbruegge, The Historical Development of the Doctrines of At-
tribution and Due Diligence in International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 265, 306 
(2004).
91. Frédéric Mégret, Beyond “Freedom Fighters” and “Terrorists”: When, if Ever, Is 
Non-State Violence Legitimate in International Law? 10 n.45 (Apr. 6, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1373590 (also underscoring that “the articles on state 
responsibility are really too steeped in inter-state considerations to provide much of a foothold 
for a truly erga omnes (i.e.: also encompassing individuals) reaction to fundamental illegali-
ty.”).
92. For a critical account, see Vincent-Joël Proulx, The World Court’s Jurisdictional 
Formalism and its Lost Market Share: The Marshall Islands Decisions and the Quest for a 
Suitable Dispute Settlement Forum for Multilateral Disputes, 30 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 925 
(2017).
93. Despite the Court’s state-centric mode of dispute settlement, which denies individ-
uals and NSAs standing before the Court, the ICJ has nonetheless delivered several key pro-
nouncements dealing with the rights and obligations of NSAs under international law. In addi-
tion, the Court has examined wrongful conduct authored by NSAs for the purposes of 
determining whether that behavior could be attributed to states for the purpose of establishing 
SR. The Court has also weighed in on the rights and obligations of NSAs in advisory proceed-
ings. For a review of relevant jurisprudence, see Hernández, supra note 64, at 140–64.
94. For optimistic views that the Court can and should accept to adjudicate complex 
multilateral disputes, see Béatrice Bonafé, Establishing the Existence of a Dispute Before the 
International Court of Justice: Drawbacks and Implications, 45 QUESTIONS INT’L L. 3, 27–28
(2017). Some publicists stress that, by adopting a more procedurally flexible approach, the 
Court could avoid undesirable scenarios where access to justice is impeded by judicial formal-
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it is possible that the Court’s predominantly state-centric structure and bilat-
eral process would meet their match, leaving it unable to contribute mean-
ingfully to the development of ICIR (especially when it rejects cases on ju-
risdictional and/or admissibility grounds).
More importantly, a second challenge would emerge in tandem with the 
fact that the ICJ does not have jurisdiction ratione personae over NSAs, 
which then begs the question whether the only determinations the Court 
could make on ICIR—in strictly interstate disputes—would be done indi-
rectly or by way of “incidental censure.”96 Irrespective of the answer to this 
query, one thing remains clear: the ICJ does not constitute a reliable or even 
relevant forum for invoking or establishing the international responsibility 
of NSAs, let alone attempting to secure remedies for their international law 
breaches. In other words, not every case before the Court will be as straight-
forward as Belgium v. Senegal from procedural and admissibility stand-
points,97 nor will every case offer a potential entry-point for considerations 
related to international individual responsibility. This partly explains why 
this Article’s emphasis is on legal tools the UNSC can use to enhance indi-
vidual responsibility. While potential ICIR enforcement amongst NSAs 
could be explored as a form of “soft law,” with domestic legal regimes and 
relevant transnational frameworks remaining the more central players, the 
ICJ’s structure, make-up, and recent jurisprudence suggest a decidedly less 
relevant model for developing and implementing ICIR.
Thus, this Article’s focus on the UNSC is informed by three additional 
rationales. First, scholars have recently examined the UNSC’s role in pre-
venting/suppressing global security threats, with insistence on the subver-
sive activities of NSAs in the framework of states’ obligations. Consequent-
ly, the UNSC can play a role, sometimes determinant, in implementing SR 
for state failures to prevent terrorism or violations of other important coun-
terterrorism obligations.98 Indeed, the use of legal rhetoric in UNSC deliber-
ism. See, e.g., Surabhi Ranganathan, Nuclear Weapons and the Court, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 88
(2017); Ingo Venzke, Public Interests in the International Court of Justice–A Comparison 
Between Nuclear Arms Race (2016) and South West Africa (1966), 111 AJIL UNBOUND 68
(2017).
95. On this point, see Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the 
Nuclear Arms Races and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Preliminary Objec-
tions, 2016 I.C.J. Rep. 833, ¶¶ 33–41 (Oct. 5) (separate opinion by Judge Tomka). See also
Vincent-Joël Proulx, The Marshall Islands Judgments and Multilateral Disputes at the World 
Court: Whither Access to International Justice?, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 96, 99–100 (2017).
96. This expression is borrowed from a different, yet still relevant, context. See Gaeta-
no Arangio-Ruiz, Article 39 of the ILC First-Reading Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
83 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 747, 765 n.31 (2000); see also Karel Wellens, The
UN Security Council and New Threats to the Peace: Back to the Future, 8 J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 1, 49 (2003).
97. See infra nn. 114–17 and accompanying text.
98. See generally VINCENT-JOËL PROULX, INSTITUTIONALIZING STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY: UN ORGANS AND GLOBAL SECURITY (2016) [hereinafter PROULX, 
INSTITUTIONALIZING]; Vincent-Joël Proulx, An Incomplete Revolution: Enhancing the Securi-
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ations is more commonplace than some might think. Sometimes, interna-
tional law arguments might have considerable purchase in swaying UNSC 
decision-making constituencies toward a particular outcome.99 This account 
continues this line of inquiry: this logic—and the UNSC’s occasional use of 
international law—could likely enhance ICIR mechanisms.
Second, the impetus toward revisiting individual responsibility mecha-
nisms, beyond international criminal law (“ICL”), stems largely from SR’s 
failures. The idea of “international responsibility”100 must be understood 
broadly, encompassing various processes, actors, and levels of wrongdo-
ing/accountability. A more comprehensive and effective international re-
sponsibility system must increasingly grapple with the involvement of mul-
tiple private actors internationally. They operate alongside state and 
institutional players, which frequently contribute to shaping legal rapports 
and consequences across networks of multi-leveled relationships of respon-
sibility.
One criticism leveled against the ARSIWA is that they fail to consider 
the growing importance of NSAs, focusing almost exclusively on “bilat-
eral,” “individualistic,” and “privatistic” conceptions of SR.101 In some sec-
tors, private actors obviate the need for regulation by self-regulating, for in-
stance by adopting corporate codes of conduct or relying on “soft law” 
regimes.102 A case in point is the Montreux Document, which was premised 
on a shared understanding that private military and security companies 
would self-regulate.103 The flipside is that states should not be able to elude 
responsibility or disguise their participation in armed hostilities by hiding 
ty Council’s Role in Enforcing Counterterrorism Obligations, 8 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT
303 (2017) [hereinafter Proulx, An Incomplete Revolution].
99. See IAN JOHNSTONE, THE POWER OF DELIBERATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
POLITICS AND ORGANIZATIONS (2011) (especially chapters 5 and 8) [hereinafter JOHNSTONE,
THE POWER]; Ian Johnstone, Legal Deliberation and Argumentation in International Deci-
sion-Making, in THE FAULT LINES OF LEGITIMACY 175 (Hilary Charlesworth & Jean-Marc 
Coicaud eds., 2010); Ian Johnstone, Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better 
Argument, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 437 (2003); Ian Johnstone, The Security Council and Interna-
tional Law, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE 21ST CENTURY 771 (Sebastian von Ein-
siedel et al. eds., 2016).
100. See THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 13.
101. See generally Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, The Marginal Role of the Individual in 
the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, 15 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 39 (2004). 
102. On “soft law” mechanisms, see Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 327–28. Moreover, 
reliance on “soft law” mechanisms might prove problematic in some instances as the underly-
ing norms might be perceived as imprecise or non-binding. See generally Kenneth W. Abbott 
& Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422 
(2000); Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L.
581 (2005).
103. See Letter Dated 2 October 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland 
to the U.N. Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/467-S/2008/636 (Sept. 17, 
2008). 
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behind private military firms.104 Perhaps counterintuitively, “soft law” in-
struments promulgated by international organizations might in fact “gener-
ate as much or sometimes greater compliance than formally binding sources
of international obligation like treaties,” even though it remains unclear 
whether their violation amounts to an internationally wrongful act.105
Third, if we are truly to rethink individual responsibility outside the 
box, then regime interaction will be central in that inquiry. Individual re-
sponsibility often crops up in factually complex scenarios. In any given 
case, such responsibility might arise through a multi-leveled process involv-
ing multiple actors and different decisionmakers, including the ICJ and
UNSC (that is, a network of multi-leveled relationships of responsibility). 
Consequently, different legal regimes (such as ICIR, ICL, HR, IHL, and 
SR) might be superimposed, intersect, or interact. An obvious interaction 
might happen between individual responsibility and SR,106 as there is noth-
ing precluding SR from applying coextensively with individual responsibil-
ity schemes.107 However, the ICJ emphasized that individual criminal re-
sponsibility and SR constitute distinct legal schemes and pursue different 
104. See Oliver R. Jones, Implausible Deniability: State Responsibility for the Actions of 
Private Military Firms, 24 CONN. J. INT’L L. 239, 258 (2009).
105. JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 351, 359 (2017) (also arguing that international law generated by inter-
national organizations exists along a continuum of bindingness, thereby eluding the classical 
positivist tendency to search for an “ ‘on/off’ switch where something is or isn’t law,”); see 
also Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998).
106. This sometimes entails complementarity between SR and international (criminal) 
individual responsibility. See Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Complementarity Between 
State Responsibility and Individual Responsibility for Grave Violations of Human Rights: The
Crime of State Revisited, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY 
OF OSCAR SCHACHTER, supra note 25, at 259. On the interplay between SR and individual 
responsibility, see BÉATRICE I. BONAFÈ, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND 
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (2009); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, In-
ternational Criminal Responsibility of the Individual and International Responsibility of the 
State, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 
1085–99 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002); Hazel Fox, The International Court of Justice’s
Treatment of Acts of the State and in Particular the Attribution of Acts of Individuals to the 
States, in LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 147 (Nisuke Ando et al. eds., 2002); Nol-
lkaemper, supra note 2, at 615–40; Marina Spinedi, State Responsibility v. Individual Respon-
sibility for International Crimes: Tertium Non Datur?, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 895 (2002); Andre-
as Zimmermann, Comment: Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 
International Criminal Law and Human Rights Law – Synergy and Conflict?, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES 215 (Wolff Heintschel
von Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 2007).
107. See George T. Yates, III, State Responsibility for Nonwealth Injuries to Aliens in 
the Postwar Era, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO 
ALIENS 213 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1983).
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aims. A finding of responsibility under one regime does not necessarily en-
tail the same conclusion under the other.108
Sometimes, the same factual complex will involve wrongful conduct by 
different actors, be they states, individuals, or nonstate entities (for example, 
organizations or corporations), which can lead to shared responsibility be-
tween actors for the same wrongful act or for a series of interrelated wrong-
ful acts.109 In the counterterrorism context, a single terrorist strike can be fa-
cilitated by multiple state failures to thwart preparatory acts spanning 
several territories. The consequences of such attack may be exacerbated by 
state complacency or failure to act on intelligence reports. Different indi-
viduals and/or entities may have funded that terrorist enterprise. Other 
groups or individuals may have trained the operatives involved in the terror-
ist excursion. Different individuals or entities may have provided valuable 
logistical assistance, for example by forging documents or offering travel 
assistance. This is not to mention the actual underlying terrorist act(s) car-
ried out by NSAs during the strike. Ultimately, a complex web of wrongdo-
ing and multi-leveled relationships emerges: what role and to what degree 
will “individual responsibility” be brought to bear on this chain of events? 
This inquiry will invariably involve difficult determinations related to evi-
dence, causation, the apportionment of liability, standing, and enforce-
ment/implementation of responsibility.110
108. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶¶ 127–29 (Feb. 3). On its impli-
cations and related questions, see Beatrice I. Bonafè, Reassessing Dual Responsibility for In-
ternational Crimes, 73 SEQÜÊNCIA 19 (2016). For a critical take on this type of reasoning in a 
different, but related, case, see Antonio Cassese, A Judicial Massacre (Feb 27, 2007 2:50 
PM), GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/feb/27/
thejudicialmassacreofsrebr.
109. “Shared” international responsibility and related questions have received consider-
able academic coverage. See DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(André Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs eds., 2015); PRINCIPLES OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN APPRAISAL OF THE STATE OF THE ART (André Nollkaemper & 
Ilias Plakokefalos eds., 2014); Jean d’Aspremont et al., Sharing Responsibility Between Non-
State Actors and States in International Law: Introduction, 62 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 49 
(2015); André Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs, Shared Responsibility in International Law: A
Conceptual Framework, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 359 (2013). On shared responsibility and non-
state terrorists, see Kimberley N. Trapp, Shared Responsibility and Non-State Terrorist Ac-
tors, 62 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 141 (2015).
110. See generally Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary Ob-
jections, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. 240, 258–59 (June 26); André Nollkaemper, Introduction: Proce-
dural Aspects of Shared Responsibility in International Adjudication, 4 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 277 (2013); André Nollkaemper, Issues of Shared Responsibility Before the In-
ternational Court of Justice, in EVOLVING PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (Eva 
Rieter & Henri de Waele eds., 2012); John E. Noyes & Brian D. Smith, State Responsibility 
and the Principle of Joint and Several Liability, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 225 (1988). On the chal-
lenges posed by causation under SR, see Ilias Plakokefalos, Causation in the Law of State Re-
sponsibility and the Problem of Overdetermination: In Search of Clarity, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L.
471 (2015). See also PETERS, supra note 3, at 166 (highlighting difficulties in defining the 
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The key takeaway is that international individual responsibility—
especially when envisaged beyond the traditional “criminal” paradigm—
will often arise in combination with other levels of responsibility. Let us re-
view two brief examples. Following the Lockerbie incident, Libya’s SR was
bound up with the actual perpetrators’ individual responsibility for the air-
plane bombing, which ultimately facilitated investigation and prosecution 
by domestic institutions. Consequently, the UNSC dealt with Libya’s SR, as 
advocated by France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, while the 
ICJ was seized of the disputes over the culprits’ potential extradition under 
the Montreal Convention. In the end, the UNSC held Libya internationally 
responsible, but not without some ambiguity surrounding attribution stand-
ards.111 The ICJ never had the opportunity to rule on the merits of the dis-
putes submitted to it in Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 
1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie 
(Libya v. United Kingdom) (Libya v. United States).112
The Lockerbie disputes were state-to-state, handled by different UN or-
gans. However, underlying these disagreements was the individual respon-
sibility of the persons who committed the wrongful act (the Lockerbie 
bombing), which arose concomitantly with the processes described previ-
ously. It was only years later that suspicion arose that the bombing was di-
rectly ordered by Libya’s political leadership. Almost a decade earlier, the 
finding of individual responsibility facilitated (or catalyzed) Libya’s ac-
ceptance of its “civil” responsibility for the incident, given that “a credible 
judicial determination of the guilt of a Libyan secret service agent removed 
the element of deniability, and is likely to have encouraged acceptance of 
the obligation to make reparation on that basis.”113
legal regime governing “parallel responsibility” for international law breaches existing simul-
taneously between state actors and individuals).
111. For a full-fledged discussion of this precedent, see PROULX, INSTITUTIONALIZING, 
supra note 98, §§ 2.4.2, 3.1.5.1, 3.2.1, 3.2.1.1, 3.2.2, 4.1, 4.4.1, 4.4.5, 4.4.9, 4.5.1, 4.5.2 and 
4.6.1.
112. The Court also dealt with requests for provisional measures in both cases. See
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from 
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. 3 
(Apr. 14); Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Aris-
ing from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 
Rep. 114 (Apr. 14). During that phase of the proceedings, the ICJ rejected the argument that 
Libya was stripped of the exercise of its rights under the Montreal Convention, alleged on the 
ground that the UNSC was seized of a related matter and imposed certain obligations upon 
that state. Central was the fact that the Court had taken jurisdiction before the UNSC issued 
the relevant resolutions. See Libya v. U.S. ¶¶ 38, 44; see also Andreas L. Paulus, Jurispru-
dence of the International Court of Justice: Lockerbie Cases, Preliminary Objections, 9 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 550 (1998); Pieter H.F. Bekker, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 
1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) and (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgements, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 503 (1998).
113. TRAPP, supra note 23, at 236. For details on the criminal conviction and the rele-
vant individual’s subsequent release to Libya on compassionate grounds, see id. at 236 n.33. 
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Another example arose in the Belgium v. Senegal case. Here, the ICJ 
was confronted, inter alia, with Senegal’s failure to comply with the obliga-
tion to extradite or prosecute under the UNCAT regarding Mr. Hissène Ha-
bré, the former Chadian leader who orchestrated and directed various HR 
abuses, including acts of torture, during a specific time period.114 When an 
individual who violated the Convention is located on its territory, Article 
7(1) requires each party to, “if it does not extradite him, submit the case to 
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”115 This litigation 
raised a series of interesting questions, including whether Senegal would 
have fulfilled its obligation had it referred the case to the ICC. Otherwise 
put, did the “prosecute” component of the aut dedere aut judicare duty (the 
obligation to extradite or prosecute) necessarily mean domestic prosecution? 
In this instance, Senegal did not submit the case to the ICC by the time the
ICJ heard the dispute, and it created numerous delays in bringing the matter 
forward in its own jurisdiction. Granted, a plain reading of the Convention 
might suggest that Senegal was expected to submit the case to its own au-
thorities for the purposes of domestic criminal prosecution (though, as 
shown below, the outcome reached was not purely “domestic”).
Unsurprisingly, the Court found that Senegal violated its obligation by 
failing to submit the case to its competent authorities for criminal prosecu-
tion, stressing that it had to, “without further delay,” comply with this du-
ty.116 Mr. Habré was ultimately tried and convicted in Senegal following 
many delays. He was sentenced to life in prison for crimes against humanity 
by the Extraordinary African Chambers, a court instituted by the African 
Union and Senegal.117 This precedent shows that establishing individual re-
sponsibility is typically tied to or facilitated by the prior establishment of 
SR, or at least by the intercession of an authoritative decisionmaker outside 
the strict realm of individual criminal responsibility judicial decision-
making.
Here, it so happened to be the ICJ, but the UNSC can also be relevant in 
this regard. The Court’s settlement of the interstate dispute helped incentiv-
ize Senegal to forge ahead with the prosecution, ultimately resulting in a 
formal judicial finding of individual responsibility. This regime interaction 
On Libya’s acceptance of responsibility, see S.C. Res. 1506, at pmbl. (Sept. 12, 2003); Letter 
Dated 15 August 2003 from the Chargé d’Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya to the U.N. Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2003/818 (Aug. 15, 2003).
114. For commentary, see André Nollkaemper, Wither Aut Dedere? The Obligation to 
Extradite or Prosecute After the ICJ’s Judgment in Belgium v. Senegal, 4 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 501 (2013).
115. UNCAT, supra note 33, art. 7, ¶ 1.
116. Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Mer-
its, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 422, ¶ 122(6) (July 20).
117. See Ruth Maclean, Chad’s Hissène Habré Found Guilty of Crimes Against Human-
ity, GUARDIAN (May 30, 2016, 1:22 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/30/
chad-hissene-habre-guilty-crimes-against-humanity-senegal. 
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and mutual reinforcement of different responsibility-seeking processes also 
works the other way, namely, where a prior finding of individual criminal 
responsibility can inform a court’s analysis on a SR claim related to the 
same underlying facts, albeit transposed to the interstate level. For example, 
the ICJ’s Bosnian Genocide and Croatia v. Serbia decisions, both dealing 
with alleged violations of the Genocide Convention, drew considerable in-
spiration from the factual findings on individual responsibility formulated 
by the ICTY.118
Any project aiming to expand the scope of individual/international re-
sponsibility—and to presumably enhance accountability and reduce impuni-
ty—must acknowledge that establishing individual responsibility will some-
times be dependent on a multiplicity of (sometimes mutually reinforcing) 
legal and political processes, involving various actors. This includes a role 
for the UNSC. Recent developments support the need for alternate modes of 
liability in international law, beyond criminal responsibility. They indicate a 
shift toward the gradual recognition that individuals and NSAs can assume 
direct legal obligations under international law, of an increasing variety. 
This conclusion raises the related question of how those obligations are to 
be implemented and enforced. Conventional wisdom dictates that the tradi-
tional enforcement mechanisms to implement obligations between sover-
eign states, be they legal, judicial, diplomatic or political, have little to con-
tribute to this debate in terms of being the sole implementers of ICIR. In 
combination with other transnational/domestic legal and political processes, 
actors, and institutions, however, they may become effective means to es-
tablish and implement ICIR. This approach might go a long way in palliat-
ing some of the normative and enforcement voids described earlier.
As shown below, the UNSC disposes of some tools to bolster efforts 
toward fulfilling these objectives within a broader framework of concurrent 
legal regimes and institutions. Particularly valuable are the UNSC’s poten-
tial and actual contributions in formulating primary obligations incumbent 
upon individuals and NSAs. In a recent resolution addressing terrorism in 
Somalia, the Council reiterated its oft-repeated call to combat terrorism by 
“all means . . . . .”119 It then specifically subsumed “international law” within 
those means, including international human rights law, refugee law, and 
IHL, but not limiting its approach to those facets of international law.120 This 
posture suggests two key developments. First, the UNSC can play a role in 
developing international legal standards, particularly but not exclusively in 
118. See generally Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 3); Application of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. 
v. Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶¶ 278–376, (Feb. 26) (especially at 
¶ 297) (finding that a genocide, within the meaning of the Convention, was perpetrated at Sre-
brenica).
119. S.C. Res. 2444, at pmbl. (Nov. 14, 2018).
120. Id.
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the field of counterterrorism. Second, it follows logically from that power 
that the Council can also play a role in enforcing and implementing those 
standards and other extant international law duties in apposite scenarios. 
More broadly, recent developments highlight the variety of legal obligations 
individuals and NSAs assume under international law, extending beyond the 
familiar HR and IHL commitments.121 Thus, it is now up to scholars and 
policy-makers to identify meaningful and effective enforcement mecha-
nisms for such obligations.
III. The UNSC as Legislator: 
Impact on Individual Responsibility
Since 9/11, the UNSC has been a central force in driving counterterror-
ism agendas to enhance individual responsibility, including setting up a 
novel security apparatus like the Counter-Terrorism Committee (“CTC”)122
and further developing the “targeted” or “smart” sanctions regime. Indeed, 
the “targeted” sanctions regime has come under increasing scrutiny in recent 
years and generated considerable legal and policy debate.123 While the 
“smart sanctions” regime has some relevance for ICIR, this Article attempts 
to identify other modes and spaces for individual accountability. In other 
words, it seeks to offer a complementary understanding of other internation-
al individual responsibility mechanisms to remedy the dearth in scholarship. 
In so doing, it advocates a central role for a UNSC-driven general responsi-
bility model to be considered alongside the UN “targeted sanctions” model. 
That said, the “targeted” sanctions regime remains important in articulating 
the foundations of a general ICIR regime, given that the UNSC sanctions 
committees hand down decisions that are directly binding on individuals. 
For example, the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee designated 
individuals in fulfilling its mandate.124
121. See also supra nn. 54–62 and accompanying text.
122. On the creation of the CTC, see Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 333 
(2003). For a recent CTC-related resolution, see S.C. Res. 2395 (Dec. 21, 2017).
123. A full review of its implications has been carried out elsewhere, resulting in a rich 
literature. See generally Lisa Ginsborg, The United Nations Security Council’s Counter-
Terrorism Al-Qaida Sanctions Regime: Resolution 1267 and the 1267 Committee, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRORISM 608 (Ben Saul ed., 2014). 
More broadly, see Kristen E. Boon, U.N. Sanctions as Regulation, 15 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 543 
(2016). The “targeted sanctions” regime has also raised important questions regarding UNSC 
accountability and transparency, as seen in DEVIKA HOVELL, THE POWER OF PROCESS: THE 
VALUE OF DUE PROCESS IN SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS DECISION-MAKING (2016); La-
rissa van den Herik, Peripheral Hegemony in the Quest to Ensure Security Council Accounta-
bility for Its Individualized UN Sanctions Regime, 19 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 427 (2014); 
Devika Hovell, Due Process in the United Nations, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (2016). 
124. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1333, ¶ 8(c) (Dec. 19, 2000); see also PETERS, supra note 3, at 
95. On the Committee’s listing and delisting processes, along with its background and proce-
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A. The UNSC’s “Quasi-Legislative” Excursions
From a “quasi-legislative” standpoint, the UNSC formulated several 
primary legal norms, the observance of which concerns both states and 
NSAs and the violation of which could trigger both SR and ICIR. The 
UNSC’s most important initial contribution stemmed from Resolution 1373, 
which instituted the CTC. That landmark document is widely perceived as a 
prime example of the Council “legislating” relevant primary counterterror-
ism norms for both NSAs and states.125 From a broader systemic perspec-
tive, this UNSC lawmaking foray corresponds to a “legislative” trend asso-
ciated with international organizations generally. This precedent and other 
similar subsequent overtures by the Council have also been specifically 
equated with a UNSC-driven “legislative” trend, especially in counterterror-
ism contexts.126
Resolution 1373 primarily addressed states by universalizing certain ob-
ligations pertaining to terrorist financing and its criminalization, requiring 
the criminalization of other terrorism-related offenses in states’ legal sys-
tems, and prohibiting the direct/indirect support of terrorism. While this 
document requires states to monitor and regulate NSA conduct,127 it does not 
expressly address the potential responsibility of NSAs. Therefore, the viola-
tion of its prescriptions might be more relevant to SR deployment in the 
event of a breach.
dure, see Sanctions List Materials, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/
securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list (last visited Mar. 17, 2019). 
125. Although, in fairness, the resolution’s principal addressees are states. See BARDO 
FASSBENDER, THE UNITED NATIONS AS THE CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 96–97 (2009). More generally, see also José E. Alvarez, Hegemonic Interna-
tional Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 873, 874 n.7 (2003).
126. ALVAREZ, supra note 105, at 116–27 (reviewing relevant counterterrorism resolu-
tions as a manifestation of global “legislation”); see JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 195–217 (2005); JOHNSTONE, THE POWER, supra note 99,
at 93–105; Alan Boyle, International Lawmaking: Towards a New Role for the Security 
Council?, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 172, 178–80 (Anto-
nio Cassese ed., 2012); Ian Johnstone, Law-Making by International Organizations: Perspec-
tives from IL/IR Theory, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 266, 272–73 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & 
Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013); Ian Johnstone, Law-Making Through the Operational Activities 
of International Organizations, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 87 (2008); Ian Johnstone, The
Security Council as Legislature, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY 80, 80–82, 90 (Bruce Cronin & Ian Hurd eds., 2008); Paul C. 
Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 901–05 (2002); Stefan 
Talmon, Note and Comment, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT’L L.
175, 175–78 (2005).
127. For some, Resolution 1373 “might be seen as approval of an expanded theory of 
state responsibility attributing the behavior of non-state terrorists to a state that knowingly 
‘harbors’ terrorists and does not take action to prevent further terrorist attacks.” E.g., J. Patrick 
Kelly, The International Law of Force and the Fight Against Terrorism, DEL. LAW., Summer 
2003, at 18, 19.
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The resolution’s putative state centrism might be explained by its gen-
eral legislative tenor and the fact that it did not fix any applicable geograph-
ical or temporal limits to its application. It was adopted “in a general context 
not directly related to disciplining any individual country or particular non-
state actor.”128 However, the underlying obligations incumbent upon NSAs 
are implicit and flow from the wording of the document, especially when 
coupled with other landmark documents and the slew of subsequent themat-
ic and specific counterterrorism resolutions. Furthermore, there is validity to 
the idea that, in many instances, UNSC resolutions govern the conduct of 
NSAs, at least indirectly, by requiring states to regulate and counteract the 
unlawful actions of nonstate entities and individuals.129 A clear example of 
such UNSC action is evidenced by several resolutions obligating states to 
adopt various measures against terrorist groups and individuals.130 Another 
illustration of this practice resides in the UNSC’s creation of various 
“smart” sanctions regimes, over twenty-five since the end of the Cold War. 
They aim to constrict—with the support of national legislations and institu-
tions—the movements and capacity of subversive groups and individuals 
through, inter alia, “financial sanctions, travel bans, commodity trade re-
strictions and sectoral economic means.”131 Admittedly, this exercise of 
UNSC functions aligns more squarely with the objective of implementing 
individual responsibility, although such use of its powers remains intimately 
tied to UNSC “quasi-legislation.” More importantly, construing such UNSC 
measures as “indirect” regulation of NSAs might rest on an artificial distinc-
tion with “direct” regulation, especially since “these sanctions are triggered 
by and designed to reverse acts of non-state entities.”132 Nevertheless, in 
other instances, the UNSC directly and unequivocally regulates NSAs them-
selves without directing states or institutional actors to mediate or facilitate 
its prescriptions.133
128. Emilio J. Cárdenas, The United Nations Security Council’s Quest for Effectiveness,
25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1341, 1341 (2004).
129. See 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 800–02 (Bruno 
Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012); Fox et al., supra note 65, at 700.
130. See Resolutions, U.N. SEC. COUNCIL COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE,
https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/resources/security-council/resolutions/ (last visited March 17, 
2019). 
131. Mikael Eriksson & Peter Wallensteen, Targeting Sanctions and Ending Armed 
Conflicts: First Steps Towards a New Research Agenda, 91 INT’L AFF. 1387, 1388 (2015); see 
also Boon, supra note 123, at 560–61.
132. Fox et al., supra note 65, at 700 (observing that “the indirect nature of the punitive 
measures is not a meaningful distinction from direct measures.”).
133. International Law Association Non State Actor Committee Washington Confer-
ence, Third Report Prepared by the Co-Rapporteurs, Cedric Ryngaert and Jean d’Aspremont,
6–7 (2014) (remarking that the UNSC has required NSAs to observe HR duties); Jan Klab-
bers, (I Can’t Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State Ac-
tors, in NORDIC COSMOPOLITANISM: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MARTTI 
KOSKENNIEMI 351, 354–355 (Jarna Petman & Jan Klabbers eds., 2003) (suggesting that im-
posing obligations upon NSAs must be justified); P.H. Kooijmans, The Security Council and 
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In the same vein, the UNSC subsequently arrogated further lawmaking 
powers and extended its coverage of terrorism-related prescriptions to nu-
clear disarmament and nonproliferation, this time clearly carving out obliga-
tions for NSAs. It emphasized the clear nexus between its counterterrorism 
resolution-making and NSAs’ potential individual responsibility. In Resolu-
tion 1540’s preamble, adopted unanimously, the UNSC stated that it was
[g]ravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-
State actors such as those identified in the [UN] list established and 
maintained by the Committee established under [UNSC] resolution 
1267 and those to whom resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, de-
velop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 
and their means of delivery . . . .134
Moreover, the UNSC defined the term “[n]on-State actor” as an “indi-
vidual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in con-
ducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution.”135 In the 
operative part adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC de-
cided—presumably still assuming that the underlying prohibited conduct 
could trigger individual responsibility—that “all States shall refrain from 
providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, 
acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons and their means of delivery . . . .”136 It further decided 
that all States shall, “in accordance with their national procedures, . . . adopt 
and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor” 
to pursue the aims enumerated above.137
This last obligation was reiterated by the Council in a subsequent reso-
lution, which also reemphasizes much of Resolution 1540’s content.138 This 
development is significant because it takes the Council’s rhetoric and 
measures outside of the familiar fields of IHL and HR, expanding its regula-
Non-State Entities as Parties to Armed Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 333, 333–46 (Karel Wellens ed., 1998); see also infra Part IV.
134. S.C. Res. 1540, at pmbl. (Apr. 28, 2004) (italicization in original). The UNSC has 
also issued directions to prevent nonstate terrorist actors from acquiring other types of wea-
ponry. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2370 ¶¶ 7, 9, 13 (Aug. 2, 2017). But see PETERS, supra note 3, at 
93–94. 
135. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 134, at pmbl.
136. Id. ¶ 1.
137. Id. ¶ 2; see also Daniel H. Joyner, The Security Council as Legal Hegemon, 43
GEO. J. INT’L L. 225, 227–38 (2012); Roberto Lavalle, A Novel, If Awkward Exercise in Inter-
national Law Making: Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), 51 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 411,
429–34 (2004).
138. See S.C. Res. 2325, ¶ 15 (Dec. 15, 2016). On the UNSC’s broader role in reducing 
proliferation by NSAs, see Marco Pedrazzi, The Role of the Security Council in the Frame-
work of International Efforts to Fight Proliferation by Non-State Actors, in NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS: STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME 179 (Ida Caracciolo et al. 
eds., 2016).
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tory scope to a range of prohibited activities connected, inter alia, to the 
manufacturing, transmission, sale, and movement of harmful chemical, bio-
logical, and nuclear materials. These developments, paired with the UNSC’s 
regulation of terrorist NSAs described below, signal that the Council’s for-
mulation of international obligations can also be envisaged outside the well-
trodden paths of its past lawmaking on HR and humanitarian matters. Sure-
ly, this manifestation of power confirms that the Council might contribute to 
enhancing individual responsibility frameworks on a predominantly civil 
plane.
B. The UNSC’s Direct Move Toward Regulating Nonstate Actors
The UNSC recently “legislated” to regulate directly the conduct of in-
dividuals attempting to travel abroad to receive terrorist training or join the 
ranks of terrorist organizations, particularly singling out Al Qaeda, 
Daesh/ISIL, and the Al-Nusra Front (“ANF”) in Syria and Iraq.139 When 
compared to the practice canvassed in the preceding section, this recent 
move by the Council connotes more direct engagement with and regulation 
of NSAs, whereas its previous resolution-making was primarily addressed 
to states and only indirectly related to NSA conduct. At this juncture, de-
tractors of this use of UNSC powers might voice concerns over the prospect 
of that organ overstepping its bounds and assume its inability to bind non-
member states or nonstate entities because they fall outside of the UN’s 
membership. Certainly, this type of “law of treaties” argument, which is 
very much of classic vintage, acquired traction in some circles and might 
find further grounding in one passage of the Namibia Advisory Opinion.140
However, the UNSC’s practice over the last decades tells a different story. 
Its resolutions have generated a solid track record of compliance, confirm-
ing the pervasive reach of its prescriptions, particularly but not exclusively 
in the counterterrorism field. For instance, there is ample empirical evidence 
that the UNSC can bind non-member states with its resolutions, a proposi-
tion which has also been endorsed in the literature.141 Of course, such power 
139. In addition to the resolutions canvassed below, see also the entries in Foreign (Ter-
rorist) Fighters: Prospects and Challenges, 112 ASIL PROC. 301, 301–314 (2019) (including 
contributions by David DeBartolo, Sandra Krähenmann, Moira Macmillian, and Vincent-Joël 
Proulx).
140. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advi-
sory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, ¶ 126 (June 21). For scholarly takes on the reach of this 
passage, see Kelvin Widdows, Security Council Resolutions and Non-Members of the United 
Nations, 27 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 459, 461–62 (1978); Philippe Cahier, La Charte des Nations 
Unies et les Etats Tiers, in CURRENT PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS ON U.N.
LAW AND ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 81, 99–100 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1975); see 
also Öberg, supra note 70, at 885.
141. See, e.g., JEREMY MATAM FARRALL, UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 65–67 (2007); Devon Whittle, The Limits of Legality and the United Nations Security 
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is of limited practical importance since virtually all states are members in 
good standing of the UN.
That said, accepting that the UN Charter enjoys a quasi-constitutional 
status within the international community might make the prospect of the 
UNSC binding both non-member states and individuals/NSAs through its 
resolutions more palatable.142 Indeed, leading publicists rely on these devel-
opments and highlight the “trend towards the constitutionalization of the in-
ternational legal system,” which they explain mostly through increasing in-
stitutionalization and an enhanced emphasis on individual rights on the 
international scene143 (to which one should add the emergence of individual 
obligations as well). Given its role and features, the UNSC, while not strict-
ly a “judicial” organ, can exercise “both decision-making and executive 
powers.”144 This enables it to act to protect the interests of the international 
community. In summary, while it is not endowed with “judicial” powers, “it 
may incidentally perform certain quasi-judicial activities such as effecting 
determinations or findings[,]”145 which presumably also cover issues sur-
rounding ICIR. The ICJ’s Kosovo Advisory Opinion146 further suggests that 
the UNSC can formulate legal obligations directly binding upon individuals 
and NSAs, either expressly or implicitly, although any implicitly formulated 
obligation should be approached with caution because it might contravene 
the principle of legality.147
In Resolution 2170, the UNSC required states to take “national 
measures to suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters . . . .”148 Acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, the UNSC further enumerated a series of 
Council: Applying the Extra-Legal Measures Model to Chapter VII Action, 26 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 671, 674 (2015). Some of the relevant resolutions are also canvassed in the present account. 
142. For leading accounts framing the UN Charter as the constitution of the international 
legal system, see FASSBENDER, supra note 125; Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Char-
ter as Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529, 531
(1998). See also PETERS, supra note 3, at 99. On the constitutional impact of the law of inter-
national responsibility, see generally André Nollkaemper, Constitutionalization and the Unity 
of the Law of International Responsibility, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 535 (2009).
143. See Vera Gowlland-Debbas & Vassilis Pergantis, Rule of Law, in POST-CONFLICT 
PEACE BUILDING: A LEXICON 320, 320–326 (Vincent Chetail ed., 2009); Vera Gowlland-
Debbas, Security Council Change: The Pressure of Emerging International Public Policy, 65 
INT’L J. 119, 131 (2009-2010).
144. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadi?, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 37 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo-
slavia Oct. 2, 1995).
145. Id.
146. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independ-
ence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, ¶ 116 (July 22); text ac-
companying supra note 64. 
147. See also PETERS, supra note 3, at 97. For arguments cautioning against expanding 
the UNSC’s powers, see Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and 
the UN: A Dialectical View, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 325 (1995).
148. S.C. Res. 2170, ¶ 8 (Aug. 15, 2014).
252 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 40:215
condemnations and counterterrorism obligations incumbent upon individu-
als/NSAs, including:
(i) Strongly condemning the indiscriminate killing and targeting 
of civilians, along with other atrocities perpetrated in Syria and 
Iraq;149
(ii) Demanding that all nonstate terrorist groups cease all violent 
acts and disarm immediately;150
(iii) Condemning recruitment of individuals by those terrorist enti-
ties, which exacerbates ongoing conflicts and contributes to vi-
olent radicalization;151
(iv) Noting with concern that certain terrorist groups and individu-
als control oilfields and related infrastructure, supplementing 
their income and recruitment efforts;152
(v) Condemning any direct/indirect trade involving such terrorist 
groups or individuals;153 and
(vi) Linking the actions of such organizations and individuals to its 
terrorism sanctions regime, reiterating that it is prepared to list 
relevant actors under that system.154
As discussed in Part IV, these “quasi-judicial” moves might be more 
aptly equated with the establishment/implementation of individual responsi-
bility as opposed to constituting pure manifestations of (quasi-) “legislative” 
power. Most importantly, in Resolution 2170, the Council established an 
unequivocal connection between those terrorist factions’ conduct and the 
potential individual responsibility of the authors of the atrocities, including 
international criminal responsibility. The UNSC addressed NSAs directly 
and categorically obligated them to prevent terrorism when it
[r]ecall[ed] that widespread or systematic attacks directed against 
any civilian populations because of their ethnic or political back-
ground, religion or belief may constitute a crime against humanity,
emphasize[d] the need to ensure that ISIL, ANF and all other indi-
viduals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida 
are held accountable for abuses of [HR] and violations of [IHL], 
[and] urge[d] all parties to prevent such violations and abus-
es . . . .155
149. Id. ¶ 2. 
150. Id. ¶ 4.
151. Id. ¶ 7.
152. Id. ¶ 13.
153. Id. ¶ 14. The UNSC imposed similar obligations in other resolutions concerning 
Daesh/ISIL, ANF, and all other individuals and groups associated with Al Qaeda. See, e.g.,
S.C. Res. 2199 (Feb. 12, 2015); S.C. Res. 2347, ¶ 2 (Mar. 24, 2017).
154. S.C. Res. 2170, supra note 148, ¶ 7.
155. Id. ¶ 3 (emphases added); see also id., at pmbl. (“[r]eaffirming that those who have 
committed or are otherwise responsible for violations of [IHL] or violations or abuses of [HR] 
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The UNSC continued building on these pronouncements. As “one of 
the most important quasi-legislative efforts of the Council since resolution 
1373 (2001),”156 Resolution 2178 was adopted one month after Resolution 
2170, following a special sitting chaired by President Barack Obama and 
corralling many heads of state and/or government.157 It pursues the legacy of 
Resolutions 1373, 2161, and 2170 by requiring states to implement several 
measures constricting the movement and recruitment of foreign terrorist 
fighters. This development further bolstered the UNSC’s comprehensive 
counterterrorism strategy.158 Moreover, Resolution 2178 stresses the im-
portance of de-radicalization/counter-radicalization efforts, particularly by 
advocating a grassroots and concerted approach to achieve those objectives. 
This approach further reinforces the notion that individuals who commit ter-
rorist acts or support such conduct are liable to engage their ICIR. Striking-
ly, the resolution directly addresses individuals in its first operative para-
graph, when the Council “demand[ed] that all foreign terrorist fighters 
disarm and cease all terrorist acts and participation in armed conflict.”159
in Iraq and Syria, including persecution of individuals on the basis of their religion or belief, 
or on political grounds, must be held accountable . . . .”) (italicization in original).
156. Marko Milanovic, UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 2178 on Foreign Terror-
ist Fighters, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.ejiltalk.org/un-security-council-
adopts-resolution-2178-on-foreign-terrorist-fighters/. 
157. See also MYRIAM FEINBERG, SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL TERRORISM:
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 40–42 (2016) (arguing that Resolution 2178 
“goes at least one step further than Resolution 1373,” largely because of its treatment of 
states’ obligations regarding the freezing of individuals’ assets). For critical takes, see Kent 
Roach, Comparative Counter-Terrorism Law Comes of Age, in COMPARATIVE COUNTER-
TERRORISM LAW 1, 14–15 (Kent Roach ed., 2015) (lamenting the resolution’s “definitional 
ambiguity,” opining that it “will increase the risk that dissenters will be investigated and pun-
ished as terrorists. This may undermine the legitimacy of some counter-terrorism efforts.”); 
Kai Ambos, Our Terrorists, Your Terrorists? The United Nations Security Council Urges 
States to Combat “Foreign Terrorist Fighters”, but Does Not Define “Terrorism,” EJIL:
TALK! (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.ejiltalk.org/our-terrorists-your-terrorists-the-united-
nations-security-council-urges-states-to-combat-foreign-terrorist-fighters-but-does-not-define-
terrorism/; Martin Scheinin, Back to Post-9/11 Panic? Security Council Resolution on For-
eign Terrorist Fighters, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/
15407/post-911-panic-security-council-resolution-foreign-terrorist-fighters-scheinin/.
158. See S.C. Res. 2178 (Sep. 24, 2014). On foreign fighters, including various aspects 
of Resolution 2178, see FOREIGN FIGHTERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BEYOND
(Andrea de Guttry et al. eds., 2016). On Resolution 2178’s potential effects on the obligations 
of individuals, see Anne Peters, Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014): The “Foreign Ter-
rorist Fighter” as an International Legal Person, Part I, EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/security-council-resolution-2178-2014-the-foreign-terrorist-fighter-
as-an-international-legal-person-part-i/; Anne Peters, Security Council Resolution 2178 
(2014): The “Foreign Terrorist Fighter” as an International Legal Person, Part II, EJIL: 
TALK! (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.ejiltalk.org/security-council-resolution-2178-2014-the-
foreign-terrorist-fighter-as-an-international-legal-person-part-ii/.
159. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 158, ¶ 1 (italicization in original). On the direct effect of 
this resolution under international law, see PETERS, supra note 3, at 94, 508–09 (arguing that 
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This survey of recent practice highlights several key ideas. First and 
foremost, these resolutions establish a clear nexus between terrorism and the 
prospect of international individual responsibility. Second, by “legislating” 
and formulating important primary obligations for both individuals/groups 
and states, the UNSC has signaled that the violation of these duties will 
have important implications for the deployment of different levels of re-
sponsibility. As a result, relevant UNSC “legislative” forays and subsequent 
enforcement of its legislated counterterrorism norms under Chapter VII re-
inforced their binding character and bolstered the case for ICIR.
The UNSC thus sends important messages to actual and potential viola-
tors of international law and enhances the legal system’s overall coherence 
and robustness. The UNSC also offers valuable guidance for the post-breach 
calculus and clarifies relevant primary obligations, which will illuminate 
situations in which individuals and NSAs engage in wrongful conduct. In-
deed, UNSC determinations of individual responsibility can serve as an in-
structive benchmark and powerful registration of legal guilt “on the record,” 
which will facilitate subsequent processes seeking to implement the con-
cerned actor’s/actors’ responsibility in another setting, be it judicially or in 
some less formal avenue.160
Third, these precedents suggest that it is difficult to completely dissoci-
ate (or disentangle) the prospect of individual responsibility from SR con-
siderations. Rethinking the contents and contours of individual responsibil-
ity must be done against the backdrop of a comprehensive strategy, taking 
due account of states’ role(s) (and their obligations) in combating terrorism. 
The UNSC’s post-9/11 discourse is replete with responsibility-expansive 
language regarding states’ duties and also those of NSAs by implication. In-
deed, in areas such as transboundary pollution and terrorism, states’ compli-
ance with their primary obligations will often remain dependent on the ac-
tions of private individuals/legal persons within their jurisdiction, over 
which those states may or may not exert sufficient control for the purposes 
of both prevention and attribution under SR.
Last, on a related point, even when contemplating individual responsi-
bility, the role of states cannot be excised altogether from the equation. The 
effectiveness and enforcement of global counterterrorism efforts can only be 
achieved by enlisting their assistance, particularly through the exercise of 
their legislative power.161 Even a brief survey of domestic legislation con-
the prohibition on travelling to a region to participate in, support or finance terrorism found at 
paragraphs 1, 6 and 8 might create directly enforceable obligations under international law). 
160. For a compatible argument concerning SR, see Giorgio Gaja, Réflexions sur le Rôle 
du Conseil de Sécurité dans le Nouvel Ordre Mondial: A Propos des Rapports entre Maintien 
de la Paix et Crimes Internationaux des États, 97 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 297, 309 (1993) (Fr.).
161. See also High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) (“States are still 
the front-line responders to today’s threats.” These threats include “terrorism”). More recent-
ly, in a resolution highly relevant for the regulation of unlawful activity carried out by indi-
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firms that several states have criminalized individuals’ attempts to travel 
abroad to join or receive training from terrorist organizations.
UNSC Resolutions 2170 and 2178 apparently did not envisage a broad-
er conception of “individual responsibility” by focusing exclusively on “ter-
rorist” fighters. While preventing individuals from joining the ranks of ter-
rorist organizations is an important objective, these resolutions do not 
contemplate emerging challenges that may have unforeseen implications for 
ICIR. For instance, they would presumably fail to capture mercenaries or 
humanitarian do-gooders traveling abroad to fight against Daesh/ISIL. In 
some instances, anti-ISIL militias have perpetrated IHL or HR violations, 
which could potentially trigger the wrongdoing individuals’ legal accounta-
bility under an expanded theory of international individual responsibility.
What about a medic who travels to Syria but stays beyond the front-
lines, only providing support to an anti-ISIL militia that perpetrates HR/IHL 
violations? What if the sideline supporter decides to take up arms against 
Daesh/ISIL and, in the process, violates IHL or HR norms? These types of 
scenarios are both increasingly frequent and reveal policy and legal gaps in 
regimes governing individual responsibility for acts falling outside of strict-
ly defined “terrorist” activities.162 Setting aside the question whether there is 
a moral equivalency between the types of “foreign fighter” in these exam-
ples, the UNSC refers to “foreign terrorist fighters” and connects the threat 
such individuals represent not only to their acts but also to their “providing 
or receiving of terrorist training . . . .”163 These new and difficult scenarios 
raise more queries than solutions, but they must be addressed squarely going 
forward in devising individual responsibility models.
viduals—in particular, foreign (terrorist) fighters—the UNSC stressed that “Member States 
have the primary responsibility in countering terrorist acts and violent extremism conducive to 
terrorism.” See S.C. Res. 2395, supra note 122, at pmbl. (reiterating, throughout the resolu-
tion, several state-based obligations to prevent individuals from perpetrating or supporting 
terrorist activities). See, e.g., id., ¶¶ 16, 21–23.
162. A few interesting cases have arisen in Singapore. See. e.g., Shashi Jayakumar, The 
Curious Case of Wang Yuandongyi, STRAITS TIMES (Apr. 2, 2016), 
https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-curious-case-of-wang-yuandongyi; Yan Liang Lim, 
4 Singaporeans Arrested Under ISA for Involvement in Armed Violence Abroad, STRAITS 
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/4-singaporeans-arrested-
under-isa-for-involvement-in-armed-violence-abroad (recounting the 2016 arrest of four citi-
zens who planned to travel to Syria and Yemen. At least one individual was intent on fighting 
against Daesh/ISIL in Syria, but all four men were arrested since they had “demonstrated a 
readiness to use violence to pursue their religious cause. . . . [T]hey [were] assessed to pose a 
security threat to Singapore.”). 
163. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 158, ¶¶ 4–5 (emphasis added); see also Simon Chester-
man, Dogs of War or Jackals of Terror? Foreign Fighters and Mercenaries in International 
Law, 18 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 389, 396–97, 399 (2016). More recently, the UNSC en-
hanced its regulation of foreign terrorist fighters, arguably extending previous coverage of 
individuals’ and NSAs’ international legal obligations beyond what is mandated by both Res. 
1373 and the sectoral anti-terrorism conventions. See S.C. Res. 2396, supra note 16.
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IV. The UNSC as Implementer: Impact on 
Individual Responsibility
As prefaced above, the “targeted” sanctions regime remains considera-
bly relevant for this account. The freezing of terrorist assets and the terror-
ism sanctions regime have been used, supplemented, and refined liberally 
by the UNSC through a series of resolutions.164 In addition, there are at least 
two other principal ways in which UNSC action can enhance the individual 
responsibility (broadly understood) of private terrorists on the international 
plane. On one hand, the UNSC may pave the way for establishing individual 
criminal responsibility, either through hortatory language or binding pre-
scriptions in its resolutions or by exercising its referral power under the 
Rome Statute. On the other hand, the Council may enlist the logic and con-
ceptual tools of the law of SR to address the wrongful conduct of individu-
als and NSAs. Both options are discussed in turn below.
A. The UNSC and Criminal Liability
First, the UNSC considers that some terrorist atrocities could result in 
individual criminal responsibility. For instance, in Resolutions 2170 and 
2379, the UNSC considered that some terrorist acts might qualify as crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, or genocide and insisted that their authors 
should be held accountable.165 In many resolutions, the UNSC only address-
es NSAs directly to the extent that it reiterates that they must comply with 
existing IHL or HR obligations or duties arising under a peace treaty to 
which they are parties in armed conflict contexts.166 However, that trend is 
rapidly changing, at least following recent UNSC “quasi-legislative” forays 
concerning “foreign terrorist fighters” (and sometimes “hybrid” forays, 
combining “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” elements).
Indeed, the co-extensiveness between individual criminal responsibility 
and other normative schemes comes into relief when investigating regime 
interaction under the broad umbrella of “individual responsibility.” In many 
instances, this symbiosis cannot and should not be avoided as those regimes 
can be mutually reinforcing. Such interplay should be encouraged to bolster 
all relevant legal mechanisms deployed to enhance individual accountability 
and combat impunity. The promotion of increased civil/legal accountability, 
164. For the ISIL/Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee, see, for example, S.C. Res. 1267 
(Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 124; S.C. Res. 1730 (Dec. 19, 2006); S.C. Res. 
1904 (Dec. 17, 2009); S.C. Res. 1989 (June 27, 2011); S.C. Res. 2161 (June 17, 2014); S.C. 
Res. 2253 (Dec. 17, 2015). 
165. See S.C. Res. 2379, ¶ 1 (Sept. 21, 2017); supra note 155 and accompanying text.
166. Cahin, supra note 13, at 340. In addition to calling upon nonstate groups to observe 
undertakings under internationalized peace treaties, the UNSC has also directed such entities 
“to comply with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and with rules and princi-
ples of international law, in particular [IHL], [HR] and refugee law, and to implement fully 
the relevant decisions” or cease the violations of such obligations immediately. See S.C. Res. 
1296, at pmbl. (Apr. 19, 2000).
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at any level of governance, will reinforce norms and narratives against im-
punity. Insofar as it does, key stakeholders will be incentivized to block 
harmful activity, repair past breaches, facilitate attribution of responsibility 
to wrongdoing actors, and better prevent and/or deter future harms.167 After 
all, the UNSC has a key—even if at times troubled—role to play in 
strengthening and promoting the international rule of law.168 This likely en-
compasses its involvement in determining and implementing international 
responsibility for wrongful conduct in apposite circumstances.
Within the confines of individual criminal responsibility—which can 
remain co-extensive with a would-be ICIR regime—there are ways the 
UNSC can bolster existing accountability mechanisms. More generally, it 
could make more use of its Article 13(b) referral power under the Rome 
Statute. This mechanism enables the ICC to assume jurisdiction over a “sit-
uation in which one or more” of the crimes enumerated in Article 5 “ap-
pears to have been committed [and] is referred to the Prosecutor by the Se-
curity Council acting under Chapter VII.”169 This course of action, however, 
poses several obstacles. First, such a robust exercise of power by the UNSC 
and consequently the ICC could harm the ICC’s already shaky reputation in 
some regions of the world. For instance, several African nations have with-
drawn or announced their intention to withdraw as parties to the Rome Stat-
167. This argument is perhaps strengthened in situations where reparation beyond a 
mere determination of breach/non-pecuniary remedies can be envisaged. Indeed, some publi-
cists associate retributive, punitive and deterrent dimensions with the concept of compensato-
ry reparation. See, e.g., ANTONIO AUGUSTO CANÇADO TRINDADE, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR 
HUMANKIND: TOWARDS A NEW JUS GENTIUM 371 (2010). Unsurprisingly, at the interstate 
level, an international law violation entails the duty to repair any resulting harm. This oft-cited 
principle finds one of its earliest judicial expressions in Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 
Jurisdiction, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (July 26) and has since been invoked countless 
times in different settings and codified by the ILC. See, e.g., Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. 
Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13); ROSALYN HIGGINS,
PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 148 (1994); Constantin 
Economides, La Responsabilité de l’État pour Fait Internationalement Illicite, in 34
THESAURUS ACROASIUM: STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL, supra note 24, at 
165, 203–04; Christine Gray, Is There an International Law of Remedies?, 56 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 25, 29 (1985); Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State 
Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 833, 835 (2002). The outstanding query, however, remains 
whether this general principle can be extrapolated and applied to NSAs (that is, individuals 
and groups). Based on the arguments advanced in this Article, it appears that this transposition 
could be envisaged in some ICIR scenarios. 
168. See generally STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW THROUGH THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL (Jeremy Farrall & Hilary Charlesworth eds., 2016).
169. Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 13(b). For a recent account addressing the rela-
tionship between the UNSC and ICC and exploring the centrality of the referral mechanism in 
that dynamic, see GABRIEL M. LENTNER, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE REFERRAL MECHANISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
(2018) (assimilating the nature of this referral mechanism to a conferral of powers from the 
UNSC to the ICC).
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ute on the grounds that the ICC harbors an African bias.170 If the UNSC used 
its Chapter VII powers to initiate cases that predominantly involved African 
countries, that bias narrative would gain further traction. Second, there ex-
ists a broader concern about jurisdiction and consent. The Article 13(b) 
mechanism is perceived by some as operating as a “back door” type juris-
dictional hook by permitting the ICC to investigate and prosecute cases 
concerning locales that have not consented to the Rome Statute.171 While 
there are compelling reasons for this authority to exist, there are also com-
pelling reasons that the UNSC exercise it only in the most extreme of cir-
cumstances.
This mechanism is attractive in theory, but its infrequent invocation il-
lustrates states’ lack of political will as one of many factors prompting them 
not to support ICC proceedings resulting from UNSC referrals.172 Those 
states include Rome Statute parties—for example, South Africa, Nigeria, 
Uganda, Djibouti, and Chad. For instance, ICC arrest warrants against Su-
danese President Omar al-Bashir followed from a situation referred by the 
UNSC.173 Yet, President al-Bashir visited several countries after the indict-
ment, and they refused to arrest and extradite him.174 While I am not sug-
170. See, e.g., Brendon J. Cannon et al., The International Criminal Court and Africa: 
Contextualizing the Anti-ICC Narrative, 2 AFR. J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 6, 6 (2016); Kamari M. 
Clarke et al., Africa and the ICC: An Introduction, in AFRICA AND THE ICC: PERCEPTIONS OF 
JUSTICE 1, 1 (Kamari M. Clarke et al. eds., 2016); Sarah McGibbon, Risky Business: Witness-
es and Africa’s ICC Withdrawal, 28 HAGUE Y.B. INT’L L. 115, 157–58 (2015); Mandiaye 
Niang, Africa and the Legitimacy of the ICC in Question, 17 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 615, 615 
(2017). In fairness, some states that initially announced their intention to withdraw from the 
Rome Statute have reversed their intentions or have seen their domestic courts block their 
withdrawal. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Shift by South Africa on International Criminal 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2017, at A9; Agence France-Presse, Burundi Becomes First Na-
tion to Leave International Criminal Court, GUARDIAN, (Oct. 28, 2017, 8:34 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/oct/28/burundi-becomes-first-nation-to-leave-
international-criminal-court; Jason Burke, South African Judge Blocks Attempt to Withdraw 
from ICC, GUARDIAN, (Feb. 22, 2017, 5:59 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
feb/22/south-african-judge-blocks-attempt-to-withdraw-from-international-criminal-court. 
171. See, e.g., Sherif Elgebeily, The Politicization of International Criminal Law 
through the UN Security Council—Article 13(b) and the Flawed Backdoor to Prosecution, in 
THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Holly Cullen et al. eds., forthcoming, 
2019). For a neocolonialism-based critique of the Article 13(b) mechanism, see generally RES 
SCHUERCH, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AT THE MERCY OF POWERFUL STATES:
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEO-COLONIALISM CLAIM MADE BY AFRICAN STAKEHOLDERS
169–217 (2017). On the controversial relationship between the UNSC and the ICC, see also
Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Security Council and the ICC, in DIPLOMATIC AND JUDICIAL 
MEANS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 25 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes et al. eds., 2013).
172. See, e.g., Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, Before the United Nations 
Security Council on the Situation in Darfur, Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), INT’L CRIM.
CT., ¶ 14 (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=161213-otp-stat-
unsc-darfur.
173. See S.C. Res. 1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
174. See also Fatou Bensouda (Prosecutor of the Int’l Crim. Court), Twenty-Third Rep. 
to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), ¶ 11 (June 9, 2016) (also la-
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gesting that these omissions necessarily entailed legal effects, the lack of 
political will of those states to support ICC proceedings, many of which 
were parties to the Rome Statute, clearly evidenced the shortcomings of the 
ICL system.175 Of course, many other factors could be at play, such as a lack 
of appetite among the UNSC Permanent Members to refer situations to the 
ICC. It could also be that the UNSC has declined to recognize situations as 
sufficiently severe to warrant referral. Conversely, there have likely been 
genuine missed opportunities as well.176 When situations were referred to 
the ICC under Article 13(b), states’ subsequent inaction might also be ex-
plained by their misguided belief that international law prevents them from 
arresting a head of state.
An indictment could also be issued by the ICC Prosecutor against the 
Filipino President Mr. Rodrigo Duterte in light of alleged large-scale extra-
judicial killings and other abuses in his “war on drugs.” Indeed, the Prosecu-
tor hinted at this possibility in 2016, not to mention that the ICC opened a 
preliminary examination into the matter in February 2018.177 However, no 
UNSC referral would be required in such a case since the Philippines was a 
Rome Statute party at the material time, despite recently withdrawing from 
the ICC.178 A unique feature of that instrument resides in Article 27, which 
disables official capacity or head-of-state immunity from barring the 
Court’s jurisdiction.179 In broader terms, these examples and others only 
menting the UNSC’s inaction), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/23-otp-rep-UNSC-
darfur_ENG.pdf. 
175. For a critical take from the perspective of counterterrorism, see generally Vincent-
Joël Proulx, Counterterrorism and National Security: The Domestic/International Law Inter-
face, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 171.
176. See generally Elgebeily, supra note 171.
177. See Nikko Dizon, International Court Warns PH on Killings, PHILLIPINE DAILY 
INQUIRER (Oct. 16, 2016, 1:36 AM), https://globalnation.inquirer.net/146810/international-
court-warns-ph-on-killings?utm_expid=.XqNwTug2W6nwDVUSgFJXed.1. On the ICC’s
preliminary examination, see Preliminary Examination: The Philippines, INT’L CRIM. CT., 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/philippines. (last visited Mar. 17, 2019).
178. In fact, there is a pending case before The Philippines’ Supreme Court challenging 
the constitutionality of the announced withdrawal. See also Felipe Villamor, Duterte Says 
Philippines to Exit Court at The Hague, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2018, at A6. The fate of this 
constitutional challenge is now unknown, however, since the Philippines’ withdrawal from the 
ICC became effective on March 17, 2019. The withdrawal should not affect the ongoing ex-
amination and potential future proceedings against Mr. Duterte since “the ICC retains its ju-
risdiction over crimes committed during the time in which the State was party to the Statute 
and may exercise this jurisdiction over these crimes even after the withdrawal becomes effec-
tive.” ICC Statement on The Philippines’ Notice of Withdrawal: State Participation in Rome 
Statute System Essential to International Rule of Law, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Mar. 20, 2018), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=161213-otp-stat-unsc-darfur. See also Raul 
Dancel, Philippines Leaves International Criminal Court as it Probes Duterte’s Drugs 
Crackdown, STRAITS TIMES (Mar. 16, 2019), https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-
asia/philippines-leaves-international-criminal-court-as-it-probes-dutertes-drugs-crackdown.
179. One potential problem arises when attempting to remove immunity rationae mate-
riae to downgrade heads of state, or other high-level officials, to the status of regular interna-
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evince the inherent political implications of such a procedure while confirm-
ing the paucity of relevant precedents related to “terrorism” and other sub-
versive activities perpetrated by NSAs.
The biggest stumbling block to this approach resides in the fact that the 
Rome Statute failed to create a stand-alone jurisdictional basis for adjudicat-
ing “terrorism” crimes. But all is not lost. Through creative arguments, one 
can “read in” terrorist acts meeting all other Rome Statute “threshold” re-
quirements of core crimes in apposite factual scenarios. After 9/11, some 
advocated a rapprochement between terrorist acts of a sufficient scale to 
qualify as either crimes against humanity (for example, the 9/11 attacks)180
or war crimes181 and ICC jurisdictional requirements. Arguably, these pos-
tures were later assisted by jurisprudential developments at the ICTY182 and 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”).183 That said, the consensus remains 
that the ICC currently does not have jurisdiction over “terrorism” as a stand-
alone crime.184 An amendment to the Rome Statute would be required to 
create such a category.
tional individuals, subject to a would-be ICIR. In such cases, the applicable legal regime is ill-
defined, despite some publicists’ hopeful outlook. See Lorna McGregor, State Immunity and 
Human Rights: Is There a Future after Germany v. Italy?, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 125, 139–
44 (2013).
180. See Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court:
Possibilities and Problems, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 26–41, 52 (2002); Vincent-Joël Proulx, Re-
thinking the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in the Post-September 11th Era:
Should Acts of Terrorism Qualify as Crimes Against Humanity?, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1009, 1080 (2004); ROBERTA ARNOLD, THE ICC AS A NEW INSTRUMENT FOR REPRESSING 
TERRORISM 202–72 (2004).
181. See Sébastien Jodoin, Terrorism as a War Crime, 7 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 77, 77, 
108 (2007).
182. The ICTY confirmed the existence of a customary war crime of “spreading terror 
amongst a civilian population.” Prosecutor v. Gali?, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Judgment, 
¶¶ 79, 87–90 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006); see also Ben Saul, 
Crimes and Prohibitions of “Terror” and “Terrorism” in Armed Conflict: 1919–2005, 4 J.
INT’L L. PEACE & ARMED CONFLICT 264, 269 (2005). Previously, some scholars had ad-
vanced that “terrorism” amounted to an international customary crime. See ANTONIO 
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 120–30 (2003).
183. In 2011, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s (“STL”) Appeals Chamber found that a 
customary international crime of terrorism exists during peacetime. See Prosecutor v. Ayyash, 
Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, 
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, ¶¶ 83–113, 145–48 (Special Trib. for Leb. Feb. 
16, 2011). For critical takes, see Kai Ambos, Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon: Is There a Crime of Terrorism Under International Law?, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
655 (2011); Ben Saul, Legislating from a Radical Hague: The United Nations Special Tribu-
nal for Lebanon Invents an International Crime of Transnational Terrorism, 24 LEIDEN J.
INT’L L. 677 (2011).
184. See Andreas Zimmermann, Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law: Article 
5, in ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 111, 113–
15 (Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds., 3d ed. 2016); Antonio Cassese, Terrorism Is Also Dis-
rupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 994 
(2001).
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Some “first wave” scholars argued that the UNSC can facilitate ICC 
prosecutions by referring cases to the Court. They suggested that the Coun-
cil could do so when confronted with individuals/organizations that commit-
ted terrorist acts conforming with the requirements of Article 7 of the Rome 
Statute (that is, crimes against humanity).185 Recently, there has been a re-
crudescence of this line of argument, or at least a push toward broadening 
the ICC’s jurisdictional scope to encompass “terrorism” crimes,186 while 
considerable skepticism over the viability of such a prospect continues to 
animate other camps.187 Nevertheless, the practical and conceptual problem 
with this prospect lies in the fact that, to qualify as “war crimes,” terrorist 
acts must necessarily be committed in armed conflict.
Moreover, to qualify as “crimes against humanity,” the facts underlying 
any terrorist acts presumably falling within ICC jurisdiction must fulfil the 
requisite elements of this core crime under Article 7. Ultimately, one would 
still be faced with crimes against humanity (because the underlying acts 
meet all statutory and jurisprudential requirements for that category of 
crime) that also happen to constitute “terrorism,” irrespective of how that 
term is defined.188 Hence, this conclusion would strictly be a factual appre-
ciation with no legal implications or effect whatsoever under the current 
ICC structure. That is a far cry from digging a new jurisdictional furrow in 
which “terrorism” can be accommodated on a standalone basis. An alternate 
avenue is to create a specialized international/hybrid tribunal to handle ter-
rorism cases. The UNSC could also institute an ad hoc tribunal, but this path 
is fraught with many potential pitfalls, chief amongst them being the lack of 
a universally agreed upon definition of “terrorism.”189 More importantly, 
185. See, e.g., Proulx, supra note 180, at 1018–19. But see generally Robert Cryer, Ter-
rorism and the International Criminal Court, 82 AUSTL. L. REFORM COMMISSION REFORM J.,
Autumn 2003, at 14 (arguing that the UNSC should not rewrite the Rome Statute through its 
resolutions). 
186. See Aviv Cohen, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal Court:
Reevaluating an Unused Legal Tool to Combat Terrorism, 20 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 219 
(2012); Angela Hare, A New Forum for the Prosecution of Terrorists: Exploring the Possibil-
ity of the Addition of Terrorism to the Rome Statute’s Jurisdiction, 8 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L.
REV. 95 (2010); Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sin Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection 
of Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119, 192 (2008). 
187. See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, The Quest for Individual Adjudication and Accountabil-
ity: Are International Tribunals the Right Response to Terrorism?, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
497, 501–06 (2010); Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, From Rome to Nuremberg with Roman-
ticism: On Terrorism, 38 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 689, 710–11 (2016).
188. See ANDREA BIANCHI & YASMIN NAQVI, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
AND TERRORISM 247–56 (2011).
189. On this aspect and the challenges of setting up a specialized “terrorism” tribunal, 
see Bibi van Ginkel, Combating Terrorism: Proposals for Improving the International Legal 
Framework, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 126, at 
461, 470. After 9/11, some commentators nonetheless suggested the creation of an ad hoc in-
ternational tribunal to address Al Qaeda’s unlawful conduct. See, e.g., Christopher Green-
wood, International Law and the ‘War Against Terrorism,’ 78 INT’L AFF. 301, 305 (2002).
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these considerations echo my earlier remark that the international communi-
ty’s overemphasis on individual criminal responsibility might be misguided, 
overly selective/arbitrary, and ultimately counterproductive in identifying 
and developing richer individual accountability models.
B. The UNSC and Civil Liability
The second and more relevant approach available to the UNSC is to fol-
low what could be characterized as “SR logic,” but transposed to an indi-
vidual responsibility setting. In fact, the UNSC has sometimes done so very 
plainly. As a preliminary matter, any apprehension about potentially elevat-
ing subversive NSAs to an undesirable level by granting them (limited) le-
gal personality for the purposes of holding them legally accountable must be 
dispelled. Indeed, “it is necessary not to give too much weight to the fear, 
often stated in the academic literature, that such groups would thereby be 
accorded legitimacy and the legal personality, even if functional and lim-
ited, which is the necessary corollary of responsibility.”190 A purist’s objec-
tion to this approach might be rooted in the belief that NSAs have no formal 
role to play, or any at all, within international law’s universe, either as law-
making entities or formal/direct subjects of the discipline.191 However, this 
view is increasingly (and rightly) rejected by many publicists as antiquated, 
overly state-centric, and simply impractical in light of present-day security 
threats.192 For example, such a rigid and overly formalistic construction 
stands in opposition to the reality of non-international armed conflicts. It 
faces persuasive functionalist claims “assert[ing] a need to recognize greater 
legal parity among parties to [such conflicts] where rebels control substan-
tial territory and in other ways act like states.”193 Above all, the simple fact 
190. Cahin, supra note 13, at 338. 
191. See, e.g., d’Aspremont, supra note 79, at 25.
192. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-STATE ACTORS, supra note 11; NON-STATE 
ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11; PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 11. See generally NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: CREATION,
EVOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 8; BARBARA WOODWARD, GLOBAL CIVIL 
SOCIETY IN INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2010); Agata Klec-
zkowska, Armed Non-State Actors and Customary International Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS 
AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: CREATION, EVOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 
8, at 60; Math Noortmann & Cedric Ryngaert, Non-State Actors: Law-Takers or Law-
Makers? Is That the Question?, in NON-STATE ACTORS DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
FROM LAW-TAKERS TO LAW-MAKERS 195 (Math Noortmann & Cedric Ryngaert eds., 2010).
193. Fox et al., supra note 65, at 669. For views on both sides of this debate, see Wil-
liam Worster, Relative International Legal Personality of Non-State Actors, 42 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 207, 229–40 nn. 78–131 (2015). For a review of the legal implications of “territorial 
nonstate actors” in different contexts, see Natalia Cwicinskaja, International Human Rights 
Law and Territorial Non-State Actors: Cases of the Council of Europe Region, in NON-STATE 
ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: CREATION, EVOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT,
supra note 8, at 260–84; Yaël Ronen, Human Rights Obligations of Territorial Non-State Ac-
tors, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 21 (2013).
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remains that for international law to ignore the importance and role of NSAs 
in norm creation and enforcement is to ignore reality.194
A vital objective in articulating a general ICIR regime is to facilitate the 
development of a narrative against impunity. The power of that rhetoric 
might in turn embolden key constituencies and stakeholders to pursue 
claims against wrongdoing individuals and NSAs, which may lead to civil 
lawsuits, reparation, or the shaming of unlawful conduct and/or actors. This 
narrative might also incentivize some states to better monitor and regulate 
the activities of subversive NSAs under their jurisdiction or control. At the 
same time, it is imperative that the conceptual architecture of a general ICIR 
regime operate on the understanding that a necessarily limited legal person-
ality be conferred to NSAs within this framework. It follows that, “[i]n re-
ality, legal personality is only of value to the extent of its social utility, 
which in this case is the aim of making the formidable power to cause harm 
of such entities, a power which is not reducible to the individual acts of their 
members, coincide with a corresponding capacity to be held responsible.”195
In short, the architects of a general ICIR regime must be cautious not to 
produce the absurd result of unduly legitimizing subversive and/or unlawful 
NSAs. Similarly, the resulting regime must not grant such actors rights in-
compatible with the nature of their mission statements and actions. For 
most, it would be unthinkable to formally recognize Daesh/ISIL’s or Boko 
Haram’s right to claim territorial control and political independence or their 
right to sue. These considerations must be woven into the ICIR regime’s 
conceptual and theoretical fabric.
Relevant precedents confirm that the UNSC can implement SR for state 
failures to prevent terrorism or violations of other counterterrorism duties.196
Indeed, the UNSC sometimes attributes wrongful conduct to states and cor-
194. By way of example, NGOs have been instrumental in expanding the enforcement of 
HR in the counterterrorism context. See, e.g., Jeffrey Davis, NGOs in Terrorism Cases: Dif-
fusing Norms of International Human Rights Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: CREATION, EVOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 8, at 
459.
195. Cahin, supra note 13, at 338.
196. See PROULX, INSTITUTIONALIZING, supra note 98; Proulx, An Incomplete Revolu-
tion, supra note 98. On the UNSC and SR generally, see Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, The
Role of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System, in THE ROLE 
OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 269 (Michael Byers ed., 2000); Giorgio Gaja, Comment: The Impact of 
Security Council Resolutions on State Responsibility, in PEACE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 53–60 (Georg Nolte ed., 2009); 
Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the Interna-
tional Legal System, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, id., at 277; Vera Gowlland-Debbas, 
Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility, 43 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 55 (1994) [hereinafter Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action]; 
Rosalyn Higgins, The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security 
Council, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1970).
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respondingly devises legal consequences flowing from the breaches it has 
determined.197 This translates into the imposition of secondary obligations 
upon the responsible states. When it holds states accountable, the Council 
thus draws heavily on the SR repertoire, sometimes without expressly label-
ling its decisions accordingly. It nonetheless imposes obligations of cessa-
tion, assurances of non-repetition, satisfaction, other forms of reparation un-
der Chapter VII, and other secondary obligations outside Chapter VII 
(including reparation broadly and compensation specifically).198
Similar logic could govern ICIR and manifest in the UNSC’s attribution 
of wrongful conduct to NSAs, subject to the caveats expressed in section 
II(A) concerning the elaboration of a remedial normative scheme that heeds 
the distinct nature and character of NSAs. Hence, “[t]he criminal responsi-
bility of the members of various armed groups,” affirmed by UNSC resolu-
tions, “does not constitute the only way in which those individuals may be 
held to account for illegal acts which are attributable to them.”199 In fact, 
“[a]nother form of responsibility may be said to exist, as a result of the 
‘sanctions’ adopted by the Security Council against such groups . . . .”200 In 
contrast to the above situations, however, the UNSC has stopped short of 
ordering reparation or pecuniary compensation when holding NSAs respon-
sible.
That said, “there is no justification for subjecting non-State groups to 
rules which are substantially different from those applicable to States. An 
evolution of the practice of the [UNSC] in this regard is not to be exclud-
ed . . . .”201 This reality not only stems from the nexus between SR and indi-
vidual responsibility but also from the blind spots characterizing the former 
regime discussed above. After all, this Article’s introductory remarks must 
be reiterated in respect to armed bands and criminal groups. While, in prin-
ciple, nothing precludes the law of SR from being applied coextensively 
with individual responsibility mechanisms, it is precisely SR’s inefficiency 
in dealing with such actors that would justify recognizing an international 
responsibility of armed bands and criminal groups. At least, this line of ar-
gument has been persuasively defended by some commentators.202
197. See, e.g., PROULX, INSTITUTIONALIZING, supra note 98, at 155–260; Gowlland-
Debbas, The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal Sys-
tem, supra note 196; Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action, supra note 
196.
198. For relevant arguments and practice, see generally PROULX, INSTITUTIONALIZING,
supra note 98; Proulx, An Incomplete Revolution, supra note 98.
199. Cahin, supra note 13, at 339.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 340.
202. Id. at 335–36. Relatedly, existing scholarship has generally treated the legal respon-
sibility of armed opposition groups as a question governed by ICL, IHL, and HR. See
LIESBETH ZEGVELD, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002).
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Stepping outside the familiar HR and IHL fields, on at least one occa-
sion the UNSC transposed a fundamental international legal norm expressly 
reserved for sovereign states to NSAs. It is widely known that the definition 
of “aggression” in international law was originally adopted to capture un-
lawful use of force carried out by states.203 Nevertheless, in 1977, the UNSC 
attributed an act of aggression to nonstate mercenaries for their subversive 
activities in Benin.204 What is more, the Council noted that “the Government 
of Benin ha[d] reserved its right with respect to any eventual claims for 
compensation which it may wish to assert . . . .”205 This precedent is signifi-
cant because it evidences the UNSC’s willingness to transpose state-centric 
legal rationales to the unlawful acts of NSAs. It directly supports this Arti-
cle’s central argument in that regard. In addition, the Council was cautious 
not to specify which entity could be the target of Benin’s eventual reparative 
case, not to mention that it used the plural form when suggesting that the 
victim state might have actionable compensation claims. At a minimum, this 
conclusion suggests that multiple undefined parties might have been respon-
sible for that wrongful act (and on the hook for compensation). In the best-
case scenario for present purposes, this UNSC resolution suggests that those 
responsible parties could include nonstate entities. Irrespective of one’s in-
terpretation of that precedent, it bolsters the case for ICIR in international 
law.
While the UNSC has generally been reluctant to impose direct orders 
on private businesses and/or individuals, it certainly has the ability to do so. 
For example, the UNSC could impose a financial embargo and determine to 
which firms that measure applies.206 Yet, the Council has not done this, 
which begs the question—why? One answer, at least in part, might be the 
absence of a comprehensive legal regime governing this type of situation. 
The particular legal relationships and the consequences thereof lack defini-
tion and are thus not operative.
Moreover, conventional wisdom dictates that states are better situated to 
induce individuals under their jurisdiction to comply with constraining legal 
orders.207 There is no reason why more targeted UNSC-prescribed individual 
203. See G.A. Res 3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974).
204. See S.C. Res. 405, ¶ 2 (Apr. 14, 1977) (“Strongly condemns the act of armed ag-
gression perpetrated” by the NSAs) (italicization in original); see also Cohen, supra note 186,
at 249–50. For a compatible UNSC resolution on the unlawful activities of nonstate mercenar-
ies against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see S.C. Res. 239 (July 10, 1967).
205. S.C. Res. 405, supra note 204, ¶ 9.
206. Tomuschat, supra note 38, at 319.
207. See id. However, the UNSC exercising such power might help palliate shortcom-
ings of domestically-based transnational HR litigation, especially given recent developments 
surrounding ATCA’s application and the European Court of Human Right’s (“ECtHR”) rejec-
tion of universal civil jurisdiction. With respect to ATCA, consider the following passage 
from the U.S. Court of Appeals: “No corporation has ever been subject to any form of liability 
(whether civil, criminal, or otherwise) under the customary international law of human rights. 
Rather, sources of customary international law have, on several occasions, explicitly rejected 
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responsibility measures could not be facilitated by those same states. Just 
because the measures emanate from the Council does not mean that they 
cannot be given simultaneous legal effect domestically, internationally, and 
perhaps even transnationally. On this last point, it may well be that relevant 
UNSC measures could enlist the support of other NSAs for more effective 
implementation. For example, the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) 
has been pivotal in developing “soft law” standards to combat terrorist fi-
nancing, efforts which could be extended to support UNSC-imposed conse-
quences targeting particularly subversive NSAs in the global financial sec-
tor.208
C. Relevant UNSC Practice
While it might not have ordered pecuniary compensation as a direct 
consequence of its findings of individual responsibility, the UNSC has at-
tributed wrongful conduct and, by extension, individual responsibility to 
NSAs in the past, including the National Union for the Total Independence 
of Angola (“UNITA”),209 Bosnian Serb paramilitary units,210 Al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan,211 the Janjaweed in Sudan,212 and other terrorist groups.213 In 
the idea of corporate liability. Thus, corporate liability has not attained a discernible, much 
less universal, acceptance among nations of the world in their relations inter se, and it cannot, 
as a result, form the basis of a suit under the [ATCA]. Acknowledging the absence of corpo-
rate liability . . . is . . . a recognition that the States of the world, in their relations with one 
another . . . have determined that moral and legal responsibility for heinous crimes should rest 
on the individual whose conduct makes him or her ‘hostis humani generis, an enemy of all 
mankind.’ ”
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 148–49 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); 
see also id. at 121. On more recent developments, see infra Part V.
208. See Terrorist Financing: FATF’s Strategy on Combating Terrorist Financing,
FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/terroristfinancing.html
(last visited Mar. 17, 2019). On the FATF’s contributions to combating terrorist financing, see 
Ben Saul, The Emerging International Law of Terrorism, 1 IND. Y.B. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 10–
12 (2010).
209. See infra nn. 223, 232, 240, 246, and accompanying text; see also S.C. Res. 1127 
(Aug. 28, 1997).
210. See S.C. Res. 819, ¶ 7 (Apr. 13, 1993) (“[r]eaffirm[ing] its condemnation of all vio-
lations of [IHL], in particular the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and reaffirm[ing] that those 
who commit or order the commission of such acts shall be held individually responsible in 
respect of such acts;”) (markings omitted); see also S.C. Res. 713 (Sept. 25, 1991).
211. See S.C. Res. 1390, at pmbl. (Jan. 16, 2002) (“[c]ondemning the Al-Qaida network 
and other associated terrorist groups, for the multiple criminal, terrorist acts, aimed at causing 
the deaths of numerous innocent civilians, and the destruction of property,”) (italicization in 
original).
212. See S.C. Res. 1564, at pmbl. (Sept. 18, 2004); see also id., ¶¶ 1, 7.
213. See Gowlland-Debbas, The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the 
International Legal System, supra note 196, at 307–08; Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Responsibil-
ity and the United Nations Charter, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra 
note 13, at 129; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, State Sponsors of Terrorism: Issues of International Re-
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2015, it attributed a series of attacks to Daesh/ISIL in straightforward terms, 
including the destruction of a Russian airliner over Egypt’s Sinai desert. In 
that context, the Council
[u]nequivocally condemn[ed] in the strongest terms the horrifying 
terrorist attacks perpetrated by ISIL also known as Da’esh which 
took place on 26 June 2015 in Sousse, on 10 October 2015 Ankara, 
on 31 October 2015 over Sinaï, on 12 November 2015 in Beirut 
and on 13 November 2015 in Paris, and all other attacks perpetrated 
by ISIL also known as Da’esh, including hostage-taking and kill-
ing, and note[d] it has the capability and intention to carry out fur-
ther attacks and regard[ed] all such acts of terrorism as a threat to 
peace and security . . . .214
This resolution followed UNSC Resolution 2166. There, the Council con-
demned in equally severe terms the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight 
MH17 in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine, and “[d]emand[ed] that those responsi-
ble . . . be held to account and that all States cooperate fully with efforts to 
establish accountability,” again demonstrating the important synergy be-
tween SR and individual responsibility.215
Similarly, the UNSC “condemn[ed] in the strongest terms recent terror-
ist attacks perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the region . . . .”216 It 
noted “with concern the number of attacks in Mogadishu,” before “ex-
press[ing] further concern that Al-Shabaab continue to carry out terrorist 
acts in Somalia . . . .”217 Most important, the Council emphasized a direct 
nexus between its attribution of the terrorist attacks and the importance of 
individual responsibility, at least in a rhetorical and sweeping sense. It none-
theless resulted in a strong message of deterrence and accountability. In one 
operative clause, the UNSC “underline[d] the importance of holding perpe-
trators to account (in full compliance with international law) . . . .”218 More-
over, the Council’s conclusion here unequivocally links its opprobrium with 
normative and legal consequences under international law, suggesting that it 
could assume some role—however limited or infrequent—through a general 
regime for the establishment and implementation of ICIR. In a more recent 
resolution dealing with Somalia, the UNSC strongly condemned the devas-
sponsibility, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 3, 8 (Andrea 
Bianchi ed., 2004).
214. S.C. Res. 2249, ¶ 1 (Nov. 20, 2015) (italicization in original). On the airliner attack, 
see Gwyn Topham et al., Egypt Plane Crash: Russia Says Jet Was Bombed in Terror Attack,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2015 1:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/17/
egypt-plane-crash-bomb-jet-russia-security-service.
215. S.C. Res. 2166, ¶¶ 1, 11 (July 21, 2014) (italicization in original). On follow-up
action and obstacles, see Michael Ramsden, Uniting for MH17, 7 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 337, 337–
39 (2017).
216. S.C. Res. 2158, ¶ 7 (May 29, 2014).
217. Id.
218. Id. (italicization in original).
268 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 40:215
tating terrorist attacks carried out by Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu in October 
of 2017 and February of 2018, emphatically denounced the presence of 
groups affiliated with Daesh/ISIL in Somalia, and imposed an obligation of 
cessation upon those NSAs to ensure a return to legality.219 After 
“[e]xpress[ing] concern about all violations of [IHL] and violations and 
abuses of [HR] including by Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to 
[Daesh/ISIL],” the Council “call[ed] on all parties to comply immediately 
with their obligations under international law and to fulfil their obligations 
under [IHL] . . . .”220
The breach–attribution–consequence syllogism, central in SR, also an-
imated other UNSC resolutions where it directed the application of second-
ary remedial norms to NSAs. When confronted with complex armed hostili-
ties, the UNSC imposed an obligation of cessation upon state and nonstate 
actors. Dealing with the Rwandan conflict, it “[d]emand[ed] that all parties 
to the conflict immediately cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire, and bring 
an end to the mindless violence and carnage engulfing Rwanda . . . .”221
Handling the repression of civilians in Kosovo, coupled with grave HR and 
IHL violations, the UNSC again drew inspiration from international respon-
sibility logic and directed its prescriptions to both states and nonstate actors, 
demanding “that all parties, groups and individuals immediately cease hos-
tilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo . . . .”222 Similarly, in a different 
context the UNSC demanded “that all Somali parties, including movements 
and factions,” observe their obligations previously articulated in a ceasefire 
and disarmament agreement.223 More recently, it relied on this logic when 
addressing escalating violence in Syria by calling on all parties, including 
nonstate terrorist actors, to cease any attacks against civilians and civilian 
objects.224
Similarly, in 1999 to 2000, the UNSC, confronted with hostilities tran-
spiring in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”), admonished 
both Uganda and Rwanda for their outside interferences and prescribed ob-
219. See S.C. Res. 2408, supra note 76, ¶ 22.
220. Id. For a more recent resolution, see S.C. Res. 2444, supra note 119, at 1, 7 (con-
demning a range of unlawful acts by Al-Shabaab and Daesh/ISIL-linked affiliates in Somalia).
221. S.C. Res. 918, ¶ 1 (May 17, 1994).
222. S.C. Res. 1199, ¶ 1 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1203, ¶ 4 (Oct. 24, 1998); S.C. Res. 
1160, ¶ 2 (Mar. 31, 1998); see also S.C. Res. 752, ¶¶ 1, 3–4 (May 15, 1992) (addressing hos-
tilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and interferences by neighboring states, as well as prescribing 
obligations of cessation).
223. S.C. Res. 814, ¶ 8 (Mar. 26, 1993); see also S.C. Res. 1010, ¶¶ 1–2 (Aug. 10, 1995) 
(demanding that the Bosnian Serb party provide access to UN and ICRC personnel and re-
spect their rights); S.C. Res. 1127, supra note 209, ¶¶ 2–3 (demanding that UNITA observe its 
demilitarization duties and provide information on disarmament). 
224. See S.C. Res. 2254, ¶ 13 (Dec. 18, 2015); S.C. Res. 2268, ¶ 3 (Feb. 26, 2016); see 
also, e.g., supra nn. 155, 220–222 and infra nn. 226–27, 229, 245 and accompanying text.
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ligations of cessation in line with international responsibility rationale.225 In 
Resolutions 1234 and 1304, it underscored a direct rapprochement between 
its principal mandate of maintaining international peace and security and 
international legal norms. This precedent has positive implications for the 
potential deployment of ICIR under the UNSC’s auspices.
This practice also suggests that the UNSC may enhance international 
individual responsibility efforts. Obviously, further adjustments, along with 
firmer and clearer formulation of applicable secondary (read: remedial) 
norms, might be required in the future. In these specific resolutions, the 
UNSC expressed grave concern in the face of widespread IHL and HR vio-
lations in the DRC, including acts of and incitement to ethnic hatred com-
mitted by various entities, including NSAs. In its operative language, it 
called upon all parties to “protect [HR] and to respect [IHL],” expressly 
mentioning within its prescriptions the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 
Additional Protocols of 1977 as well as the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948.226
Addressing secondary obligations to “all parties” is recurrent in UNSC 
resolutions, especially in those dealing with armed conflict, a practice une-
quivocally covering individuals and nonstate groups (and potentially their 
eventual violation of UNSC prescriptions, which could entail ICIR). On this 
front, the UNSC’s language is sweeping in its coverage of potential individ-
ual and nonstate actors breaching international law. The Council’s resolu-
tion-making encompasses “ ‘all parties, including those other than States,’ 
‘all parties, all movements et [sic] all factions,’ ‘all parties and other inter-
ested persons,’ or ‘all forces and armed groups’ . . . .”227 It is also addressed 
to individually identified nonstate entities, including “ ‘the Serbs of Bosnia,’ 
‘elements of the Croatian Army,’ ‘the Kosovo Liberation Army or all other 
groups or individuals’ . . . .”228 Similarly, Council resolutions have expressly 
targeted “ ‘the Burundi Front for the Defence of Democracy (FDD), the 
former armed forces of Rwanda (ex-FAR)/Interhamwe and the Alliance of 
Democratic Forces,’ ‘the RUF, the civil defence forces and other armed 
groups,’ and ‘the Sudanese rebel groups, especially the Movement for Jus-
tice and Equality/Sudan Liberation Movement.’ ”229 This non-exhaustive re-
225. See S.C. Res. 1234, ¶¶ 1–3 (Apr. 9, 1999); see also S.C. Res. 1304, ¶¶ 1–4 (June 
16, 2000).
226. S.C. Res. 1234, supra note 225, ¶ 6; see also S.C. Res. 1304, supra note 225, at 
pmbl., ¶ 15. 
227. Cahin, supra note 13, at 338. For a recent example, see S.C. Res 2444, supra note 
119, ¶ 47 (demanding that “all parties” facilitate and allow humanitarian aid in Somalia). 
228. Cahin, supra note 13, at 338; see also, e.g., S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 15 (June 10, 1999) 
(demanding that the Kosovo Liberation Army and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups cease 
all hostilities and comply with a range of demilitarization requirements).
229. Cahin, supra note 13, at 338. For a range of relevant resolutions, see ERIC DAVID, 
PRINCIPES DE DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMÉS 647 n.2 (5th ed. 2012). For recent examples, see 
S.C. Res. 2401, ¶ 7 (Feb. 24, 2018) (demanding that all parties observe a range of internation-
al law obligations in Syria); S.C. Res. 2216, ¶ 8 (Apr. 14, 2015) (condemning the Houthis’
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view of addressees of UNSC prescriptions illustrates that organ’s willing-
ness to cast a wide net when attributing wrongful conduct to NSAs and im-
posing secondary obligations resulting from their unlawful acts.
Finally, aside from imposing remedial obligations upon NSAs falling 
short of monetary compensation (such as cessation or declarations of 
wrongdoing), the UNSC has imposed sanctions against such actors which 
were justified by the Council first assigning international responsibility to 
them. While the UNSC’s language is not always firmly couched in ICIR 
terms in this regard, its relevant resolutions at least operate on a de facto 
finding of NSAs’ liability. In these resolutions, the UNSC clearly attributes 
some violation of the international legal order to nonstate entities or indi-
viduals and then imposes consequences, be they in the form of sanctions or 
some other measures. For example, in Resolution 1474, the Council ex-
pressly imposed sanctions upon NSAs by “stress[ing] the obligation of all 
States and other actors” to observe a previous resolution instituting an arms 
embargo concerning Somalia.230 In sanctions resolutions dealing with the 
DRC, the UNSC made individuals who recruit child soldiers or attack 
peacekeepers the object of financial and travel sanctions.231
Outside of the more systematic regime of “targeted” sanctions, the 
UNSC can also contribute to advancing individual responsibility models 
through the adoption of ad hoc measures or sanctions based on the factual 
exigencies of any situation with which it is confronted. It bears repeating 
that the UNSC already assigns de facto ICIR when it imposes sanctions or 
other measures upon individuals and other NSAs. Indeed, UNSC-imposed 
sanctions can be reconciled with the ethos of international responsibility 
given that the Council is essentially handing down specific consequences 
flowing from a NSA’s violation of its international obligation(s). In sanc-
tioning unlawful conduct, the UNSC has, inter alia, imposed:
1. A military and oil embargo, the freezing of funds, possessions 
and other economic resources, and refusal of entry and/or 
transit of UNITA leaders on or through the territory of any 
State stemming from that entity’s violation of its undertakings 
under the Lusaka Peace Accords;232
aggravation of hostilities and calling on all parties to uphold HR in Yemen). See also Fox et 
al., supra note 65, at 702 n.274 (calling such practice by the UNSC “almost routine”).
230. S.C. Res. 1474, ¶ 1 (Apr. 8, 2003) (emphasis added); see also S.C. Res. 1519, ¶ 1 
(Dec. 16, 2003). The arms embargo was imposed in S.C. Res. 733, ¶ 5 (Jan. 23, 1992). For a 
recent reaffirmation of that arms embargo in the face of evolving security threats, see S.C. 
Res. 2444, supra note 119, ¶ 13.
231. See S.C. Res. 2136, ¶ 4 (Jan. 30, 2014); see also S.C. Res. 1857, ¶¶ 3–4 (Dec. 22, 
2008) (applying sanctions to several individuals, including those “operating in the [DRC] and 
committing serious violations of international law”).
232. See Farid Wahid Dahmane, Les Mesures Prises par le Conseil de Sécurité contre 
les Entités Non-étatiques, 11 REVUE AFRICAINE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARE 
227, 234 (1999).
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2. Similar measures “with respect to Usama bin Laden, members 
of the Al-Qaida organization and the Taliban and other indi-
viduals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with 
them,” identified by name;233
3. Military and logistical embargoes targeting armed groups and 
foreign militias operating on the DRC’s territory, especially in 
Kivu and Ituri,234 and against several NSAs and armed groups 
carrying out activities in Liberia235 and in Darfur;236 and
4. Various measures concerning serious IHL and HR abuses by 
the above entities and other NSAs.237
Similarly, the UNSC has directed with relative frequency that armed oppo-
sition groups refrain from engaging in various conducts during or in the 
wake of armed conflict, such as disregarding HR norms, violating IHL, or 
breaching peace accords.238 Moreover, the Council’s specific demands of 
such groups have varied greatly—running the gamut from observing 
HR/IHL obligations to respecting electoral outcomes—and have targeted 
NSAs in Afghanistan,239 Angola,240 Cambodia,241 the Central African Repub-
lic,242 the DRC,243 Syria,244 and the former Yugoslavia.245
233. See S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 211, ¶ 2. 
234. See S.C. Res. 1493 (July 28, 2003); S.C. Res. 1552 (July 27, 2004); S.C. Res. 1596 
(Apr. 18, 2005).
235. See S.C. Res. 1521 (Dec. 22, 2003); see also S.C. Res. 2237, ¶ 1 (Sept. 2, 2015) 
(renewing the arms embargo regarding NSAs in Liberia).
236. See S.C. Res. 1556 (July 30, 2004). On the recent use of embargoes in the counter-
terrorism context, see S.C. Res. 2370, supra note 134, ¶¶ 3–4.
237. The UN Secretary-General also formulated a proposal that targeted measures be 
directed against the military and political leadership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE). See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. on Children and Armed Conflict in Sri Lanka, U.N. 
Doc. S/2006/1006, ¶ 63 (Dec. 20, 2005).
238. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2113, ¶¶ 4, 15–17 (July 30, 2013) (condemning HR and IHL 
violations in Sudan); S.C. Res. 2098, ¶ 8 (Mar. 28, 2013) (expressing concern regarding HR 
and IHL violations in the DRC, and calling for accountability); S.C. Res. 1964, ¶ 15 (Dec. 22, 
2010) (condemning HR transgressions in Somalia, and calling for accountability); S.C. Res. 
1935, ¶ 9 (July 30, 2010) (requiring all groups in Sudan to observe HR and IHL duties); S.C. 
Res. 1577, ¶ 5 (Dec. 1, 2004) (devising measures concerning those responsible for HR viola-
tions in Burundi); S.C. Res. 1509, ¶ 4 (Sept. 19, 2003) (requiring parties in Liberia to ob-
served their duties under the peace and ceasefire accords).
239. S.C. Res. 1214, ¶ 12 (Dec. 8, 1998) (requiring that “Afghan factions put an end to 
discrimination against girls and women and other violations [of HR]”). 
240. S.C. Res. 851, ¶ 4 (July 15, 1993) (demanding that “UNITA accept unreservedly 
the results of the democratic elections of 1992 and abide fully by the ‘Acordos de Paz’;”). 
241. S.C. Res. 792, ¶ 8 (Nov. 30, 1992) (demanding “that the PDK fulfil immediately its 
obligations under the Paris Agreements;”).
242. S.C. Res. 2121, ¶ 15 (Oct. 10, 2013) (demanding “that all armed groups, in particu-
lar Sekela elements[,] prevent the recruitment and use of children,”).
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These sanctions, including the increasingly frequent freezing of assets 
in counterterrorism contexts, again demonstrate that ICIR’s effective de-
ployment remains largely dependent on state action. By the same token, as 
this pattern of UNSC practice also suggests—particularly but not exclusive-
ly in the case of UNITA—when armed opposition groups disregard the 
Council’s directives, they increasingly become subject to sanctions handed 
down by that organ.246 At least upon first glance, there is a direct conse-
quence for violating international law (even if it falls short of pecuniary 
compensation), an outcome which is eminently reconcilable with the es-
sence of international responsibility.
Beyond sanctions, in its application of SR norms, the UNSC has inter-
preted its functions very broadly and imposed far-reaching and diversified 
secondary obligations flowing from its findings of illegality. It may be pon-
dered why similar creative and expansive solutions could not animate its 
imposition of secondary norms of individual responsibility flowing from 
NSAs’ violations of primary obligations. Of course, the scale, duration, 
magnitude, authorship, and effects of relevant breaches will undoubtedly 
inform the scope of UNSC responses to infringements. Nevertheless, the 
central idea is that the UNSC is less constrained in selecting options from its 
remedial toolbox when compared with the avenues available to an injured 
state attempting to implement SR unilaterally.
A case in point is the UNSC’s institution of the indemnity fund and UN 
Compensation Commission (“UNCC”) following Iraq’s unlawful invasion 
and occupation of Kuwait, which largely derived from SR and U.S. mass 
tort claims theory.247 Similar models could be envisaged to facilitate and 
streamline the administration of claims resulting from ICIR for terrorism, at 
243. S.C. Res. 1417, ¶ 4 (June 14, 2002) (reaffirming that the UNSC “holds the Rassem-
blement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma, as the de facto authority, responsible to bring to 
an end all extrajudicial executions, [HR] violations and arbitrary harassment of civilians in 
Kisangani,”).
244. S.C. Res. 2139, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 2014) (condemning “widespread violations [of HR 
and IHL]” by “armed groups, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence, as well 
as all grave violations and abuses committed against children in contravention of applicable 
international law, such as recruitment and use, killing and maiming, rape, attacks on schools 
and hospitals as well as arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, ill treatment and use as human 
shields;”).
245. S.C. Res. 752, supra note 222, ¶ 1 (demanding “that all parties and others con-
cerned in Bosnia and Herzegovina stop the fighting immediately, [and] respect immediately 
and fully the cease-fire”).
246. See, e.g., Nigel D. White, Sanctions Against Non-State Actors, in COERCIVE 
DIPLOMACY, SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 127, 148–49 (Natalino Ronzitti ed., 
2016).
247. On these aspects and relevant UNSC resolutions, see PROULX, supra note 23, at 
197–98, 299. See also PROULX, INSTITUTIONALIZING, supra note 98, at 202–05.
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least regarding massive or large-scale violations perpetrated by entities such 
as Daesh/ISIL.248
V. The Way Forward: Toward a Flawed but Workable Model?
There is every indication that the scope of some UNSC resolutions 
might extend beyond the immediate matters on which the Council is decid-
ing, thereby enjoying more pervasive, general obligation-setting qualities. 
As demonstrated above, the Council’s role in enforcing international legal 
norms and implementing individual responsibility remains intimately tied to 
its formulation of primary obligations (read: “quasi-legislative” function). 
Otherwise put, there is great validity, continuity, and logic to the idea that, 
once the UNSC promulgates a primary norm binding on states and/or NSAs, 
it could then proceed to implement and enforce it in the event of its viola-
tion by a subject of the UNSC’s resolutions (or by an actor whose conduct is 
captured under the Council’s prescriptions). More broadly, this synergy be-
tween UNSC “quasi-legislation” and implementation has also had an impact 
on general international law, particularly in the counterterrorism context but 
also beyond.249
This approach might strike some as flat-out undesirable primarily be-
cause the UNSC might be perceived as unable to set obligations prospec-
tively under customary international law, or because its structural make-up
might seemingly make it ill-equipped to engage in lawmaking. There is 
nonetheless evidence beyond the present account that the UNSC is an active 
lawmaking entity. For example, a recent and insightful study analyzing a 
compiled data set of all UNSC resolutions from 1990 to 2013 evinces that 
organ’s undeniable contribution to shaping customary international law on 
obligations related to non-international armed conflicts (that is, on NSAs’ 
HR obligations, the binding nature of peace agreements in such conflicts, 
and the importance of holding post-conflict elections in the affected 
states).250
248. See also Cahin, supra note 13, at 340 (discussing UNSC measures against Al 
Qaeda, the Taliban and other nonstate terrorist actors, and remarking that “[f]rom a technical 
point of view, the international management of an indemnity fund, composed of blocked 
funds and assets, is perfectly foreseeable”).
249. See, e.g., Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action, supra note 196;
Gowlland-Debbas, The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the International 
Legal System, supra note 196; Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Security Council as Enforcer of 
Human Rights, in SECURING HUMAN RIGHTS?: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES OF THE 
UN SECURITY COUNCIL 36 (Bardo Fassbender ed., 2011). For a nuanced and critical take, see
Koskenniemi, supra note 147. On the various limitations of the UNSC’s “legislative” func-
tions in counterterrorism matters, see generally Luis Miguel Hinojosa Martínez, The Legisla-
tive Role of the Security Council in Its Fight Against Terrorism: Legal, Political and Practical 
Limits, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 333 (2008).
250. See Fox et al., supra note 65, at 649–731. For a more dated, cynical view on the 
UNSC’s ability to alter existing rules of international law, see Wellens, supra note 96, at 48–
50.
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A. Prospects and Limits: 
International Civil Individual Responsibility as a Way Forward?
The model advocated in this Article is by no means perfect and may 
well generate arbitrary and selective application of international legal norms 
in some circumstances. The UNSC’s institutional features might ultimately 
jeopardize the “general” character of the proposed regime of individual civil 
responsibility advertised in this Article’s title. This reality is exacerbated by 
the fact that the Council’s lawmaking pattern and use of international law 
can mostly be characterized as piecemeal, random, and arbitrary. Conse-
quently, the UNSC should not be turned to as a reliable, uniform, or evenly 
fair dispenser of international law. For one thing, affording the UNSC with 
such normative power, both in terms of setting primary obligations of con-
duct and enforcing secondary norms of liability against NSAs, might unduly 
vest powerful states with the ability to determine issues of ICIR to the det-
riment of the developing world. Setting aside these political dimensions, 
even in situations where the UNSC intervenes to actuate individual respon-
sibility, the twin problems of enforcement and implementation frequently 
constitute a considerable stumbling block to securing an effective remedy. 
This is particularly true when the Council targets specific terrorist organiza-
tions (such as Daesh/ISIL and Al-Shabaab) that may elude enforcement 
mechanisms for various reasons. In this light, the question remains whether 
the prospect of instituting individual responsibility in international law is 
prompted by the absence of alternative targets of liability as opposed to be-
ing driven by existing doctrine. It may be that in the absence of effective 
control by a territorial state over a terrorist group, the UNSC may be called 
upon to establish that group’s international responsibility. It may also be 
that this group does not lend itself to the imposition of quasi-SR for a range 
of reasons, but that some of its key members have been satisfactorily identi-
fied as perpetrators of unlawful acts. In such a scenario, the UNSC could 
again play a role in determining those individuals’ international responsibil-
ity.
However, enforcement and implementation problems are true of many 
facets of international law, including, in some cases, when an injured state 
attempts to implement SR unilaterally in the context of diplomatic relations. 
Power politics or the prospect of disrupting a previously established pattern 
of reciprocal relations between the injured and wrongdoing states might 
preclude the former from securing meaningful redress against the latter.251
Consequently, there might be something inherently attractive about submit-
ting some unresolved questions of international responsibility—be they of 
an individual or interstate nature—for judicial determination by formal dis-
251. For a compatible argument, see Karl Zamanek, Does the Prospect of Incurring Re-
sponsibility Improve the Observance of International Law?, in INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER, supra note 25, at 125, 
129. 
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pute settlement bodies. Quarrelling parties may find comfort in the process 
of de-politicizing their dispute through formal adjudication, though not eve-
ry case is destined (nor suited) for such a fate. Furthermore, even formal 
dispute settlement by international courts or tribunals may not always yield 
effective enforcement results.252
There is an element of jurisdictional parity between disputing states, 
exemplified by the consensual nature of international dispute settlement (or 
interstate negotiations). This element of parity may be absent in dispute set-
tlement proceedings concerning the implementation of ICIR, for example in 
cases before regional HR courts and domestic tribunals. This same parity 
may also be absent in other means of implementation of ICIR, for example 
when the UNSC establishes the liability of NSAs and imposes resulting 
secondary obligations. In such scenarios, the object of liability—that is, an 
individual or group—may not have consented to the jurisdiction of the deci-
sion-making entity (or to its decisional power, more broadly). Here, the in-
dividual’s or group’s inability to consent may be attributable to the fact that 
the decision-making entity’s prescriptions are compulsory, such as when the 
UNSC hands down binding measures or sanctions. Alternatively, the inabil-
ity to consent might be explained by the fact that the decision-making entity 
is a jurisdictional body of a compulsory or general nature which can compel 
the performance of secondary obligations, such as a domestic court. This 
scenario stands in sharp contrast to the consent-based jurisdictional nature 
of interstate dispute settlement. This is not to mention that NSAs do not 
have standing to appear before many non-criminal international tribunals.
Interestingly, consent to jurisdiction is also typically present in so-
called “mixed” disputes between investors and the host states of their in-
vestments.253 This makes the settlement of some ICIR disputes qualitatively 
252. On the recent saga surrounding the South China Sea dispute, see, for example, Feng
Zhang, The Paradox at the Heart of the South China Sea Ruling, FOREIGN POLICY (July 28, 
2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/28/can-china-actually-be-benefiting-from-south-
china-sea-ruling-paradox-hague-philippines/; Stefan Talmon, The South China Sea Arbitra-
tion and the Finality of ‘Final’ Awards, 8 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 388 (2017). Similarly, 
following Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 
624 (Nov. 19), Colombia refused to abide by some aspects of the ruling and withdrew from 
the Pact of Bogotá, leading to a second case instituted by Nicaragua alleging violations of its 
sovereign rights in its maritime spaces. The Court asserted jurisdiction to hear the merits. Al-
leged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. 
Colom.), Preliminary Objections, 2016 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Mar. 17). It must be stressed, however, 
that the rate of compliance with state-to-state arbitral awards and ICJ decisions is generally 
high. See, e.g., Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the 
International Court of Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815 (2007).
253. However, there is arguably no parity between a foreign investor and the host state 
after the capital is invested or, at least, considerably diminishing bargaining power for the in-
vestor “[u]nless . . . both sides appreciate that if negotiations fail, compulsory arbitration will 
follow.” W. Michael Reisman, International Investment Arbitration and ADR: Married but 
Best Living Apart, 24 ICSID REV. 185, 190–91 (2009) (emphasis in original); see also Sergio 
Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of In-
vestment Law, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 361, 369 (2018). For an earlier, empirically-based assess-
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different than more “traditional” international dispute settlement proceed-
ings. Moreover, the notion of enforcement and its relevance take on a dif-
ferent complexion in the context of SR as opposed to ICIR. For instance, 
determinations of SR have implications beyond available remedies such as 
reputational costs for the concerned state(s), the availability of counter-
measures in apposite cases, and an impact on diplomatic relations, all absent 
features in the ICIR scenario.254 That said, enforcement and compliance is-
sues might arise across the full spectrum of disputes and implementation 
models of international responsibility (state-based or individual in both ju-
dicial and non-judicial contexts), irrespective of jurisdictional considera-
tions.
In addition, one overarching objective of this account was to explore in-
ternational individual responsibility models beyond the UN “targeted” (or 
“smart”) sanctions regime. The aim was also to add to the voluminous Kadi 
literature in a complementary fashion and without fully unpacking all poten-
tial HR considerations.255 That said, inspiration will need to be drawn from 
the UNSC sanctions regime in building an eventual ICIR regime. The 
UNSC sanctions regime offers some points of rapprochement but also con-
siderable differences. After all, the paramount objective of the “smart” sanc-
tions regime bears reemphasis—namely, to induce individuals to align their 
behavior with what is required by international law and previous UNSC 
resolutions.256 Yet, this system is seriously deficient from a due process per-
spective. Invariably, the question of due process should feature centrally in 
the development and formulation of a general ICIR regime, especially if the 
ment, see Stephen J. Kobrin, Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing Sector 
in Developing Countries, 41 INT’L ORG. 609 (1987).
254. There is a complicated relationship between interstate enforcement measures, such 
as ICJ proceedings and countermeasures, and their potential relevance to inducing restitution 
and/or compensation for the benefit of individual victims of wrongful acts—an area where 
relevant practice is scarce. See Randelzhofer & Tomuschat, supra note 24; see also
CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11–12
(2005). On the reputational costs of states’ conduct, see generally ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW 
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008).
255. The Kadi literature primarily centers on two cases handed down by the European 
Union’s (“EU”) judiciary, which addressed the hierarchy between general principles of EU 
law and international legal norms. The decisions reviewed the legality of European Commis-
sion measures imposing sanctions on individuals who had been listed by the UN Sanctions 
Committee. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Aftermath of an Unwise Decision: The U.N. Terrorist 
Sanctions Regime After Kadi II, 6 AMSTERDAM L.F. 51 (2014); KADI ON TRIAL: A
MULTIFACETED ANALYSIS OF THE KADI TRIAL (Matej Avbelj et al. eds., 2014); Joris Larik, 
The Kadi Saga as a Tale of ‘Strict Observance’ of International Law: Obligations Under the 
UN Charter, Targeted Sanctions and Judicial Review in the European Union, 61 NETH. INT’L 
L. REV. 23 (2014); Francesco Francioni, The Right of Access to Justice to Challenge the Secu-
rity Council’s Targeted Sanctions: After-Thoughts on Kadi, in FROM BILATERALISM TO 
COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA 908 (Ulrich Fastenrath 
et al. eds., 2011).
256. See PETERS, supra note 3, at 94.
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UNSC is involved in making determinations of unlawful conduct and im-
plementing international responsibility and its consequences.257
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of developing a general ICIR 
regime by engaging international institutions lies in the contributions the 
UNSC could make in filling a normative, regulatory, and enforcement void. 
Particularly relevant is the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) regime,258
which grants U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over cases in which foreign 
claimants allege violations of customary international law rules by other in-
dividuals or legal persons.259 This model clearly shows that ICIR can theo-
retically be facilitated and enforced by enlisting the assistance of domestic 
jurisdictions. This has resulted in both private persons and transnational 
corporations being sued, often involving criminal offenses at the core whose 
civil dimensions were dealt with by U.S. courts under ATCA.260 Inherent in 
the U.S. courts’ treatment of ATCA cases is the notion that individuals and 
other NSAs bear obligations under international law. As a corollary, the 
breach of such substantive norms remains guided by international law and 
presupposes the imposition of international responsibility upon individuals 
and other NSAs.261
In the Alvarez-Machain case, the U.S. Supreme Court set out two con-
siderable restrictions on the jurisdiction of U.S. courts under ATCA. In 
short, in any case, the international law norm that is the object of the suit 
under ATCA must be specific and universally recognized.262 More recently, 
a suit was brought under ATCA in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
alleging that Royal Dutch Shell and its subsidiaries aided and abetted the 
Nigerian government in perpetrating serious HR violations. In deciding the 
case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that “customary internation-
al law has steadfastly rejected the notion of corporate liability for interna-
257. In the context of “targeted” sanctions, see generally Bardo Fassbender, Targeted 
Sanctions Imposed by the UN Security Council and Due Process Rights, 3 INT’L ORG. L. REV.
437 (2006); see also ALVAREZ, supra note 105, at 109–13; supra note 123 and accompanying 
text.
258. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see also supra nn. 4, 207, and 
accompanying text.
259. This regime has generated considerable jurisprudence and settlements. See general-
ly David Wallach, The Alien Tort Statute and the Limits of Individual Accountability in Inter-
national Law, 46 STAN. J. INT’L L. 121 (2010).
260. For instance, in 1995 the Serbian leader ?????????????????????????????????????s-
nian claimants to the tune of $745 million for international crimes perpetrated in Bosnia. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals stressed that “certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations 
whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of the state or only as private individu-
als.” See ?????? ??? ????????, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added); see also
PETERS, supra note 3, at 162–64.
261. See, e.g., PETERS, supra note 3, at 116 (equating this process with the imposition of 
“public law” responsibility).
262. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
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tional crimes, . . . .”263 Therefore, the Second Circuit said that “insofar as 
plaintiffs bring claims under the [ATCA] against corporations, plaintiffs fail 
to allege violations of the law of nations, and plaintiffs’ claims fall outside 
the limited jurisdiction provided by the [ATCA].”264 In other words, under 
this approach, which was endorsed in international jurisprudence, the linch-
pin of the analysis concerned the responsibility of natural, but not legal, per-
sons. Consequently, courts were more inclined to hold the leaders of busi-
ness entities accountable for HR violations as opposed to imposing liability 
upon the enterprises themselves.265
Ultimately, on appeal in Kiobel, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals—albeit on different grounds—concluding 
that ATCA does not grant jurisdiction over extraterritorial claims.266 Thus, 
this precedent arguably left the question of corporate liability under ATCA 
open. The more recent Jesner v. Arab Bank decision revisited the debate 
over corporate liability, with the Supreme Court holding that foreign corpo-
rations cannot be sued under ATCA.267 However, it is likely that the case 
failed to resolve the issue of corporate liability of U.S. corporations given 
that the ruling was limited to foreign corporations. Therefore, this series of 
precedents creates a space in which the UNSC may play a role in bolstering 
transnational and international individual responsibility regimes.
Another recent development lending further support to the arguments 
advanced above lies in the rejection by the European Court of Human 
Rights (the “ECtHR”) of the notion of universal civil jurisdiction.268 An in-
263. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010).
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., PETERS, supra note 3, at 163.
266. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013). For further dis-
cussion about the case, see, for example, Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601 (2013); Julian G. 
Ku, Kiobel and the Surprising Death of Universal Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute,
107 AM. J. INT’L L. 841 (2013).
267. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018). However, in recent years, 
the United States has considerably expanded civil liability for foreign terrorist acts against 
U.S. nationals under the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, espousing a more nation-
alist approach to ICIR. See generally Stephen J. Schnably, The Transformation of Human 
Rights Litigation: The Alien Tort Statute, the Anti-Terrorism Act, and JASTA, 24 U. MIAMI 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 285 (2017) (arguing that the “near demise” of ATCA, coupled with 
“the growth of anti-terrorism legislation” in the United States, “represent a turn away from a 
cosmopolitan vision of building a global legal order, in which all states protect human rights 
regardless of nationality”).
268. This concept, also referred to as “universal tort jurisdiction,” operates without the 
need to establish a jurisdictional nexus between the decisional forum and the international law 
violation. See CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (2d ed. 2015); 
see also Menno T. Kamminga, Universal Civil Jurisdiction: Is It Legal? Is It Desirable?, 99 
ASIL PROC. 123, 123 (2005) (defining universal civil/tort jurisdiction “as the principle under 
which civil proceedings may be brought in a domestic court irrespective of the location of the 
unlawful conduct and irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim, on the 
grounds that the unlawful conduct is a matter of international concern.”); Donald Francis Do-
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herently attractive argument might be that the future of such jurisdiction is 
primarily domestic. This militates in favor of broader involvement of na-
tional jurisdictions through concepts such as universal jurisdiction for torts 
or civil wrongdoing—just like the future of international criminal justice 
might also be predominantly municipal in implementation and enforce-
ment.269 Despite the potential availability of universal civil jurisdiction,270
the international legal system still has a role to play, possibly an important 
one. In the Naït-Liman case, the ECtHR’s Chamber was confronted with an 
attempt by a refugee to seize a Swiss court with a civil claim for damages 
resulting from torture allegedly sustained in Tunisia after his efforts to vin-
dicate his rights before Swiss courts were rejected. Amongst relevant issues, 
the Chamber was called upon to determine whether universal civil jurisdic-
tion constituted a requirement under international law, ultimately holding 
that it was not following a comparative inquiry. Consequently, the com-
plainant’s right of access to a tribunal had not been violated under the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights.271
On appeal, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR focused on one key issue 
for present purposes, namely, whether Switzerland had an obligation under 
international law to entertain the applicant’s civil claim. The Grand Cham-
ber affirmed the Chamber’s ruling that states enjoy seemingly unfettered 
appreciation in taking or declining jurisdiction over civil suits concerning 
extraterritorial torts,272 even where the unlawful act breaches a jus cogens 
norm. Indeed, the Court investigated whether Switzerland was bound to 
acknowledge universal civil jurisdiction for torture claims under customary 
international law or conventional law.273 When analyzing customary law, the 
Court observed that, out of the legal systems of the thirty-nine member 
states studied, only the Netherlands recognizes universal civil jurisdiction.274
novan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM.
J. INT’L L. 142 (2006); Donald Francis Donovan, Universal Civil Jurisdiction–The Next Fron-
tier?, 99 ASIL PROC. 117 (2005). 
269. For a compatible argument in the counterterrorism field, see Proulx, supra note 175
(arguing that ICL may be best pursued through a “transnational network of criminal and civil 
law”).
270. It should be stressed that the existence of this concept is still highly debated. For 
the Institute of International Law’s recent work on the matter, see Andreas Bucher, Universal 
Civil Jurisdiction with Regard to Reparation for International Crimes, 76 Y.B. INST. INT’L L.
1, 7–37 (2015) (mapping out still emergent domestic practices involving reparations sought by 
and against individuals and against corporate entities).
271. See Naït-Liman v. Switzerland, App. No. 51357/07, Judgment (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 
21, 2016). For a critical take on the judgment, see Devika Hovell, The Authority of Universal 
Jurisdiction, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 427, 450–53 (2018).
272. See Cedric Ryngaert, Note and Comment, From Universal Civil Jurisdiction to Fo-
rum for Necessity: Reflections on the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Nait-Liman, 100 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 782, 805 (2017). 
273. Naït-Liman v. Switzerland [GC], App. No. 51357/07, Judgment, ¶¶ 45–66 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Mar. 15, 2018) (reviewing relevant international law sources).
274. Id. ¶ 183.
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While the Court identified limited legal avenues in Canada and the United 
States enabling claimants to bring civil actions in the context of criminal 
proceedings,275 it noted the absence of a crystalized customary norm that 
would have obligated the Swiss courts to hear the applicant’s case (though it 
underscored that relevant practice was evolving).276
The Court then arrived at a similar conclusion under treaty law. It first 
observed that the Committee against Torture stressed an expansive interpre-
tation of Article 14 of UNCAT, which presumably covers civil claims alleg-
ing acts of torture perpetrated outside the forum’s territory.277 That said, the 
Court found that both the Committee’s practice and the travaux prépa-
ratoires of UNCAT did not ground a legal obligation that Switzerland make 
its domestic courts available to the applicant.278 The Court was nonetheless 
cautious to emphasize that its holding did “not call into question the broad 
consensus within the international community on the existence of a right for 
victims of acts of torture to obtain appropriate and effective redress, . . . .”279
It encouraged states to open up such legal avenues and applauded those that 
did so.280 Underscoring the “dynamic nature of this area,” the Court accept-
ed the possibility that international law might evolve in this field and invited 
states “to take account in their legal orders of any developments facilitating 
effective implementation of the right to compensation for acts of tor-
ture . . . .”281
When considered in tandem with recent ATCA jurisprudence, the Naït-
Liman precedent disappointed HR proponents. This is especially true in the 
post-Kiobel legal landscape, with this line of cases having considerably lim-
ited available legal options for extraterritorial civil claims. In fact, these de-
275. Id. ¶ 184.
276. Id. ¶ 187. 
277. Id. ¶¶ 188–98; see also UNCAT, supra note 33; text accompanying supra note 33.
For one example of domestic implementation of this provision, see Torture Victim Protection 
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992) (“TVPA”) (instituting a right of 
“civil action” in U.S. courts against any individual having committed “torture” or “extrajudi-
cial killing”). For a pre-Naït-Liman account arguing that Article 14 of UNCAT requires—and
TVPA provides for—universal civil jurisdiction, see Christopher Keith Hall, The Duty of
States Parties to the Convention against Torture to Provide Procedures Permitting Victims to 
Recover Reparations for Torture Committed Abroad, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 921, 931–937
(2007).
278. Naït-Liman [GC], ¶¶ 188–98.
279. Id. ¶ 218; see also id., ¶ 97.
280. Id.
281. Id. ¶ 220. It must be recalled that in a previous judgment, exhibiting more laconic 
reasoning on this point, the Court concluded that the question whether UNCAT “has given 
right to universal civil jurisdiction” was “far from settled.” Jones v. United Kingdom, 2014-I
Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, ¶ 208. For a critique of the Chamber’s Naït-Liman judgment, which still holds 
true regarding the Grand Chamber’s judgment, see Hovell, supra note 271, at 450–53. The 
outcome reached by the Grand Chamber might be contrasted with its earlier assertion that 
“[e]veryone has the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought 
before a court or tribunal.” See Naït-Liman [GC], ¶ 113.
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velopments and the ECtHR’s reasoning might induce states to reject univer-
sal civil jurisdiction. It may also affect the relevant opinio juris adversely 
and weaken the jus cogens character of the prohibition against torture, as 
forewarned by the dissenting judges in the Chamber’s judgment.282 These 
developments again demonstrate that, while there is growing consensus that 
certain unlawful acts carried out by individuals and NSAs are proscribed in 
international law, the legal avenues to enforce their resulting liability are 
scarce (at least domestically), and the content of both primary and second-
ary norms is ill-defined concerning certain would-be obligations. As a re-
sult, some victims of internationally wrongful acts might be left without 
standing to enforce their rights and/or access civil remedies (and an appro-
priate forum). Therefore, this Article has advocated that we consider turning 
to international institutions in apposite contexts, particularly the UNSC, to 
address the normative, regulatory, and enforcement gaps left in the realm of 
ICIR. While this is by no means an ideal or even consistently reliable solu-
tion, there is evidence that the UNSC can play a role in shaping and defin-
ing relevant primary norms of behavior binding individuals and NSAs in 
certain areas. It can also play a role in enforcing those and other existing 
norms through sanctions and other measures. In so doing, the UNSC already 
disposes of a rich corpus of international legal tools to draw from, including 
SR law and the broader framework of international responsibility.
B. A Return to Familiar but Limited Notions
Invoking international responsibility’s primary-secondary mechanics 
provides the UNSC with the powerful language (and notions) of attribution, 
responsibility, reparation, cessation, and return to legality.283 Moreover, the 
UNSC can bolster its findings of illegality with sanctions in appropriate 
cases, should its formulated obligations of cessation and non-repetition fail 
to generate the desired compliance pull. These UNSC measures can become 
robust and complementary enforcement mechanisms, which may enlist the 
support of domestic jurisdictions for more effective implementation.284 Ul-
timately, the UNSC may decide to turn to a more ambitious model of “insti-
tutionalized” reparation for wrongful acts committed by NSAs. For exam-
282. But, for a sympathetic take on the outcome reached by the Chamber, see Ryngaert, 
supra note 272, at 783 (expressing doubt about the existence, legality, or desirability of an 
international legal rule that would oblige states to acknowledge universal civil jurisdiction).
283. See PETERS, supra note 3, at 164–66 (arguing that the “legal possibility of impos-
ing secondary international legal obligations on individuals as well as primary obligations 
should be welcomed from an abstract perspective in principle. . . . [As it] represents a fair cor-
ollary to the progressive unfolding of individual rights and would consolidate the legal status 
of the individual as a primary subject of international law.” But, adopting a more nuanced and 
practical stance in assessing the usefulness of such approach). 
284. See, e.g., NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2004); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Do-
mestic Implementation of UN Sanctions, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER 
STATES 63 (Erika de Wet & André Nollkaemper eds., 2003).
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ple, it may do so by setting up an indemnity fund and accompanying com-
mission to handle mass claims, which might be suited to redress large-scale 
and/or repeated terrorism, along with systematic and massive HR/IHL viola-
tions by armed opposition groups within territories under their control.
Yet, we must be cautious not to overstate the UNSC’s potential contri-
butions. The enforcement and implementation of individual responsibility 
remain challenging in many terrorism scenarios. These concerns may be 
partly assuaged by the adoption of UNSC “targeted” sanctions and 
arms/trade embargoes. Yet, such measures might fail to acquire the requisite 
traction to be effective, especially when terrorists operate in fragile or failed 
states or wield exclusive control over a territorial enclave. Furthermore, a 
healthy dose of pragmatism is apposite. The UNSC’s process is not without 
its imperfections, and its attribution of individual responsibility may be sub-
ject to factual errors. For instance, in 2004, it attributed the Madrid terrorist 
attacks to Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (“ETA”).285 Subsequently, the UNSC’s 
factual determination and related finding of responsibility were proven to be 
erroneous.286 This precedent exposes the UNSC’s blind spots and potential 
overbreadth in determining questions of international responsibility. It fur-
ther reinforces the necessity that due process safeguards be carefully con-
sidered and built into any general ICIR regime involving that organ as key 
decisionmaker.
Conversely, the fact that the UNSC’s process remains considerably dif-
ferent than that used by courts does not, in and of itself, dispossess the 
Council of the ability to make “quasi-judicial” determinations or engage in 
dispute settlement under the UN Charter.287 In fact, despite the call for 
greater fact-finding on its part in the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful 
Settlement of International Disputes288 and the wording of Chapter VI of the 
UN Charter, it would be unrealistic to expect the UNSC to act like a court of 
285. S.C. Res. 1530, ¶ 1 (Mar. 11, 2004).
286. See Gowlland-Debbas, Responsibility and the United Nations Charter, supra note 
213, at 129–30; see also Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 143, at 124; Thérèse O’Donnell, Nam-
ing and Shaming: The Sorry Tale of Security Council Resolution 1530 (2004), 17 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 945 (2006).
287. See, e.g., ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS, supra 
note 126, at 416–24. On the exercise of the UNSC’s “quasi-judicial” powers, see generally 
Oscar Schachter, The Quasi-Judicial Role of the Security Council and the General Assembly,
58 AM. J. INT’L L. 960 (1964); PROULX, INSTITUTIONALIZING, supra note 98, at 126–36. On 
the question of due process and UNSC decision-making, see supra nn. 123, 257; infra note 
289. 
288. Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes art. 2, ¶ 
4(d), U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/10, annex (Nov. 15, 1982) (calling upon states to “[c]onsider mak-
ing greater use of the fact-finding capacity of the Security Council in accordance with the 
Charter;”). On the UNSC’s fact-finding role, see generally Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, Le
Traitement des Différends Internationaux par le Conseil de Sécurité, 85 RECUEIL DES COURS
1, 40 (1954).
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law, in both process and substance.289 However, that is a far cry from sur-
mising that no due process concerns whatsoever can be accommodated and 
ultimately incorporated into an eventual general ICIR regime.
On balance, a more robust individual accountability model for terrorism 
will likely find steadier footing amidst a comprehensive strategy, entailing a 
network of multi-leveled relationships of responsibility and involving vari-
ous actors as well as legal and political processes. This is precisely the strat-
egy advocated and reaffirmed by the UNSC in its action against Daesh/ISIL, 
for example, which also features a central role for states and their obliga-
tions in the international responsibility calculus.290
After all, in the Bosnian Genocide Case, the ICJ moved toward a multi-
lateral expectation that several states, “each complying with its obligation to 
prevent” where a single state’s efforts have fallen short, might produce the 
desired outcome of preventing genocide.291 This rationale is transposable to 
terrorism prevention and other important present-day transnational security 
concerns. The security imperatives of a post-9/11 world and individual re-
sponsibility mechanisms will be enhanced if many states and other actors
work in concert. This is against the backdrop of interactive, concurrently 
applicable, and sometimes mutually reinforcing legal regimes. In the “tar-
geted sanctions” field, for instance, at least three possible scenarios of “par-
allelism” can be identified in which UNSC mandates and ICC action can 
intersect and lead to varying degrees of formal or informal synergy. These 
situations of “parallelism” might signal that both distinct—but parallel—
legal regimes have their source in UNSC action and address different threats 
but focus on the same individuals; or address the same threat and are im-
posed simultaneously; or co-exist simultaneously but have a different 
origin.292
Looking to the future, many legal challenges abound, not least the ques-
tion of how the proposed model would accommodate key HR and procedur-
al guarantees (such as due process). While this contribution has focused on 
some legal tools available to the UNSC in implementing individual respon-
289. But cf. Keith Harpher, Does the United Nations Security Council Have the Compe-
tence to Act as a Court and Legislature?, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 103 (1994) (advocat-
ing that inquiries should be pursued to determine whether the UNSC acted appropriately as a 
court when it exercises seemingly similar functions, including through the adoption of proce-
dural rules to promote due process and regulate the admissibility/authenticity of evidence, 
affording parties the ability to be heard, preventing interested parties from self-judging their 
own cases, striking equality of arms amongst litigants, and publishing the UNSC’s reasons for 
its decisions).
290. See Proulx, An Incomplete Revolution, supra note 98, at 308–11, 338. 
291. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide 
(Bosn. and Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 430 (Feb. 26).
292. See Larissa van den Herik, The Individualization of Enforcement in International 
Law: Exploring the Interplay between United Nations Targeted Sanctions and International 
Criminal Proceedings, in THE PURSUIT OF A BRAVE NEW WORLD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
234 (Tiyanjana Maluwa et al. eds., 2017).
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sibility, thinking more broadly about this topic requires grappling with other 
challenging and unpleasant questions. For instance, how can we persuade 
armed opposition groups/terrorist factions that wield territorial control and 
have set up their own courts and/or civil administrations (for example, 
Daesh/ISIL or the Taliban) to uphold fundamental IHL and HR standards?293
Holding an armed opposition group responsible for IHL and HR violations 
might be the only way to secure the rights of locals where the nonstate 
group has taken control over a given territory from the territorial state.294 Is 
partial, patchy, or even rare compliance with relevant legal standards on 
their part better than none at all?
Setting aside the thorny issue of enforcement, there is little doubt that 
such nonstate entities are responsible for upholding basic international law 
protections and could be held legally accountable if they fail to do so.295
While the state-centric nature of contemporary international law might pose 
obstacles to a more progressive framework to deal with armed opposition 
groups, there are compelling policy and legal reasons why such actors 
should be liable to pay reparations for IHL and HR violations.296 How can 
we make a convincing case to such NSAs regarding the observance of inter-
national law? How effective or realistic would persuasion be in such scenar-
ios? Should that be a consideration at all and, if so, what does that tell us 
about the prospect of developing an ICIR regime? If the struggle over the 
elaboration of corporate liability frameworks has taught us anything, it is 
that a softer, less legalistic approach might be the way forward.297 Is that 
293. The classical, but perhaps outdated, view was that nonstate armed groups were not 
legally bound to uphold HR guarantees codified in treaties as opposed to IHL standards. See
U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. to the Commission on Human Rights: Minimum Humanitarian 
Standards, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/87, ¶ 59 (Jan. 5, 1998). There is now some traction for the 
idea that NSAs, armed opposition groups, and de facto regimes should be bound by HR stand-
ards. See generally, e.g., KATHARINE FORTIN, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED GROUPS 
UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2017); Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-
State Actors in Conflict Situations, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 491 (2006); Asbjørn Eide et al., 
Combating Lawlessness in Gray Zone Conflicts Through Minimum Humanitarian Standards,
89 AM. J. INT’L L. 215 (1995); Jennifer Moore, From Nation State to Failed State: Interna-
tional Protection from Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Actors, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 81 (1999); Michael Schoiswohl, De Facto Regimes and Human Rights Obligations—The 
Twilight of Public International Law?, 6 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 45 (2003).
294. See, e.g., International Law Association Non State Actor Committee Washington 
Conference, supra note 133, at 6; see also Dapo Akande & Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Arbi-
trary Withholding of Consent to Humanitarian Relief Operations in Armed Conflict, 92 INT’L
L. STUD. 483, 487 n.15 (2016).
295. See, e.g., RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NON-STATE ACTOR IN ARMED CONFLICT AND 
THE MARKET PLACE (Noemi Gal-Or et al. eds., 2015).
296. See, e.g., Paloma Blázquez Rodríguez, Does an Armed Group Have an Obligation 
to Provide Reparations to its Victims? Construing an Obligation to Provide Reparations for 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS: CREATION, EVOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 8, at 406.
297. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. However, it is nonetheless encouraging 
that the HR Council is attempting to elaborate an international, legally-binding instrument on 
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middle-ground approach satisfying? Unfortunately, these are only some of 
the many legal complexities related to the amorphous threats posed by “ter-
rorists” and other subversive NSAs. These queries warrant serious consider-
ation in seeking richer accountability models.
VI. Conclusion
There are compelling legal, political, policy, and moral reasons to en-
hance frameworks for the establishment and enforcement of the legal ac-
countability of individuals and NSAs in international law. A fundamental 
motivation for this agenda is that wrongful conduct should not go un-
addressed. Violations of international legal obligations should not go un-
sanctioned. An equally principled reason for turning international legal 
minds to this question is the need to resolve a significant tension between an 
important objective and an arguably regressive trend.
On one hand, there is an increasing demand—some might argue a ne-
cessity—to articulate more robust international responsibility standards to 
address the subversive acts of individuals and NSAs, ranging from terrorists 
to transnational corporations. This impetus cuts across a vast range of inter-
national law regimes and is evidenced by the gradual recognition that indi-
viduals and nonstate groups can assume a broader set of international obli-
gations. The flipside to this reality is that there should be a corresponding 
increase in their potential liability for wrongdoing. The ILC’s own work has 
opened the door to this possibility. This proposition is also supported by 
myriad factors, including the evolving international legal personality of 
nonstate entities and its implications for international law, the need to iden-
tify alternative targets of liability when a territorial state simply cannot be 
blamed, doctrinal and practical reasons for circumscribing the role and ac-
countability of NSAs on the international plane, etc. On the other hand, con-
siderable obstacles remain in better defining a would-be regime to govern 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to HR. See Human 
Rights Council, Draft Res. 26/. . . U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (June 25, 2014); Human 
Rights Council, Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (July 14, 2014). In fact, the recently 
leaked “zero draft” of the would-be treaty uses legally-binding language regarding civil liabil-
ity. See Human Rights Council, Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Hu-
man Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporation and Other Business Enterprises 
(July 16, 2018), at 2–3, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/
WGTransCorp/Session3/DraftLBI.pdf. But see Ioana Cismas & Sarah Macrory, The Business 
and Human Rights Regime Under International Law: Remedy Without Law?, in NON-STATE 
ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: CREATION, EVOLUTION AND ENFORCEMENT,
supra note 8, at 222 (arguing that, while there is broad agreement that business entities must 
provide reparation for HR violations, the content of primary norms they must observe is ill-
defined and/or absent). Recent scholarly proposals include a call for the creation of an Interna-
tional Court of Civil Justice to handle complex transnational civil disputes to hold multina-
tional corporations liable for causing large-scale harm to persons, their livelihood, and the 
environment in developing countries. See MAYA STEINITZ, THE CASE FOR AN 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF CIVIL JUSTICE (2019).
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the international responsibility of individuals and NSAs, chief among them 
being the lack of definition of relevant primary norms and uncertainty sur-
rounding the mechanics of secondary remedial norms. What is more, recent 
American and European jurisprudence has called into question the existence 
of universal civil jurisdiction, which represents a setback for the develop-
ment of international individual responsibility beyond criminal liability.
Despite this resistance, however, this is a propitious moment for the in-
ternational community to move forward on ICIR. As demonstrated in this 
Article, several key building blocks are already in place. The international 
obligations of individuals and other NSAs can be traced back to several 
UNSC resolutions and treaties. The elaboration of a general ICIR regime 
also makes good policy and legal sense for reasons canvassed above. It 
would not only generate primary normative content but also help better de-
fine the application of secondary norms governing breaches of international 
law authored by individuals and NSAs. Moreover, such a regime would aim 
to palliate the considerable normative and enforcement gaps created by the 
abovementioned jurisprudence on universal civil jurisdiction. The regime’s 
would-be conceptual and theoretical foundations are also defensible when 
framed within the doctrine of international responsibility, broadly under-
stood. As shown above, there is considerable fluidity and malleability in 
transposing and adapting concepts from international responsibility dis-
course (including SR norms) to the universe of NSAs. Granted, this exercise 
is accompanied by a series of caveats, not least the fact that there are im-
portant qualitative differences between states and NSAs that must be ac-
counted for in any ICIR regime.
At the end of the day, we are left with some indication—both in politi-
cal and legal terms, domestically and internationally—that individuals and 
NSAs should not escape responsibility for their wrongdoing. Few would 
quarrel with that basic proposition, at least on an abstract level. Yet, in 
many ways, we are also left with a profoundly deficient international legal 
system to fulfil that objective, both from normative and institutional stand-
points. To many, the UNSC is the deficient institution par excellence. There 
is no debate that it is indeed a profoundly imperfect institution. Neverthe-
less, the practice and precedents analyzed in this account demonstrate that 
international individual responsibility can be actuated, but never in a 
straight line. It is in its nature to take form amidst the interactions occurring 
between a multiplicity of legal regimes, institutional and non-institutional 
actors, and legal and political processes.
Within this multi-leveled framework, the UNSC can play a key role in 
moving the agenda forward. In fact, it already is by legislating international 
obligations that bind individuals and NSAs in the counterterrorism field and 
beyond. Several precedents supporting that conclusion have been explored 
above. The next logical step is to recognize the UNSC’s ability to enforce 
and implement those norms, or other international law duties, against such 
actors in a way that is reconcilable with the essence of international respon-
sibility. Ample practice to that effect has also been reviewed and analyzed 
Winter 2019] International Civil Individual Responsibility 287
in the preceding pages. While these developments might seem abhorrent to 
some international lawyers, they are inescapable facts of international life.
If the broader ideals shared by many remain to fight impunity, instill 
life into the ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims, remedy environmental harm, 
hold the perpetrators and financiers of terrorism accountable, redress HR 
and IHL abuses, and so on, then these developments should be welcome. 
Regional and domestic courts have proven reluctant to perform their share 
of the heavy-lifting on this front, so the international legal system must fill 
the void. As demonstrated above, the UNSC already attributes wrongful 
conduct and assigns responsibility to both states and nonstate entities. It also 
devises and imposes consequences flowing from its findings of responsibil-
ity on those actors, whether in the form of declarations of wrongdoing, sanc-
tions, or other measures. Thus, future efforts would be better spent on defin-
ing the parameters of the framework in which the Council can and should 
play a role in advancing ICIR. Dwelling on its imperfections will not reme-
dy the fact that the appetite for greater accountability on the international 
scene is not always matched by a correspondingly adequate normative or 
institutional arsenal. One step in the right direction is recognizing the Coun-
cil’s limited but sometimes important role in both norm creation and en-
forcement. An equally vital step is to develop robust safeguards and mean-
ingful checks on its powers.
